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Abstract 
This thesis sets out an argument as to the principles which should determine the scope of 
public order crimes. The Preface demonstrates that the definition and scope of public order 
and corresponding public order crimes are arbitrary. In order to arrive at a clear definition of 
public order interests which can be applied in limiting the scope of offences against public 
order, in the first chapter the substantive elements of public order are constructed as 
categories of life convenience, comfort and peace, while the formal publicness is demarcated 
as multiple subjects of an interest as opposed to one specified subject of the interest. 
Taking Feinberg’s moral limits of criminalisation as its starting point, the second chapter 
restates the concepts of ‘harm to others’ and ‘offence to others’ as criminalisation 
frameworks applicable to public order crimes. In order to justify criminalisation, harm 
should be an objective, recognisable, imputable and wrongful setback to a physical interest, 
while offence should be a communicative, imputable and wrongful setback to inner peace 
based on normative sensibilities. Accordingly, harm/offence to the interests of others in 
smooth civil life is the moral basis for forming and shaping rules of criminalising disruptions 
of public order. The third chapter categorises problems of imputing public disorder and 
public offence and approaches these problems by proposing a formal test of substantial risk 
and, if necessary, a substantive test of counterbalancing justification.  
In order to address the problems of public order law in practice, the final two chapters apply 
the principles developed in the thesis to a number of typical public order problems. These 
chapters demonstrate that the valid scope of criminalising typical public order related 
conduct such as disorderly begging, loitering, indecencies and insults can be sensibly 
determined by the argued steps of limiting criminalisation. These two chapters identify some 
categories of truly intrusive and wrongful conduct that correspond to legal interests in 
convenience and comfort and inner peace. 
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Preface 
Public order law has all too often been seen as a matter of expediency or state control, 
without a coherent or underlying rationale. ‘Throughout most of our history, “bad manners” 
crimes have been called crimes against public order. Today, we call them “quality of life” 
crimes. The list of quality of life offences is long…’.1 If the list were consistent and coherent, 
it may be more desirable that it were long and inclusive than short and under-inclusive. 
However, disorder is ‘regulated differently in different countries, and even under different 
names’.2 Even within a single jurisdiction such as England, Scotland or China, as will be 
shown, ‘public order crimes’ is undefined as a concept – chaotic as a category – and 
ambiguous in scope. It performs a residual function, including things that do not fall into 
other categories. It is not clear whether it is and how it can be an independent category of 
crimes.  
This situation should be of concern to and frowned upon by criminal law scholarship. If 
public order law were not organised or rational, it is difficult to limit the arbitrary expansion 
of public order offences, which means the simplification and codification of criminal law 
cannot be completed.3 Secondly, even if individual pieces of legislation and judicial practice 
can avoid categorising an offence as against public order,4 prosecutorial guidance, crime 
statistics and textbooks cannot.5 To fulfil the task of categorisation, public order offences 
should be put on a more consistent and rational basis. More importantly, restrictions on 
personal morality and other forms of social authoritarianism, e.g. restrictions on free speech, 
are often justified in the name of civil peace or public order.6 People’s rights and liberties 
may be arbitrarily infringed if we continue to see public order law as a ‘dumping ground’.  
                                                          
1 Joel Samaha, Criminal Law (10th edn, Wadsworth 2011) 420. 
2 Nina Peršak, ‘Norms, Harms and Disorder at the Border: The Legitimacy of Criminal Law Intervention 
through the Lens of Criminalisaton Theory’ in Nina Peršak (ed), Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, 
Policy and Justice: Norms, Procedures, Outcomes (Ashgate 2014) 22. 
3 See Law Commission, A Draft Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com No 177, 1989); Eric Clive 
and others, (Scottish Law Commission, 2003) 
<www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/5712/8024/7006/cp_criminal_code.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018. 
4 For example, behaving in a threatening or abusive manner in Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 
2010 (s 38) is not explicitly classified as against public order. 
5  See CPS, ‘Public Order Offences incorporating the Charging Standard’ 
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Harassment> accessed 29 May 2018; Office for 
national Statistics, ‘Other Crimes against Society’ 
<www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/20
15-04-23#other-crimes-against-society> accessed 29 May 2018. 
6 See Anthony Bottoms, ‘Civil Peace and Criminalisation’ in R A Duff and others (eds), The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law (OUP 2010) 239. There are a series of provisions protecting ‘public order’ directly or limiting 
2 
 
Then how should we think about public order law? We should stop thinking of it as a catch-
all category of crimes into which every other crime that cannot be put in other categories can 
be dumped. Legal resources are limited. This category of crimes should have its own goal, 
task and scope. Public order law should be dedicated to protecting a unique value for 
people’s life. To justify this position I will, in the following three parts of this Preface, look 
at how the arbitrary scope of public order as a legal interest leads to crimes against public 
order having a chaotic scope – how principled criminalisation can help to establish a clear 
and valid scope of public order crimes – and then outline a progressive structure of the whole 
thesis. 
I. ARBITRARY SCOPE OF PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES 
Before examining the scope of public order crimes, the relationship between individual 
crimes and this category should be examined. That is, how can individual crimes be grouped 
within the same category? It is because they infringe the same kind of interest. The nature 
of a crime is its infringement of or risk to a legal interest.7 The protection of interests is a 
legislative goal. ‘All criminal law aims at protecting the interests of individual, collective or 
public interests, or state interests...’8 The positive classification of crimes in law is based on 
the theoretical classification of legal interests.9 The statement ‘Crimes against X (public 
order)’ is based on the perspective of the protected interest. Crimes against the person and 
crimes against property are enacted to protect individuals’ personal and property interests. 
Crimes against public order should be enacted to protect public order as a protectable interest. 
Without a clear and coherent definition of public order, public order law cannot have a clear 
and unique task and scope. That is, the arbitrary scope of public order leads to public order 
crimes having a somewhat chaotic scope – a prominent feature or aspect of public order 
legislation, justice and interpretative texts.  
In texts, the scope of public order crimes is not consistent or coherent. Blackstone took this 
category to include ‘destruction of any loci, sluice or flood-gate’ and ‘carrying deadly 
weapons’, as well as ‘threatening letters’, ‘spreading false news’ etc., in the chapter ‘offences 
                                                          
civil rights for the sake of ‘public order’ in constitutional laws e.g. European Convention of Human Rights 
and Human Rights Act 1998 or in the constitution of a jurisdiction. 
7 Legal interests are the foundation of criminal law. See Mingkai Zhang, Criminal Law (4th edn, Law Press 
2011) 576-577. They are ‘material and objective’. See CHC 109. 
8 N Jareborg, ‘What Kind of Criminal Law Do We Want?’ in A Snare (ed), Beware of Punishment: On the 
Utility and Futility of Criminal Law (Pax 1995) 21. 
9 See Markus D Dubber, ‘Theories of Crime and Punishment in German Criminal Law’ (2008) 53 AJCL 679, 
684-86. 
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against the public peace’,10 a concept which does not seem to distinguish between public 
safety crimes and public order crimes. The textbook Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis 
places ‘public order offenses’ (chapter 15) on a par with ‘offensive behaviours’ (chapter 16), 
which includes some crimes that are obvious public order crimes such as offensive behaviour 
at a football match.11 Because the book does not clarify the unique value of public order as 
opposed to other legal interests, it provides no clear test for differentiating public order 
crimes from offensive conduct.  
In British legislation, public order crimes are found in a number of different statutes. These 
statutes claim to preserve or maintain public order, but their names, purposes (as set out in 
their long titles) and structures do not explicitly define public order, which means the 
criminal offences they create may not have an organised or rational structure. For example, 
the purpose of the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006 is ‘to make 
further provision about public order and safety’. This long title adds ‘public safety’ to the 
‘public order’ already mentioned in the short title. It is unclear which provisions of the Act 
are public order law and which are not. This problem is even more serious in the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in which it is rare that any provision is obviously public 
order law and the deletion of ‘public order’ from the title would not affect understanding of 
any of the contents of the Act. Other examples are the Public Order Act 1936 and Public 
Order Act 1986, which might lead people to wonder what kind of public order is disrupted 
by the crimes in this ‘public order’ legislation. It is a pity that all these Acts of Parliament 
are said to protect public order, as none of them clarifies what public order is and some of 
them even increase ambiguity. As a result, legislation may arbitrarily or contingently 
complement the public order law with various kinds of crimes. The conduct connected with 
offensive weapons, fireworks, control of sex offenders, obscenity and pornography, political 
uniforms, quasimilitary organisations etc. in this legislation is apparently a public order 
problem,12 but it remains to be seen whether the offences this legislation creates are really 
crimes against public order. 
Decisions of the Scottish courts concerning public order crimes deal mainly with two catch-
all offences (breach of the peace and public indecency), which cause questions to define 
public order and limit public order crimes. Breach of the peace involves a conjunctive test 
                                                          
10 See Bl Comm 632-36. 
11 See Pamela R Ferguson and Claire McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis (2nd edn, Edinburgh 
UP 2014) 397-446. 
12 For example, Public Order Act 1986 is an act to abolish and create ‘offences relating to public order’ ‘and 
for connected purposes’.  
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i.e. we need both that the conduct is likely to cause alarm to ordinary people and that it 
threatens serious disturbance to the community.13 Alarm to an individual person would not 
itself be a breach of the peace. But it is not clear why alarm to an individual person can be 
connected to a disturbance to public order. That is, the relation between these two elements 
of the test is not clear. As a result, the crime may be arbitrarily used to label some conduct 
as being against public order. The Scottish crime of public indecency was created in 2005 to 
replace shameless indecency,14 but its scope is not clear and its relationship to breach of the 
peace is obscure. Public decency is no less abstract and broad a notion than public peace.15 
These two crimes exemplify the potentiality of the arbitrary scope of public order crimes. In 
England, the common law crimes of public nuisance and outraging public decency have been 
reviewed by the Law Commission as part of its work on the simplification of criminal law.16 
The former is ‘endanger[ing] the life, health, property, or comfort of the public or exercise 
or enjoyment of rights common’ to members17 – while the latter is a lewd, obscene or 
disgusting act or display outraging minimum standards of public decency as judged by the 
tribunal of fact.18 Public nuisance no longer includes outraging public decency, but public 
decency as a concept of interest itself is no less obscure than the targeted interests by the 
nuisance. As a result, common law crimes against public order provide opportunities to 
expediently cover multifarious kinds of conduct. 
In prosecution guidelines, ‘the criminal law in respect of public order offences is intended 
to penalize the use of violence and/or intimidation by individuals or groups’.19 This approach 
seems to conflate crimes of violence with those against public order. As a result, ‘public 
order offences’ may be deprived of their unique remit and scope. However, in so far that 
prosecutorial guidance offers advice on how to tackle convergence of public order offences 
and ‘violence against the person’, ‘firearms and offensive weapons’ and ‘criminal damage’, 
this seems to suggest that public order offences are a different group from personal crimes, 
public safety crimes and property crimes. Working under such contradictory guidelines, 
                                                          
13 Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65. 
14 Webster v Dominick 2005 1 JC 65. 
15 It should be clear that breach of the peace is slightly different in English law in Public Order Act 1936, s 5, 
and consider other offenses such as Vagrancy Act 1824 for indecency. 
16 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com CP No 193, 2010); Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and 
Outraging Public Decency (Law Com No 358, 2015). 
17 See R v Rimmington and Regina v Goldstein [2006]1 AC 459. 
18 See R v Hamilton [2008] QB 224. 
19  CPS, ‘Public Order Offences incorporating the Charging Standard’ 
<www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#content> accessed 29 May 2018. 
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individual prosecutors may be unsure whether the alleged conduct is against public order 
and whether they are protecting public order or other values. 
The problem of the arbitrary scope of public order crimes is also apparent in jurisdictions 
other than England and Scotland. It is claimed that public order in Chinese criminal law is 
the orderly and normal status of societal functioning in production, operation, administration 
and daily life etc.20 But, it is still unclear what the particular substances of the ‘status’ are, 
although the claim lists some social areas to ground these substantive contents. This may 
explain why Chinese policing law and criminal law, in inconsistent ways, differentiate public 
order from other interests such as social administration. It can be seen from chapter 3 of the 
policing law that public order is ranked with social administration, which is different from 
the pattern in chapter 6 of the criminal law in which public order is a basic sub-category of 
social administration. These conflicting patterns in the same country may blur the unique 
value, task and scope of public order law. 
II. PRINCIPLED CRIMINALISATION AND VALID PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES 
In this part, I will explain why I will take a normative theorizing approach (criminalisation 
theory broadly; Feinberg in particular) towards the arbitrary scope of public order crimes. 
This normative approach looks at the scope of public order crimes from a starting point 
internal to criminalisation, rather than from the perspective of an outwards approach to 
criminalisation. Admittedly, it is possible and important to take an external socio-legal 
approach toward criminalisation.21 In this way, it can be seen that the reason why public 
order is frequently conflated with policing and public safety/security is that public order 
law/policy may be regarded as one of the ‘particular institutions and practice of regulating’ 
– and as ‘an element of the traditional policing power of good governance’22 – in so far that  
uncivil/disrespectful conduct is a sign of ‘the breakdown of local social order’ and a cause 
of fear of unsafety/insecurity.23 However, any socio-legal inquiry into public order crimes 
would reach conclusioins (regarding the scope of public order offences) developed over time, 
which requires historical and political insights that are beyond the remit of this thesis. More 
                                                          
20 See Bingzi Zhao and Zhiwei Liu, ‘On Basic Problems of Crimes Disrupting Public Order’ (1999) 2 Trib PS 
L 71, 72. 
21 The outward approach to criminalisation is considered by Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal 
Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (OUP 2016).  
22 Lindsay Farmer, ‘Disgust, Respect, and the Criminalisation of Offence’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H Kramer, 
Mark R Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (OUP 2011) 
289. 
23 Ibid 287. 
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importantly, any such social-legal inquiry would be methodologically pragmatic and 
empirical of aiming to be value-neutral – and thus may fail to explain why its findings 
regarding the scope of public order offences might be deemed morally acceptable i.e. how 
the pragmatic regulation by public order law can be morally constrained. 
I would choose a doctrinal approach to the problem of public order law – to morally limit its 
scope. As a starting point: ‘many criminalisation decisions are just and fair because they are 
reconcilable with objective principles of justice such as the harm/bad consequence 
constraint…’24 So, we need to be clear how a theory of criminalisation can principally 
establish a valid and clear range of crimes and how it has been applied to public order crimes. 
It is a long-standing liberal tradition (presuming liberty from interference) that the state 
should competently justify its interference, especially criminalisation – and scholars have 
consistently sought to theoretically systemise criminalisation principles. Mill, in On Liberty, 
commended limiting the legitimate use of coercive power to cases where it is exercised to 
‘prevent harm to others’.25 Packer researches the nature and justification of the criminal 
sanction and the constraints of criminal process. 26  Schonsheck prefers ‘filtering’ (with 
principles filter, presumptions filter and pragmatics filter) to ‘balancing’ as a decision-
making  procedure for justified criminalisation.27 Similarly, Husak looks at how internal and 
external constraints on criminalisation can be derived from current criminal theory.28 All this 
work provides illuminating perspectives and ideas on the limits of criminal law, but none 
offers systematic and substantive criteria to morally limit the whole criminal law.  
In contrast, Feinberg argued for systematic moral limits of criminal law, basing his theory 
on the prevention of harm and serious offence to others while rejecting harm to self and 
harmless wrongdoing as justifications for criminalisation. 29  Feinberg’s work has been 
extensively reviewed,30  and finds counterparts in a number of subsequent monographs. 
                                                          
24 Dennis J Baker, The Right Not to be Criminalised: Democrating Criminal Law’s Authority (Ashgate 2011) 
34. 
25 See J S Mill, On Liberty (John W Parker and Son 1859) 21-22. 
26 See HL Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction (Stanford UP 1968). 
27 See Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalisation: An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law (Springer-
Science +Business Media, B V 1994). 
28 See Douglas Husak, Overcriminalisation: The Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 2008). 
29 See J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol 1: Harm to Others (OUP 1984), vol 2: Offense 
to Others (1985), vol 3: Harm to self (1986), vol 4: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). 
30 There are many book reviews in journals: Robert Amdur, ‘Harm, Offense, and the Limits of Liberty’ (1985) 
98 HLR 1946; John Kleinig, ‘Criminally Harming Others (1986) 5 Crim Just Ethics 3; David A J Richards, 
‘The Moral Foundation of Decriminalisation’ (1986) 5 Crim Just Ethics 11; Joel Feinberg, ‘Harm to 
Others—A Rejoinder’ (1986) 5 Crim Just Ethics 16; Gerald J Postema, ‘Collective Evils, Harms, and the 
Law’ (1987) 97 Ethics 414; Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exaperation: ‘An Examination of Harm to 
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Firstly, Narayan elaborates the offence principle mainly by requiring a good reason for 
offence to be taken.31 Secondly, Baker defends the harm principle as overriding the right not 
to be criminalised/jailed, but replaces the offence principle with the idea of conventional 
objectivity of morality.32 More impressively, Simester and von Hirsch uphold the harm 
principle and subsume the offence principle into the harm principle: ‘significant levels of 
harm and/or offence’ to others being ‘a prima facie positive case for state prohibition’.33 In 
sum, a wrong based on harm and/or offence to others is a prerequisite for creating a criminal 
offence. So, in the area of public order the argument of criminalisation should focus on how 
the harm and/or offence to others will be caused or risked by the conduct. 
However, ‘public order remains a neglected part of the criminal law.’34 This observation is 
also correct in other jurisdictions. Many criminal law textbooks pay scant attention to public 
order crimes, merely analysing crimes against the person and property. Substantively, ‘the 
application of the criminalisation theory to the area of disorder or incivilities is particularly 
lacking’.35 Certainly scholars have researched the criminalisation of specific public order 
crimes such as begging or breach of the peace 36  – and some of this work does apply 
criminalisation theory. Invariably, only one specific public order crime will be considered. 
More importantly, applications do not follow from systematical research into principles of 
criminalisation. This is problematic because ‘discussions of particular cases and issues are 
never shown to be fully satisfactory until the general framework of which they are a part is 
articulated and examined’.37 Notably, there has been an interdisciplinary approach to a 
                                                          
Others and Offense to Others’ (1986) 84 Mich L Rev 700; Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Feinberg on Harm, 
Offense, and the Criminal Law: A Review Essay’ (1986) 15 Phil & Pub Aff 381; Larry Alexander, ‘Harm, 
Offense, and Morality’ (1994) 7 CJLJ 199; R A Duff, ‘Harms and Wrongs’ (2011) 5 Buff Crim LR 13; 
Hamish Stewart, ‘Harms, Wrongs, and Set-backs in Feinberg’s Moral limits of the Criminal Law’ (2011) 5 
Buff Crim LR 47. Besides, Persak analyzes the harm principle and its continental perspective. See Nina 
Persak, Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, its Limits and Continental Counterparts 
(Springer 2007). Similarly, impressive differences between German and Australian criminalisation theories 
are introduced by Carl Constantin Lauterwein, The Limits of Criminal Law: A Comparative Analysis of 
Approaches to Legal Theorizing (Ashgate 2010). 
31  See Uma Narayan, ‘Offensive Conduct: What Is It and When May We Legally Regulate It?’ (PhD 
dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 1990). 
32 See Dennis J Baker, The Right Not to be Criminalised: Democrating Criminal Law’s Authority (Ashgate 
2011). 
33 A P Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(OUP 2011) 189. 
34 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters 2010) 868. 
35 Nina Peršak, Norms, ‘Harms and Disorder at the Border: The Legitimacy of Criminal Law Intervention 
through the Lens of Criminalisation Theory’ in Nina Peršak ed, Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal law, 
Policy and Justice: Norms, Procedures, Outcomes (Ashgate 2014) 29. 
36  See Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for 
Criminalising Begging’ (2009) 73 J Crim L 212; P R Ferguson, ‘Breach of the Peace and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2001) 5 Edin L R 145; C Stephen, ‘Recapturing the essence of breach of 
the peace: Harris v HM Advocate’ (2010) 1 JR 15. 
37 J D Hodson, The Ethics of Legal Coercion (D Reidel Publishing Company 1983) 151. 
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criminalisation principle in this area: Incivilities38 – an edited collection, which examines 
the application of the offence principle to offensive conduct that affects quality of life. But, 
it does not systematise the application of the offence principle. It is merely a compilation of 
individual authors’ subjective perspectives. As such, it lacks a consistent and coherent 
articulation of the offence principle and its application to offensive conduct. More helpfully, 
Ferguson analyses criminalisation through the medium of a ‘catch all’ common law crime 
of breach of the peace, including an application of principles of criminalisation.39 However, 
there is no systematic application of a criminalisation theory throughout Ferguson’s text; 
otherwise, it would be a useful example of how the scope of public order crimes in the law 
should be determined.40 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
I will offer a holistic theory of legal interests and criminal ‘evils’ –comprised of harm and 
offence – to consistently and coherently limit criminalisation in the domain of public order. 
Starting with a clarification of public order as a protectable interest based on an examination 
of Feinberg’s theory of interests (chapter 1), this thesis will subscribe to the ‘harm’ principle 
and ‘offence’ principle and aim to restate and elaborate the notions of ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ 
in the criminalisation of conduct against public order (chapters 2-3). In order to delimit the 
scope of public order crimes, the notions restated will then be systematically (chapters 4-5) 
applied to public disorder and to offensive conduct.  
Firstly, the scope of public order as legal interests should directly limit the scope of crimes 
against public order. Therefore, the definition of public order as a protectable interest is the 
basis of further research into the criminalisation of conduct against public order. In 
examining public order as a protectable interest in criminal law, I will firstly argue that public 
order is an interest – then that it is protectable – and finally that its specific categories can 
be enumerated. First, order in a general sense can be narrowed, from particular sociological 
and theoretical perspectives, to be a special kind of order such as life order. This life interest 
can be confirmed as public order interest because public order laws protect life convenience, 
comfort and peace. Secondly, I will argue that public order is not a collective interest of a 
                                                          
38 See Andrew von Hirsch and AP Simester eds, Incivilities: Regulating Offensive Behaviour (Hart Publishing, 
2006). 
39 See Pamela R Ferguson, Breach of the Peace (Edinburgh UP 2013) ch 5. 
40 In comparison, there are critically analyses of the criminalisation of almost all public order offences (ch 15) 
and offensive behaviors (ch 16) in Pamela R Ferguson and Claire McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law: A 
Critical Analysis (2nd edn, Edinburgh UP 2014), while it still failing to apply the harm principle and/or the 
offence principle systematically. 
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community or a society, but individuals’ interests in some special contexts and that these 
interests are not too trivial as to be protectable. Lastly, I will argue for specific categories of 
public order interest. After delimiting public order, the whole research object of the thesis 
(crimes against public order) is basically determinate.  
After identifying interests in public order, I will look at when it is legitimate to consider 
criminalisation to protect those interests. I will argue that the notions of ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ 
should be restated as two workable conceptual frameworks of criminalising conduct against 
public order. Firstly, all types of harm could potentially be claimed as setbacks of interests 
to justify criminalisation when the notion of harm is ambiguous.41 But I will argue that the 
principle requires determinate constituents to filter candidate conducts for criminalisation, 
which means not all kinds of disruptions of order are ‘harm’. Similarly, ‘too much legal 
commentary purports to evaluate something called “the offence principle” without first 
clarifying the nature of offence itself [as “the central term in the inquiry”].’ 42  After 
articulating the offended interest, the offending mechanism and the normative wrongfulness, 
offence in the offence principle, which initiates the consideration of criminalisation can be 
specifically demarcated. 
Thirdly, fair imputation should be valued in determining the valid scope of public order 
crimes. A setback to a public order interest, either harm or offence, may be normatively ‘too 
remote and accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or on 
the gravity of his offence’43 – or its risk may not be normatively linked or associated with 
the conduct. Feinberg, according to ‘the probability of harm’, analyses abnormal risk and 
abstract risk in the conduct itself,44 and then some remote harm.45 Rather than providing 
exact answers, I will offer a systematic identification of three kinds of imputation problems 
in public order crimes – particularly how offence (as the other kind of setback to interests 
than harm) affects the whole picture of imputation of disruptions of public order – and 
suggest a flexible application of a general approach to these kinds of imputation problems.  
                                                          
41 See Steven D Smith, ‘Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?’ (2006) 51 Am J Juris 1, 14-20; CHC 49, 77. 
42 Douglas Husak, ‘Disgust: Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB, 94. 
43  American Law Institute: Model Penal Code (1985), ss 2.03(2)(b) and (3)(b) 
<www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/UnitedStatesofAmerica/Model%20Penal%20Code%20United%20States%20of%20America%2019
62.pdf>accessed 29 May 2018. 
44 See J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol 1: Harm to Others (OUP 1984) 192-206. 
45 Ibid Ch 6. 
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The purpose of chapter 4 will be to clarify trends and problems from criminalising begging 
and loitering, which cause public place disorder problems, and to consistently identify 
wrongful harms from the perspective of the restated notion of ‘harm’, principally unjustified 
disruption of the normal use of public places. I will firstly summarise and review the selected 
jurisdictions’ legal approaches to criminalising begging and loitering, rebut claimed harms 
and/or risks, identify real harms, and lastly demonstrate the valid scope of criminalising 
begging and loitering by balancing conflicting interests and thus identifying the 
wrongfulness of real harms. The examination of harms of focused offences exemplifies how 
the scope of public order crimes can be reasonably be determined by a consistent 
criminalisation principle. 
As well as public disorder, some offensive conduct involves a serious breach of inner peace 
and calls for the application of a restated notion of offence. Firstly, a consistent classification 
of offence into threats, indecencies and insults will be posited by a critical review of typical 
theoretical and practical categorisation. More importantly, the principle will be progressively 
applied to cases of indecencies and insults to determine the valid scope of criminalisation of 
them. I will look at what kind of serious offence is caused/risked and how to balance the 
reasonableness of the offensive conduct. In doing so, we can ascertain how and to what 
extent the restated offence principle can explain and criticise the status quo of public order 
law. 
Finally, the conclusion of this thesis summarises the scope of public order crimes and reflects 
on the hierarchical limits of criminalisation. It will summarise what public order law looks 
like and how this version compares with what I have criticised in the Preface. It will also 
summarise how the criminalisation of disruptions of public order has been structurally 
limited in four hierarchical steps and will explain how this structural framework has 
advantages over others.  
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Chapter 1 Public Order as a Protectable Interest 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The definition and scope of public order as a protectable interest in criminal law is the 
starting point for my argument. Generally, criminalisation theory begins by identifying 
protectable interests. It looks for the ‘interest’ or ‘good’ to be protected – such as bodily 
integrity or property rights in the cases of offences against the person or property – before 
considering how this might be harmed or wronged. The reason for this approach is that 
‘prerequisites for criminal liability’ ‘include interference with … interests’.46 This premise 
of protectable interests has been commended in criminalisation research. A typical example 
is found in the first volume of Feinberg’s The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, ‘Harm to 
Others’, which starts by constructing a network of protectable interests. 47  Specifically, 
Feinberg identifies offence categories by the assignation of particular offences to particular 
interests. The definition and scope of crimes against public order, whether in legislation or 
textbooks, depends firstly on the definition and scope of public order, identified as a relevant 
interest. If the definition and scope of public order were unclear, there can be no achievable 
consensus on whether the category of ‘crimes against public order’ should include or exclude 
a specific crime. It follows that an appropriate starting point for the existence of an organised 
or rational public order law must be to address the question of whether public order can be 
perceived as a protectable interest. 
However, there is little existing work clarifying the definition and scope of public order as a 
protectable interest. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law avoids developing a rigorous 
definition of public order as a protectable interest. Although some texts do incorporate a 
chapter on crimes against public order, they do not discuss what public order is, but proceed 
directly to discuss specific public order crimes. Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis does 
raise the question: ‘What is the comparable value in public order?’ (compared to that in other 
                                                          
46 See Markus D Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code (OUP 2015) 22. 
47 See HTO Ch 1. 
12 
 
interests), but without offering an answer.48 Other notable contemporary texts such as Smith 
and Hogan’s Criminal Law do not even mention this issue.49  
This chapter will look at the definition and scope of public order as a protectable interest: 
whether it is possible to identify something called ‘public order’ – and, if so, what this is 
comprised of – whether this should be understood as a protectable interest for the purpose 
of criminal law – and finally, what the specific categories of public order are. Firstly, I will 
look at how public order can be understood as an interest in terms of existing theories of 
legal interests and relevant laws. My proposition will be that the elements of public order 
are life convenience, comfort and peace. I will then further consider public order as either a 
collective interest or interest of individuals – and if it were the latter, how it can be deemed 
sufficiently serious to be protectable. I will clarify the test of publicness as that of multiple 
subjects of an interest – as opposed to one specified person in private. Finally, after 
determining the two basic dimensions of public order, I will argue that there are six core 
elements to public order. 
II. PUBLIC ORDER AS AN INTEREST 
After considering certain theoretical issues, I will argue that it is possible to identify public 
order as a special kind of order interest – and that the core elements of this interest can be 
identified from theoretical, social and legal perspectives.   
(i) The Meaning of Public Order 
What kind of order is public order? Considering the notion of order itself may be helpful to 
define public order as a special kind of order. Order as a sociological concept is described 
as a ‘secure and happy condition’. 50  Without perceived regularities, patterning or 
association, there is randomness or chaos. 51  Similarly, in criminology, order is ‘the 
operations of society and the ability of people to function efficiently’.52  
                                                          
48 SCL 397. 
49 See David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 1227. See also 
ATH Smith, The Offences against Public Order: including the Public Order Act 1986 (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1987); Peter Thornton, Public Order Law: including the Public Order Act 1986 (Financial Training, 1987). 
50 Dennis H Wrong, The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society (Harvard UP, 1995) 12. 
51 Ibid, 11. 
52 See Larry J Siegel, Criminology: Theories, Patterns, & Typologies (10th edn, Wadsworth Publishing 2010) 
426. 
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With this notion of order in mind, public order, as one law dictionary suggests, might be ‘the 
smooth running of orderly society’.53 It has also been defined as the state of peaceful co-
existence and quiet living among members of the general public,54 without which there is a 
breach of the (king’s) peace (‘royal authority and the structure of the state’).55 Public order 
in criminal law would be the ideal state of ‘preventing crime and enforcing that law’.56  
But these explanations are too abstract and broad and actually refer to ‘social order’ in a 
general sense. On one view, every crime interferes with the smooth running of orderly 
society – it is undeniable that single crimes against the person, such as murder, or crimes 
against property, such as theft or robbery, are disruptions against the operations of society 
and the ability of people to function efficiently. The problem, therefore, with the above 
definitions of public order is that they cannot substantively differentiate between public 
order in criminalisation and (social) order in its more general sense. Lacking substantive 
content or internal categorisation, they cannot define and limit the scope of crimes against 
public order.  
An alternative approach is suggested by Farmer’s differentiation of civil order from order. 
In so far that order can be viewed from a particular perspective, Farmer argues that 
criminalisation can be seen as an institutional tool for securing civil order.57 Following this 
approach, might we narrow order from another particular perspective to public order, in 
order to facilitate the understanding of crimes against public order in criminalisation? If so, 
this is a different dimension of the same sort of argument as Farmer’s. There is order in 
general sense of things being orderly and tranquil – and from that we may identify public 
order as a special kind of order.  
Farmer’s account of civil order is socio-legal. Socio-legal civil order resonates with a 
sociological account, which values the institutional environment of a society. Since 
sociology looks at ‘social organisms and systems’,58 the determination of civil order in law 
may be drawn from a sociology of social organisms and systems. Given that public order is 
claimed to be ‘stability and peace of life’,59 the perspective to identify public order interests 
                                                          
53 Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A Martin (eds), A Dictionary of Law (7th edn, OUP 2009) 378. 
54 See David M Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (OUP 1980) 1015. 
55 John Bellamy, Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973) 
1. 
56 Part of the long title of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
57 See MMCL ch 2. 
58 P Sztompka, ‘The Focus on Everyday Life: A New Turn in Sociology’ (2008) 16 Eur Rev 1, 1. 
59 See Mingkai Zhang, Criminal Law (4th edn, Law Press 2011) 603. 
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in law may be drawn from another sociological school. It is worth noting that the prevailing 
ethos in contemporary sociology, rather than merely focusing on institutional elements of a 
society, has turned to focus on everyday life.60 Then, can we identify a special kind of order 
(stability and peace) in everyday life and confirm this special order as public order? In the 
following section I argue that the turn to respect everyday life situations and factors in 
contemporary sociology provides a special perspective, which can help us identify a special 
kind of social order as public order.  
(ii) Public Order as a Special Kind of Interest 
This section will set out how a public order interest can be derived from a special perspective 
of everyday life. Firstly, it will review theories of legal interests from the perspective of 
everyday life in order to differentiate between safety interests for basic living and a special 
kind of order interest in everyday life. To confirm the hypothesis that this life order should 
be seen as public order, it will then identify the key elements of public order as life 
convenience, comfort and peace, by excluding safety interests from the interests protected 
in English public order laws. 
a. Distinguishing Special Order from Safety Interests 
To identify public order interests, Feinberg’s theory of interests offers a credible starting 
point because he has considered interests in general and identified specific forms. For 
Feinberg, an interest which is protected by law should be a realistic and stable condition 
based on people’s wants and be instrumental in attaining ultimate and ulterior life goals.61 
He argues that welfare interests – such as minimum health, resources, assets and political 
liberty – are minimal, non-trivial and non-momentary conditions of well-being. 62 
Accordingly, he identifies welfare interests as central protectable interests. 
However, Feinberg’s approach omits the identification of interests in everyday life. He 
argues that instrumental wants such as exercising or working late ‘are means to the 
advancement of more general, stable, and permanent goals like health and financial 
sufficiency in which we certainly do have an interest’.63 However, some may exercise or 
                                                          
60 See P Sztompka, ‘The Focus on Everyday Life: A New Turn in Sociology’ (2008) 16 Eur Rev 1, 3. 
61 See HTO 37-45. 
62 Ibid 37, 57-59. 
63 Ibid 57. 
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work late for not necessarily physical or financial reason, but to kill time or to get pleasure 
or for any other everyday aims. These everyday multifarious wants are not inherently 
instrumental to minimum interests such as health or property, but are ends in themselves 
being the components of everyday life. Everyday life consists of activities which individual 
members of a society do for the continuation or improvement of their own lives: sport, study, 
working, leisure, amusement, worship, traffic, religion, politics, etc.64 Everyday life has its 
own meaning and is itself worth maintaining. A person’s humanity does not manifest itself 
merely in their existence from a mainly bodily perspective (which can be maintained by 
welfare interests for basic living); it mainly lies in their everyday life, which ‘paints a more 
realistic picture of the human condition’.65 Every person needs a kind of life order every day 
– and ‘smooth life’ can be literally understood as where relevant life activities progressing 
comfortably, free of problems, troubles, stresses and disruptions.  
This sociological difference between bodily existence and everyday life can be considered 
psychologically. Maslow’s theory of the hierarchical needs of humans suggests that once 
primitive and basic, physiological needs and safety needs are met, people then pursue high-
level needs to actualise their full potential.66 Low-level needs are mainly met by minimum 
welfare conditions, while high-end goals are additionally dependent on other conditions such 
as life order. People firstly need personal safety and property safety – preconditions without 
which they cannot exist, let alone conduct meaningful life. High-level needs can only be 
realised in conducting life – and life entails smooth use or enjoyment of life conditions. 
These further conditions are ‘flesh on the bone’, which renders the bodily existence 
meaningful. 
Therefore, other interests to be identified should include order interests, which are 
instrumental to the smooth life. Feinberg’s theory of interests only constructs welfare 
interests as protectable interests for minimum living, failing to identify generalised 
conditions for smooth life. This new sphere of life order interests in legal theory has not only 
a basis in sociology and psychology, but can be supported by Chinese scholars’ theory of 
legal interests. This approach to legal interests differentiates safety from order in its narrow 
sense by the test of whether the interest concerns basic living. Basic living firstly relies on 
natural living interests, which are mainly individual safety interests: personal living interests 
                                                          
64 See P Sztompka, ‘The Focus on Everyday Life: A New Turn in Sociology’ (2008) 16 Eur Rev 1, 9 & 11. 
65 Ibid 3. 
66 See A H Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’ (1943) 50 Psyc Rev 370. 
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of e.g. life, health, bodily integrity and material living interests. 67  In this sense, safety 
interests do not include special order interests that do not directly concern basic living, such 
as the internal teaching order of an institution – or the order in a general public place like 
streets – or the order in social administration areas such as border control.68 Chinese criminal 
law and policing law both have separate (sub-)chapters on public order, economic order, and 
social administration order – and separate (sub-)chapters on personal safety, property safety 
and public safety. 69  These structural arrangements confirm this categorical difference 
between safety interests and order interests.  
The identification of life order interests also accords with the everyday focus of the police. 
Policing in Chinese is called Gong An (public An). The main function of policing is to 
administrate ‘An’ – that is, ‘social order of stability and peace’.70 ‘An’ is thus the legal 
interest in the policing law. But ‘stability and peace’ themselves are still too abstract a 
concept for practical application. They need to be specified. As an object for the police to 
protect, ‘An’ in its literal sense mainly refers to three categories of interests.71 Firstly, ‘An 
Quan’: safety without endangerment to the person or property of the public or an individual. 
This is indeed a problem of safety rather than public order. Secondly, ‘An Wen’: stability of 
life conditions without inconvenience, discomfort or disruptions. Thirdly, ‘An Xin’: inner 
peace without unreasonable annoyance, alarm, distress etc. The last two are life order 
interests. Disorderly conduct mainly resonates with the ‘An’ dimensions of stability and 
inner peace. Similarly, in modern Western policing, ‘the idea that the management of minor 
offenses and disorderly behaviors is an essential function of public police has become well 
                                                          
67  See Sixin Liu and Zili Guo, ‘What Are Legal Interests: Explanations of Legal Sociology and Legal 
Economics’ (2008) 6 Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Science) 103, 105-06. Natural 
living interests are safety interests of individuals, but when they are brought into public life, whether general 
(i.e. general public places) or specialised (e.g. in a factory or bank), private safety interests become public 
interests in safety (107).  
68 Ibid 107.  
69  Chs 1-5 of Chinese Criminal law respectively prescribe crimes against national safety, public safety, 
economic order, personal rights and civil rights, property, while ch 6 ‘crimes against social administration 
order’ includes subchapter 1 (‘crimes against public order’) and other subchapters (crimes against 
administrating justice, border control, cultural relics, public hygiene, environmental resources, drugs, 
prostitution, pornography). In this sense, subchapter 1 (‘crimes against public order’) not only protect 
specialised public order, but also includes some crimes against social administration that cannot be properly 
categorized into other subchapters in ch 6 (similar to the Public Order Act 1936, ss 1-2). Chinese policing 
law has four parts: maintaining public order, protecting public safety, protecting personal and property rights 
and protecting social administration. This law separates public order from social administration, making it 
specialised. 
70 See Modern Chinese Dictionary (6th edn, Shangwu Press 2005) 1758.  
71 Ibid 1758ff. 
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established since the 1980s’.72 Enormous policing resources are put into cases of life order.73 
For example, for the purposes of Part 2 (‘Complaints and Misconduct’) of the Police Reform 
Act 2002, ‘a person is adversely affected if he suffers any form of loss or damage, distress 
or inconvenience…’.74 This means that ‘any form’ of distress or inconvenience is qualified 
as being a legitimate subject of complaint and worthy of investigation. The heart of disorder 
policing is to define and regulate the fair use of a public place enumerated by quality of life 
standards.75 This policing focus resonates with the contemporary notion of everyday life in 
sociology. 
However, although we have here limited life order interests to stability of life conditions and 
inner peace, we still do not know what kind of interest public order is. We cannot just assume 
that these life order interests are synonymous with the public order interest we are 
identifying. Legal practice might help to refine an account of interests. I will use public order 
law to help refine the theoretical argument of public order interests – to confirm the 
hypothesis that public order is the special order for smooth life. If public order laws do 
protect life order interests, then we can argue that these life order interests are the core 
elements of public order interest in law.  
b. Examining Existing Laws and Confirming Life Order Interests as Public Order  
As will be shown, English public order laws relate closely to safety interests, although they 
also reveal or summarise infringements of public order. Therefore, we can identify interests 
protected by ‘public order’ laws and then exclude safety interests from them, before 
confirming the remaining interests (in life convenience, comfort and peace) as the key 
elements of public order.  
Firstly, public nuisance is commonly recognised as a typical example of a crime against 
public order.76 It can be reagarded as a persuasive example illustrating the interests, which 
                                                          
72 James J Wills, ‘A Recent History of the Police’ in Michael D Reisig and Robert J Kane (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Police and Policing (OUP 2014) 12. 
73 David Thacher, ‘Order Maintenance Policing’ in Michael D Reisig and Robert J Kane (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Police and Policing (OUP 2014) 135.  
74 Police Reform Act 2002, s 29(5) (emphasis added). 
75 David Thacher, ‘Order Maintenance Policing’ in Michael D Reisig and Robert J Kane (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Police and Policing (OUP 2014) 122-23. Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, 
s 59, provides the power to make a public space protection order to prevent activities from affecting ‘quality 
of life’, and s 43 gives the power to issue a community protection notice to prevent a conduct from being 
detrimental to the ‘quality of life’. 
76 It is a common law offence classified as mainly against public order, see David Ormerod and Karl Laird, 
Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) ch 32; David Ormerod and others, Blackstone’s 
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public order laws protect. In a landmark decision, public nuisance was described as an 
offence ‘endanger[ing] the life, health, property, or comfort of the public or exercise or 
enjoyment of rights common’ to members of the public.77 Life, health and property are safety 
interests categorically concerning living safety while other interests of ‘comfort’ and ‘rights’ 
seem to be public order interests.78 However, it is not clear precisely what kinds of ‘comfort’ 
or ‘right’ are envisaged here.  
Specific interests may be inferred from the potential statutory form of public nuisance as 
proposed in a 2015 Law Commission report. It was suggested that in a statutory offence of 
‘public nuisance’, ‘serious nuisance’ should be defined as including ‘serious harm’, as well 
as ‘obstruction’ ‘in the exercise or enjoyment of rights’: – specifically, ‘(1) death, personal 
injury or disease; (2) loss or damage to property; or (3) serious distress, annoyance, 
inconvenience or loss of amenity; or [where someone] is put at risk of suffering any of these 
things’.79 Factors (1) and (2) refer to safety interests: – viz. (1) personal safety: life, body 
integrity and health interests; and (2) property safety. Then, after excluding safety interests, 
consideration would be given to what interests are protected as public order interests in (3).80 
Before drawing any conclusion as to defining public order interests from this suggested list, 
we may need to consider the preexisting body of public order statutory law.  
The Public Order Act 1936 and the Public Order Act 1986 also protect public safety interests 
and other interests – most obviously, public order. In POA 1936, the then section 4 which 
                                                          
Criminal Practice 2016 (OUP 2015) 664. For legislative reports, see Law Commission, Simplification of 
Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law Com CP No 193, 2010); Law 
Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law Com 
No 358, 2015). 
77 See R v Rimmington; Regina v Goldstein [2006] 1 AC 459 in which it was held that ‘exercise’ means 
convenient use as distinct from comfortable enjoyment. Similarly, statutory public nuisance protects ‘the 
peaceful passage through, or enjoyment of, a public place by a member of the public’, under reference to 
the Summary Offence Act 2005 (Queensland), s 6. 
78 Inferences from British textbooks support this conceptual difference between safety interests and public 
order: – considers treating public order as something different from personal and property safety. For 
example, SCL considers public order offences focus on tranquility, free from the offensive and especially 
the inconvenient, rarely harmful to personal safety or property safety (SCL 397-98). Similarly, in a standard 
England textbook, offences against personal and property safety are analyzed before and independently of 
‘offences against public order’ – David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th 
edn, OUP 2015). 
79 Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law 
Com No 358, 2015) para 4.3. Obstructing the exercise or enjoyment of rights is a kind of inconvenience or 
loss of amenity in item (3) and thus there is no need to list obstruction separately. 
80 The common law crime of public nuisance is argued to be replaced by ‘a general offence of doing anything 
which creates a major hazard to the physical safety or health of the public’ – J R Spencer, ‘Public Nuisance—
A Critical Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55, 83-84. In this way, public nuisance is not a crime against public 
order but against public safety. The Canadian Criminal Code, s 108, defines common nuisance similarly, 
limiting it to living safety interests. In New Zealand ‘criminal nuisance’ (Crimes Act 1961, s 145) is 
analogous. 
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prohibited offensive weapons at public meetings and processions was preliminarily 
concerned with public safety, while section 5, which prohibited offensive conduct conducive 
to breaches of the peace, was concerned with public order.81 The new offences created in 
Part I of POA 1986 address harassment, alarm and distress – conduct which is directed 
against an order interest (life peace) – while part 2 regulates on processions and assemblies 
to prevent ‘serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruptions to the 
life of the community’, which engage both safety interests and public order interests.82  
Among all the above listed setbacks to public order, the concepts of alarm, distress and 
annoyance seem to be specific inner states militating against smooth life while obstruction, 
inconvenience, discomfort, loss of amenity, breach of the peace, harassment, disorder and 
disruption can be characterised as external setbacks to smooth life. Arguably, the notion of 
inconvenience should render it difficult or even impossible to use a life condition, including 
obstruction. For example, the notice ‘out of order/use, sorry for the inconvenience’. The 
notion of discomfort or loss of amenity should worsen the effect of the use of the life 
condition. Meanwhile, breach/disruption of life peace by distress, alarm, harassment, 
disorder – disturbs the original stable state, entailing active interference from external 
factors. 
From the above lists of setbacks in public nuisance and public order acts, key elements of 
protected public order interests can be properly categorised into three types of conditions of 
smooth life: life peace; life convenience (in use); and life amenity/comfort (in enjoyment). 
These life conditions are general conditions e.g. the use of public places and public facilities 
for an individual to conduct his life smoothly i.e. relevant life activities progressing 
conveniently and comfortably, free of disruptions. The first element of public order interest 
is convenience, i.e. availability and suitability of use of a life condition. A further element is 
amenity/comfort, i.e. pleasantness resulting from an agreeable life condition, which is a 
                                                          
81  The purpose of ss 1-2 prohibiting ‘uniforms in connection with political objects’ and ‘quasi-military 
organisations’ is to protect multifarious social administration order, which is different from specialised 
public order. See the Chinese theory and legislation of interests in the last subsection.  
82 Parts 3 and 3A seem to protect groups of people from hatred. This will be discussed in terms of not being a 
problem of a collective interest of the community (III(ii)a), but a problem of inner peace of the public 
(IV(ii)a).  
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matter of degree of satisfaction of the access/use.83 Another one is to keep and enjoy external 
and inner peace.84  
In summary, the substantive meaning of public order as an interest is not welfare interests in 
the sense of basic living safety, but convenience, comfort and peace conditions for smooth 
life, which are identifiable from sociological, psychological, theoretical, policing and legal 
perspectives. 
III. PUBLICNESS AND PROTECTABILITY OF PUBLIC ORDER INTERESTS 
Now that public order has been preliminarily defined as life order interests whose key 
elements are life convenience, comfort and peace, two further questions should be 
considered. Firstly, can public order interests be understood not as interests of individuals 
(i.e. life being convenient, comfortable or peaceful), but as separate collective interests of 
the community? Secondly, if public order were really an interest of individuals, how can it 
be serious enough to warrant protection? That is, if the posited public order interests in life 
convenience, comfort and peace are interests of individuals, are they too trivial to justify 
protection by the criminal law? 
(i) Collective Interests or Interests of Individuals 
Can we understand public order as conditions of the community? For example, the Law 
Commission’s proposed framework of statutory public nuisance offence refers to conduct, 
which harms ‘members of the general public or a section of it’ – or obstructs ‘the public or 
a section of it in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to the public at large’.85 Should 
public order consist of interests ‘common to the public at large’ or ‘a section of it’, e.g. 
collective interests of the community that are apparently protectable? To take another 
example, Parts 3 and 3A of POA 1986 protect groups of people from hatred. Does the law 
                                                          
83 In this sense, the wording ‘convenience’ and ‘amenity’ in the report seem more precise respectively than 
‘exercise of rights’ and ‘comfort’/ ‘enjoyment of rights’ in the decision. The 2015 report thinks ‘comfort’ is 
wide and vague in everyday speech and even includes trivial pleasure. Law Commission, Simplification of 
Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law Com No 358, 2015) para 3.43. But in 
my thesis, plain language is preferred thus comfort and amenity are not strictly differentiated, but inter-
changeable – viz. comfort means amenity. 
84 Judging from the result targeted, three other common law crimes against public order disrupt inner peace: 
outraging public decency in England; and breach of the peace and public indecency in Scotland. See further 
on public inner peace as a specific category of public order in this chapter (IV(ii)), the concept of offence to 
others in next chapter (III) and offensive indecency and insult in chapter 5.  
85 Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law 
Com No 358, 2015) para 3.48. 
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protect a collective interest such as mutual cooperation or civility? This section argues that 
public order consists not of collective interests, but of the aggregated interests of individuals 
in some cases.  
a. Not Collective Interests 
The publicness of an interest/crime is a complex and profound question. Duff understands 
crimes as public wrongs, which require a response by the community.86 This is to understand 
all crimes from a political perspective, proposing public wrong as a requirement for calling 
a citizen to answer for a criminal offence.87 We should perceive the problem of public 
wrongs as the nature of crimes, and either public harm to the interests of the community or 
public wrong committed against the community is ‘mistaken in locating the nature of crime 
in wrongs done to the public’ – crimes ‘are public wrongs in the sense that they are wrongs 
that the community is responsible for punishing, but not necessarily wrongs against the 
public itself’.88 In short, the concept of a public wrong does not refer to public harm to an 
interest of society or the community. It does not understand a specific category of crimes 
from the perspective of the subject of the concerned interest. 
Duff’s approach reminds us that there may be a general interest or common good that cannot 
be reduced to interests of individuals. For certain crimes, the subject of the interests in 
question may be seen as the community. There are multifarious collective interests identified 
in offences of hatred (including Holocaust denial in other countries than the UK). In the 
preamble of the New York Hate Crimes Act of 2000, the legislature finds the identified harm 
and its severity to be sufficient to justify criminalisation, by ‘…tear[ing] at the very fabric 
of free society’, disrupting ‘entire communities and vitiat[ing] the civility that is essential to 
healthy democratic processes’.89 Similarly, in the German Criminal Code, holocaust denial 
or minimisation is criminalised because of the risk of ‘disturbing the public peace’.90 ‘The 
public peace’, as well as its trust and sense, is theoretically understood as general security.91 
The then legislative intention was to prevent ‘the poisoning of the political climate by the 
                                                          
86 See R A Duff, Answering for Crime, Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2007). 
87 See Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘A Critical Reading of R A Duff, Answering for Crime’ (2010) 31 Adel L Rev 47, 
47. 
88 See Grant Lamond, ‘What is a Crime?’ (2007) 4 OJLS 609, 609 (emphasis added). 
89 See NY Penal Law, s 485.00. 
90  s 130(3). See Michael Nohlander, The German Criminal Code: A Modern English Translation (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 115. 
91 See T Hörnle, ‘Offensive Behavior and German Penal Law’ (2001) 5 Buff Crim L Rev 255, 256. 
22 
 
playing down of the violent and arbitrary rule of National Socialism’.92 In specific justice, 
‘the public peace’ may include ‘the flourishing mutual cooperation between Jews and other 
groups in the population and … Jews in their feeling of security and in their trust in 
protection by the law’.93  
However, recognising these collective interests is problematic. General security and mutual 
cooperation is ‘pointless’ when every single crime violates them, while psychological trust 
in law and the sense of general security are too abstract and hollow to be objectively 
measured (such claims tend to be merely subjective).94 It will be argued in the next chapter 
(II(ii)b), that so-called collective interests of the community are not protectable because their 
setbacks cannot be recognised consistently. The same is true of the ‘fabric’ or ‘civility’ of 
the community.  
Moreover, it is notable that Feinberg denies the existence of a ‘large super-person [‘the 
public’] with super-interests of his own’.95 ‘A community is an assemblage of individuals 
with interdependent interests in the preservation and enhancement of their common 
possessions [collective interests] taken as an end itself’.96 Some individuals believe that they, 
as a community, have ‘a personal stake in the preservation of [their] community traditions’ 
[collective interests].97 They conceive collective interests, such as abstract civility of the 
community, in a vicarious stake way:98 You and I are members of this community and I 
think that it is in your and my interest to preserve this community tradition or symbol. To 
preserve the community traditions at the cost of others’ interests is to treat other people as 
means, or rather, as elements of one’s own environment. 99  In short, the concept of a 
collective interest may justify moralistic and paternalistic interference.  
After refuting collective interests, Feinberg’s theory of interests deconstructs public interests 
into three situations of assemblage of individual interests mainly ‘on the same objects or 
instrumentalities.’100  In the following two sections I will argue that this perspective is 
                                                          
92  See Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (OUP 2014) 624 
(emphasis added). 
93 Ibid 623. 
94 See T Hörnle, ‘Offensive Behavior and German Penal Law’ (2001) 5 Buff Crim L Rev 255, 257. 
95 HW 33. 
96 Ibid 36. 
97 Ibid 37. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid 67-68; On Criminalisation, 225-26. 
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pragmatically sensible, but that the relevant test of an interest being public should be clarified 
with a holistic definition and specified by reference to standards. 
b. Three Situations of Public Interests Deriving from Individual Interests  
For Feinberg, there are generally three types of public interest. This structure affects how a 
safety or order interest can be public. Firstly, when the object of a public interest is ‘a 
collection of specific interests … possessed by a large and indefinite number of private 
individuals’, such as where public safety is endangered by a large bomb being placed in a 
central station, every individual has an interest in his own safety.101 The endangered or 
victimised public interest is a compound of my personal safety, yours and others. This kind 
of public interest is merely an aggregation of individual interests (usually of the same kind).  
Secondly, when the object of a public interest is single, specific and widely shared – such as 
a sound economy and environment and the maintenance of public services – the subject of 
the interest is most or even all of the persons in a community. Each person has an interest in 
the same object.102 These public interests are ‘so widely shared that they can be said to be 
possessed by the community itself’ [‘community interests’].103 ‘The harm [if any] to many 
or all private citizens is direct and [even] serious.’104  
Although the interest in both of Feinberg’s first two types of public interest can be 
endangered without specific individuals being placed at risk, the second is different from the 
first in that a shared object can be harmed without harm to specific individuals, e.g. in cases 
of damage to the environment. In this sense, a community interest cannot be reduced to 
individual interests, but is expressed as a kind of common good. However, the interests in a 
shared object such as a public facility, place or a general natural condition still belong to 
individuals. 
In Feinberg’s third type of public interest, the direct subject of the interest is not individuals, 
but an entity such as a government when the object of interests is the operation of 
government systems of registration, taxation, customs etc. 105  Feinberg argues that 
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‘governmental interests’ are ‘ascribed to the government’ and an individual is ‘not seriously 
harmed by a single act’.106 When the harm is to one’s fellow citizens, such as in cases of tax 
evasion, the objectionable conduct is unfair to the public. However, ‘like community 
interest, governmental interests in the last analysis belong to individual citizens’.107  
Three situations involve understanding public interests as being made up of individual 
interests. Public interests are ‘derivative from independently defined individual interests’.108 
While these situations are labelled public rather than private, this is alongside the idea ‘that 
the public is composed of private individuals standing in complex social and legal relations 
to one another’.109 For example, ‘the term health of the nation is fictive and only disguises 
that fact that it concerns the protection of the health of many individual members of the 
nation’.110  In the case of a river deteriorating, the public interest consists of my aesthetic 
comfort, your drinking or watering amenity, her interest in cooling or enjoying fresh air, and 
so on; in a system of taxation, the public interest consists of my fair competition, your 
pension acquisition, others’ welfare expectations, etc. So in the third and second types above, 
the ‘near ultimate’ interest bearers of the Government, the environment etc. all rest on the 
ultimate bearer of individuals, but the severity of a crime may be hard to determine given 
that the exact interests or number of individuals affected may not be determinate and that 
‘the harm to any given individual is highly dilute and unnoticeable’.111 Given the realities of 
data availability and analytical complexities, the law expediently only reaches the ‘near 
ultimate’ bearer (a shared object).112 A public interest in this case is a preventative and 
compound common good (a condition of the object), different from eventual individual 
interests of various types, which rely on the common good.  
c. Four Standards of Individual Life Order Engaging Public Order 
Following the individualistic approach to classifying interests as public, we can examine 
public order scenarios. Public order is not an interest generated in governing activities in 
Feinberg’s third type of public interests. In the first type, public order is the convenient use 
and/or comfortable enjoyment of one’s own life conditions by many individuals. In the 
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second type, public order appears to be a general community interest, which is not reducible 
to individuals’ own interests. This kind of public disorder involves harm to a shared public 
object, normally a public place such as a road, lake, park, or public utility service such as 
‘garbage collection, street lighting, the provision of electricity power, telephone and postal 
services’,113 or a general environmental condition. All of these embody general interests, 
which meet public needs of convenient and comfortable life.  
However, Feinberg does not explicitly provide a holistic concept of publicness. So, it is not 
precisely clear why he sets out these three particular situations of public interests, rather than 
others, and how he systematises them. Is there a unifying test of publicness? He seems to 
understand publicness in three situations as requiring that the interest in question is possessed 
by ‘a large and indefinite number of private individuals’.114 This test is stricter than the test 
in public nuisance which limits public order to cases affecting ‘a substantial section of the 
public’115 – and which understands publicness with a test of ‘widespread in its range or so 
indiscriminate in its effect’.116 These tests are illuminating in determining the meaning and 
standards of publicness. I would argue that when the affected (victim) is not ‘single and 
specified’, the interest and the crime is said to be public. ‘Public’ just means many 
individuals are actually or possibly affected, whether or not the exact number of them is 
clear. It includes, but is not limited to, ‘widespread’ and ‘indiscriminate’ cases. Accordingly, 
four standards can expand the scope of ‘public’ order (crimes). 
As to the number of affected persons, firstly, when the conduct affects life order of many 
and unspecific persons, it is a crime against public order. The obstruction of a public way 
creates widespread and indiscriminate inconvenience to multiple persons and is thus a public 
nuisance.117 Intrinsically repetitive disorderly behaviour such as intrusive begging would 
affect many persons.118 
Secondly, when the class of persons affected is not indiscriminate but is extensive, the 
conduct remains a crime against the public. The operation of an entertainment venue that 
                                                          
113 HTO 223. 
114 Ibid 222 (emphasis added). 
115 Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 459 [36] (emphasis added). 
116 A-G v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169 (emphasis in original). 
117 Wesson v Washburn Iron Co 13 Allen, 95, 102 (1866). 
118 Even if the beggar decides to beg for once, the potential target is indeterminate (see the third standard below). 
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discomforts many neighbouring dwellers by noise is also a public nuisance.119 In this case, 
the dwellers are in a private place, and the effect on them may not be entirely random. 
Nevertheless, the standard of extensiveness should be considered to determine the case as 
public. 
Thirdly, when the conduct affects an indiscriminately chosen person, rather than an 
extensive group, it is still public. Exposure to one person in a public place, although targeted 
at a single person, victimises a random person and this means that many persons are put at 
risk: other members of the public who are likely located in the same place as the victim are 
at danger. For example, soliciting an undercover officer for sex on a public highway was 
still public in circumstances in which it was not only the officer who was likely to be 
affected.120 Similarly, in considering the common law crime of outraging public decency, 
the Law Commission approaches publicness as meaning a public place, which the public can 
access, view or hear.121 The crime is based on a risk of offence to many people, but it does 
not matter whether many people are in fact affected.  
Fourthly, when the person affected has been chosen (not indiscriminately), and the conduct 
is in public, there is nevertheless a public order problem. Life consists of private life and the 
public life/sphere.122 When there are bystanders – witnesses to an event who are not direct 
participants – the event is public rather than private.123 This sociological idea has normative 
implications. The common law crime of breach of the peace in Scotland requires 
discoverability by, and thus potential alarm to, a third party.124 The existence of a third party 
(even a hypothetical one) renders the disorder public. There is not only one ‘victim’ in 
particular, but inconvenience, discomfort caused or risked to other people. 
However, if the conduct takes place in private, when there is only one victim, and the victim 
is specifically targeted, it is not a public order problem. The opposite of ‘public’ is ‘private’. 
‘Private’ literally means concerning a particular person or group. A telephone call to an 
individual person is private, and thus hundreds of calls made to thirteen different women 
                                                          
119 People v Rubenfeld, 172 NE 485, 254 NY 245 (1930). The case is similar to sending suspected anthrax in a 
letter that led to the evacuation of many staff at the target address. The defendant was not convicted of public 
nuisance given the absence of mens rea. See Regina v Rimmington; Regina v Goldstein [2006] 1 AC 459. 
120 For the case, see DPP v Fearon [2010] 2 Cr App R 22. 
121 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com No 358, 2015) para 4.11. 
122 See P Sztompka, ‘The Focus on Everyday Life: A New Turn in Sociology’ (2008) 16 Eur Rev 1, 9. 
123 Ibid 9, 11. 
124 See BOP 111. 
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deemed were still private.125 In private there is no third party or other victim, either actual 
or potential, to render the act public. Typically, the POA 1986 excludes ‘private dwellings’ 
from the scope of public order. No offence is committed under sections 4, 4A and 5 when 
the actor is ‘inside a dwelling’ and the victim is ‘also inside that or another dwelling’.  
In short, when many persons – including an indiscriminate person, or one person in a public 
occasion – are adversely affected in terms of their life convenience, comfort or peace, the 
interest can be labelled as public. Public order interests principally, but do not merely, exist 
in civil life. An aggregation of private life interests can also collectively amount to public 
order. It is only in cases of the life order of ‘one specified’ victim being disrupted in private 
that it can be definitively stated that no question of public order is raised.  
(ii) Triviality Is Not a Problem for Individual Life Order Interests  
Once we accept that public order interests are conceptualised in terms of life convenience, 
comfort or peace, a problem may arise. Are these interests too trivial to warrant the 
protection of the criminal law? First, if we apply the test of publicness outlined above, we 
can see that the interest is generally not trivial. Where more than one individual’s life 
convenience, comfort or peace is affected, the seriousness of the evil tends to be sufficient 
for the criminal law to intervene. For example, when the effects of the disorder are 
widespread or indiscriminate, public prosecution is required: ‘it would not be reasonable to 
expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but that 
it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large’.126  
 
However, the standards of publicness I propose are not limited to those in public nuisance 
(‘widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect’).127 If the life order interest were 
not public enough – or if it were the interest only of an individual in private (not ‘public’ 
order interest), would it be too trivial to be protectable? I will argue here that the principle 
of de minimis non curat lex is not absolute in limiting criminal legislation and that there are 
alternative mechanisms to solve the problem of triviality, even if an individual life order 
interest seems trivial.  
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a. ‘De Minimis’ Not Always Necessary 
There seem to be good reasons to limit the scope of breach of the peace so that it may be 
regarded as a ‘public’ (locus) disorder crime.128 That is, the formal label of ‘public’ may 
have a substantive role to play in identifying what should or should not be protectable by the 
criminal law. Such a role, however, has not been articulated. I will argue that publicness may 
signify the necessity of criminal law from two perspectives, which are not absolutely right.   
Publicness can, firstly, signify the seriousness of the crime. For example, Feinberg argues 
that regular indecent behaviour by a neighbour on his lawn or the exhibition of obscene signs 
or pornographic displays on his external walls constitute a private nuisance, which ‘does 
annoy or inconvenience someone or other’ under civil law – while criminal law (public 
nuisance) requires them to occur in open places to concern the general public, because a 
resultant criminal sanction amounts to ‘such massive interference with liberty’.129 Feinberg 
requires a level of seriousness of the nuisance in criminal law because he considers criminal 
penalties so severe.  
However, Feinberg regards the appropriate penalty for serious offence to others to only be a 
fine or, at most, modest imprisonment, for a matter of days.130  These penalties do not 
necessarily interfere with liberty as substantially as other parts of the criminal law – or 
clearly outweigh civil liabilities. Lenient penalties in criminal law allow legislators to target 
nuisances of low-level seriousness.131 Thus, the divisions between private/individual and 
public/general may not be that important in the drafting of legislation. Differences in gravity 
of offending can be assessed and valued not so much when deciding whether to criminalise 
an activity, but in setting penalties or in criminal sentencing.  
A challenge to this idea may be that there are degrees of blame and a quantum of blame 
under a given threshold is not criminal blame at all.132 But how should that threshold be 
determined? More importantly, the condemnation effect can also be regarded trivial when 
the public can readily consider the special procedure involved, the relevant offence name 
                                                          
128 See BOP 91. 
129 See OTO 9-10. 
130 Ibid 4. 
131 On the contrary, severe penalty is contingent on there being a serious result. Public nuisance can be 
punishable up to life imprisonment – and this is a reason why its restatement should require public and 
serious adverse effect. See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and 
Outraging Public Decency (Law Com No 358, 2015) paras 4.2-4.3. 
132 See Douglas Husak, ‘The De Minimis ‘Defence’ to Criminal Liability’ in R A Duff and Stuart Green (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 350. 
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and the applicable penalty in a case deemed to be only ‘trivial’. For example, section 13 of 
the Chinese Criminal Law provides that extremely trivial harm should not be dealt with 
criminally. That is, the conduct can be dealt with as an administrative violation under the 
Chinese policing law where the penalty is only custody for a very short period (days) or fines 
determined and administrated by the police. But this is similar to Feinberg’s suggestion of 
penalties for offensive conduct. Therefore, administrative violations in China are similar to 
violations in some Western countries where blame is considered trivial (notwithstanding the 
violation may still be included in a ‘criminal’ code/law).133 
It may also be reasonable to require this notion of publicness when private disruptions may 
be better resolved by alternative social mechanisms or by private law remedies.134 A private 
disruption may ‘cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law’ ‘only 
to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction’ (‘thus the Court should 
dismiss the prosecution’).135 But the exercise of the principle of de minimis non curat lex in 
the operation of Model Penal Code is a judicial guideline, and not a guide to legislative 
activities.136 Even if it were, its function is to avoid unnecessary criminal condemnation. But 
civil measures may not always be effective and the victim may have insufficient resources 
to fund a civil action.137 For example, offensive ‘one on one’ messages should still be 
criminally prosecutable and punishable.138 Thus, the division between public disorder and 
private disruption may not matter that much in deciding whether to criminalise the 
behaviour. 
b. Criminalisation Discretion Solves the Problem of Triviality 
On the problem of de minimis, I do suggest that life order interests in convenience, comfort 
and peace should be considered protectable by the criminal law, but it is not necessary that 
all specific cases of a category of such interest should be so protected. The criminalisation 
theory (of legal interests) is just one factor in the whole project of criminalisation. The 
                                                          
133  See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1985, hereinafter referred to as MPC), s 1.04(6) 
<www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/UnitedStatesofAmerica/Model%20Penal%20Code%20United%20States%20of%20America%2019
62.pdf>accessed 29 May 2019. 
134 See CHW 133. 
135 MPC, s 2.12. 
136 A similar provision can be found in the Chinese Criminal Law. See s 37. 
137 See Council of Europe, Report on Decriminalisation (European Committee on Crime Problems, Strasbourg, 
1980), 52. 
138 See Malicious Communication Act 1988, s 1. 
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criminalisation process involves a range of factors: legislative, reporting, policing, 
prosecuting and decision-making.  
 
Firstly, recognising an interest as protectable does not necessarily mean that all 
infringements of that interest must or should be protected. Property ownership is a 
protectable interest, but criminal law does not protect it by generally prescribing that any 
conduct harming ownership is punishable – rather, it specifically proscribes several 
behavioral types: such as robbery, theft, fraud, vandalism or misappropriation. Criminal law 
selects some, but not necessarily all behavioral types, which infringe against a protectable 
interest, based on a series of considerations, rather than a single one factor such as triviality. 
In particular, relevant factors will be whether a given type can be properly 
prescribed/described (so as to meet the requirements of predictability and fair labelling)139 – 
whether it is of high frequency and thus of high priority – and whether it is of high severity 
and thus of high priority. Therefore, although all the interests in life convenience, comfort 
and peace, in the sense of a category, are protectable interests for life quality, in practice they 
are not always protected from any infringements, as will be shown in chapters 4-5.   
 
Further, the victim will apply discretion in deciding whether to report the life inconvenience, 
discomfort or breach of life peace. He will gauge the seriousness of the disruption of his life, 
the implications of reporting to the authorities and the availability of other alternative 
solutions. Even if he were to make a report, the police have discretion in deciding how to 
respond. Similarly, the prosecutor may exercise his discretion and decide not to prosecute 
and the court/jury may decide not to convict. All of these actors shape the substantive 
criminalisation in action. 
 
The exercise of these various forms of discretion is indeed a reflection of the costs of 
targeting trivialities. But the costs are unavoidable in practice. It is rarely possible to ex ante 
prescribe that which is not trivial, as Feinberg arbitrarily lists some, albeit not others, as 
significant welfare interests.140 Nor is it possible at the same time to avoid excluding the 
necessary protection of some interests in specific cases. In short, it is hard to set a clear line 
as to what is sufficiently serious and such a clear line could sacrifice or compromise specific 
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justice. Therefore, a theoretical alternative of an inclusive concept of life convenience, 
comfort or peace is necessary.  
IV. CORE SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN PUBLIC ORDER 
Contemporary smooth life requires traditional and new conditions. Legislation must assume 
a creative role in establishing and developing a flow of new desires, values and rules 
conditioned and demanded by social developments of technology, industrialisation and a 
new way of life. 141  After establishing the contents of public order interests as life 
convenience, comfort and peace – and specifying the standards of publicness of an interest, 
the following sections will show how typical specific categories of convenience, comfort 
and peace for contemporary life quality can be socially and normatively identified as the 
interests of public order.142 I will specify which particular dimensions or aspects of these 
interests engage public order, by linking the specific life order interest to one or more 
standards of publicness.143   
(i) External Convenience, Comfort and Peace of the Public 
Smooth life requires a variety of different external life conditions. This section will argue 
that external life conditions include the use of life places and facilities; the communication 
and acquisition of information; the enjoyment of general environmental conditions – and 
external peace of life. These conditions become public order interests in some cases. 
a. Public Use of Life Places  
Firstly, public order is the public use of life places without unreasonable disturbance. Life 
places are generally static. Of course, public transport will be a moving public place. Even 
if it is not a public place in the traditional sense of being an unmovable space, the use of 
                                                          
141 Albin Eser, ‘The Principle of ‘‘Harm’’ In the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of The Criminally 
Protected Legal Interests’ (1965-1966) 4 Duq UL Rev 345, 398. 
142 It is difficult to deduce specific categories of convenience, comfort and peace, just as Feinberg has not 
clearly rationalised why he lists categories of minimum welfare interests such as ‘emotional stability, the 
absence of groundless anxieties and resentments’ and ‘a tolerable social and physical environment’. See 
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(similar approach is adopted in finding typical wrongful affronts to sensibilities. See CHW 97). More 
importantly, each category’s rationale and meaning will be enunciated in this part. 
143 It should be stated that which exact standard of publicness is chosen or preferred for a specific life order 
interest is up to a series of considerations such as jurisdictional tradition, which is beyond discussion here.  
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public transport is an instance of civil life. For example, the hindrance of a ship from leaving 
a harbour will be public disorder.144  
Many civil life activities – such as assemblies, processions or demonstrations, cultural 
events, sports or any other large-scale activity – exist in general public places such as streets, 
parks and squares and other places, which the general public can readily access. For example, 
the law on processions and assemblies leads inevitably to the following question: can (and 
if so, how) group activities be related to public order?145 Both could be analysed from the 
perspective of reasonable use of public places. To block a door to prevent persons entering 
a place may constitute an offence of preventing public meetings – and to throw or propel an 
object that may disrupt a sporting event would be an offence in a public place.146  
Civil life activities exist also in special semi-public places such as (private owned) factories. 
This perspective of internal life order is important to protect the order internal of some 
institutions, which do not directly engage with general public life. Smooth work, production, 
teaching and scientific researches of a unit/institution are protected as public order.147 While 
only internal order can be disrupted in such cases, this disruption is still a disruption of the 
life order of a section of the public.  
Disturbance to the public use of a life place may, however, also interfere with a kind of 
personal right called freedom of movement, which in public places takes the form of normal 
traffic mobility.148 In cases of aggressive begging, chasing or intercepting, the prohibited 
conduct harms personal freedom and privacy. But the conduct seems too minor to be treated 
as crimes against personal rights. It substantially affects convenient use of public places and 
can be tackled as a crime against public order.149 For legislators, it is mainly a nuisance issue, 
which makes it inconvenient and uncomfortable to attend and enjoy one’s work or life in a 
public place.  
                                                          
144 See James Falconer (1847) Arkley 242. 
145 See POA 1986, Pt II. 
146 See Summary Offences Act 2005 (Queensland), ss 20 & 24. 
147 See Chinese Criminal Law, s 290. 
148 See Lindsay Farmer, ‘Disgust, Respect, and the Criminalisation of Offense’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H 
Kramer, Mark R Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP 2011) 287. 
149 ‘Offences about quality of community use of public places’ such as disorderly begging, urinating and being 
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b. Public Use of Life Facilities 
Secondly, public order entails the convenient and comfortable public use and operation of 
life facilities – e.g. water, heat, power, telecom, radio, television and internet facilities – 
without unreasonable interference. For example, a provision on public nuisance aims to 
prevent the lawful ‘enjoyment of a facility of a public place’ from being ‘interfered with by 
the unlawful activities of another’.150 Even if the life facility is not of a public place, it may 
still engage public order when it is connected to many private life places. For example, 
turning off a city’s electricity supply would amount to disruption of the life order of the 
public.  
The life of the general public may be indirectly interfered with. There are public institutions 
or services that are necessary extensions and direct components of the civil life of the public, 
such as post offices and hospitals.151 When we examine public institutions from their own 
perspective, they have both an internal order and external order to be protected. If someone 
interferes with the institution’s staff’s use of life facilities such as a canteen or gym or office, 
their own life order is disrupted, and they may as a result be prevented from serving the 
public whose life order is thereby disrupted (indirect interference). For example, Goldstein 
put salt in a letter which leaked on the hands of a post office worker, and was suspected to 
have been anthrax, leading to the evacuation of 110 employees and the cancellation of the 
second postal delivery for that area. 152  He objectively disrupted both the post office’s 
internal working order and the external life order of the public in using the postal service.  
c. Public Enjoyment of General Environmental Conditions 
Thirdly, public order is the public enjoyment of general, natural and sensory conditions e.g. 
sound, light, temperature, humidity or odor, without unreasonable disturbance. It is personal 
comfort/amenity based on sensory responsiveness to external stimuli. 153  Environmental 
nuisances tend to constitute the offence of public nuisance. ‘Smells, noises, waste deposits 
and water pollution all have the potential to constitute nuisances which may be sufficiently 
                                                          
150 See Weekly Hansard, Queensland Parliament (28 Sep 2004), col 2397. 
151 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 119, targets ‘a nuisance or disturbance to an NHS staff 
member who is working there or is otherwise in connection with work’. (emphasis added) The connection 
can be activities such as recreation, canteen or cleaning. 
152 See Regina v Rimmington; Regina v Goldstein [2006] 1 AC 459. 
153 John Bates, William Birtles and Charles Pugh, Liability for Environmental Harm (Tottel Publishing 2004) 
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widespread and indiscriminate in their effect to amount to a public nuisance.’154 In particular, 
making a noise could be an offence of preventing public meetings (starting or continuing),155 
because public enjoyment of a general environmental condition is disturbed. 
This aspect of public order can be sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to cover cases, 
which may not be properly covered by property and personal rights in criminal law.156 The 
expression of ‘prejudice to health or a nuisance’ means that environmental law adequately 
regulates both safety and order problems.157 For example, smoking is believed to be harmful 
to health and smoking in public places harmful to public health.158 However, the harm 
occasioned by a single act of smoking in public places is not significant enough to be 
regarded as a safety crime (against health); rather, it is more proper to be seen as an offense 
against public life order in comfort.159 The harm is to sensory amenity, something which is 
not negligible by most people because it hinders them benefiting from interesting and 
enjoyable aspects of life.  
d. Public Communication and Acquisition of Information 
Fourthly, public order includes the public communication and acquisition of true information 
without impediments or lies, because the convenience of communicating and receiving true 
information itself is a must for our smooth life that bases decisions and choices on 
information. 
In the information age, typically exemplified by the internet as the information highway, the 
convenience of accessing true information is even more important. Some criminal activity 
bullies widespread and indiscriminate cyber users by forcing or tricking them into visiting 
websites. This ‘traffic hijack’ causes inconvenience to information acquisition from the 
                                                          
154 Neil Parpworth, ‘Public Nuisance in the Environmental Context’ (2008) 11 JPEL 1526, 1531.  
155 See Summary Offences Act 2005 (Queensland), s 20. 
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perspective of users and to communication from the perspective of content providers.160 It 
is an internet version of blocking others’ freedom of movement in a traditional public place.  
True information facilitates and guides our life and moods, but a false message can cause 
‘annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety’. 161  Communication only works when 
people are assumed to be normally saying the truth, and lying and rumors considered 
abnormal – otherwise, society would degenerate separate non-communicating entities.162 
False information adulterating truth or mixing impurities makes this interest in accuracy 
unavailable or discounts it, particularly in cyberspace where rumors are not limited by space 
or time and have nearly unlimited resending with low costs and threshold.163 Therefore, 
‘certain lies in certain circumstances should be made criminal’.164 
Different jurisdictions have previously criminalised the propagation of fraudulent rumours 
(without reference to specific victims) in order to protect public order.165 Blackstone says 
‘the vice of lying is not taken notice by our law, unless it carries with it some public 
inconvenience, as spreading false news …’166 It is an offence in Queensland to advertise or 
place a notice in a newspaper or by radio, television or on the Internet false information of 
birth, death, funeral, engagement, marriage, employment.167 Although this offence is limited 
to important personal information and the mass media, it still illustrates the harmed interest 
to the convenience of the public in accessing information. This approach of restricting the 
scope of false news follows Blackstone’s (‘concerning any great man of the realm’).168 He 
alternatively limited the result (‘to cause discord between the king and nobility’). 169 
Similarly, the ninth amendment of Chinese Criminal law passed in 2015 enlarges the scope 
of the targeted rumours in the subchapter of crimes against public order, but still requiring 
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the result of serious disruption of social order.170 All public rumours are against public order 
in the sense of setting back people’s interest in the convenient communication and 
acquisition of information.  
e. Public External Peace 
Public order includes other stable conditions for smooth life of the public, e.g. external life 
peace free from disruptions by harassment.171 Harassment allegations can be credibly or 
plausibly true yet consist of junk information that actively appears in front of one’s eyes and 
thus preempts attention, disrupting life peace. Such harassment is different from the rumors 
discussed above which disturb the convenience and comfort of acquiring information by 
passively appearing when, for example, a person searches the Internet.  
When the conduct does not consist of physical contact but only troublesome disturbance, it 
may not be assault, but disorder. The risk of attacks and fear, if any, exist in the early phase 
of violence, but the direct result of harassment is harm to life quality.172 That is, even in 
cases of continuous or frequent following or contacting, violence may not be threatened or 
feared, but the victim suffers because of mind being occupied, attention called and thus their 
everyday life is disrupted.173 Harassing acts such as unwanted letters or telephone calls, even 
if not threatening, abusive or insulting, are disorder in the sense of affecting another person’s 
normal life: harassing letters or calls make it inconvenient for the recipient to identify and 
deal with legitimate letters or calls; the time and effort involved in dealing with this problem 
it itself a breach of the life peace of the recipient.  
The disorder may be against only certain specific individuals. However, when harassment 
against one person happens in public, such as the sending of unwanted gifts or attempts to 
contact a person at their workplace, it is still a public order problem. More importantly, new 
technological developments make it much easier to disturb the life peace of the general 
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public than before, e.g. by causing stubborn ‘pop up’ advertisements to appear on users’ 
computer or mobile-phone screens, as well as the sending of spam emails on a massive scale. 
When the conduct disrupts the lives of many individuals, it is a public order problem, even 
if every individual experiences this disruption in the privacy of their home.  
(ii) Public Inner Peace 
Smooth life is also referable to non-external conditions. I have argued that external life peace 
can be a part of public order. Here I will argue that inner peace is the other dimension of life 
peace by looking at how inner peace can be a kind of interest, which engages public order – 
and then analyse its protectability in terms of constitutional consistency. 
a. Public Inner Peace as a Public Order Interest 
It is claimed that transient unpleasantness – including emotional unpleasantness – are neither 
in nor against one’s interests. 174  The focus of interests is on the minimum conditions 
necessary for long-term various life goals: ‘welfare interests’ include durable ‘emotional 
stability, the absence of groundless anxieties and resentments’.175  
However, the absence of emotional unpleasantness, even momentary sensations, is 
necessary for quality of life. ‘Don’t we all of us have an interest in tranquility? In peace of 
mind?’176 Emotional unpleasantness tends to be fleeting, but the need or desire to be free 
from it is durable and stable. For individuals, ‘functional integrity’ includes protection from 
both physical and psychological losses such as momentary pain, discomfort or anxiety in the 
colloquial sense.177  I would call the psychological stability inner peace, as opposed to 
external peace. Inner peace is psychological tranquility without unreasonable distress, fear, 
alarm, disgust, annoyance etc.178  
                                                          
174 See HTO 45-46, 55-56. 
175 Ibid 37. 
176 ‘I do not think Feinberg has been as clear about these matters as he should have been.’ Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, ‘Feinberg on Harm, Offense, and the Criminal Law: A Review Essay’ (1986) 10 Phil & Pub Aff 
381, 386. 
177 See Victoria A Greenfield and Letizia Paoli, ‘A Framework to Assess the Harms of Crimes’ (2013) 53 BJC 
864, 869. 
178 Inner peace is not a natural extension of the person because it rarely affects body rights such as integrity or 
health. Neither is it necessarily related with personality rights such as dignity and privacy. 
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Both Continental and Anglo-American legal theories acknowledge the possibility of 
emotional or psychological states being protected by criminal laws against victimization.179 
In particular, severe breaches of inner peace, such as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress,180 are proposed as candidates for criminalisation, corresponding to their regulation 
in tort law.181 Moreover, criminal law should ‘permit everyone to go about their daily life 
without fear of harm to persons or property’.182 Fear is a very typical breach of inner peace, 
which makes civil life uncomfortable and other life activities inconvenient and even 
impossible.183 As an intense unpleasant feeling with strong physical demonstration because 
of a threat, 184  fear is an emotional state based on defined risk while anxiety is on 
unidentifiable stimulus or failure of coping attempts.185 Therefore, alarm is more like anxiety 
in uncontrollable states.186 Conduct which makes people worried or causes them to suffer 
from pain or anxiety and weakens their ability to deal with life is also ‘harmful’ (in colloquial 
sense).187  
I am merely suggesting the possibility of targeting public emotional unpleasantness, refuting 
Feinberg’s claim that offended mental states are not infringements of our interests. When 
the inner peace breached is that of the public, i.e. the subjects are many, unspecified or 
present on a public occasion, it becomes a part of public order. In particular, spreading terror 
hoaxes, throwing fake dangerous substances, threatening to set fire, to blast or to throw 
dangerous substances, are all to the alarm of the public.188 Besides, public indecencies and 
                                                          
179 See CHC 114. 
180 Grief is elicited by an individual’s interpretation of an involuntary loss situation. See Kathy Charmaz and 
Melinda J Milligan, ‘Grief’ in Michael Lewis and others (eds), Handbook of Emotions (3rd edn, The Guilford 
Press 2008) 516-17. Intense grief ‘elicits considerable mental and physical distress’ (519). 
181 See Leslie Yalof Garfield, ‘The Case for a Criminal Law Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress’ (2009) 5 AUCLBrief 33, 40. 
182 R (McCann and Others) v Crown Court at Manchester and Another [2003] 1 AC 787, 806 (Lord Steyn). 
183 ‘Fear may drive a burdened man for a mile, but it is only freedom that makes his load light for the long 
carry.’ Stephen Vincent Benét, ‘Freedom from Fear’ The Saturday Evening Post (Indianapolis, 13 March 
1943). 
184 A threat by itself is not even preparatory conduct risking personal safety. 
185 See Arne Öhman, ‘Fear and Anxiety: Overlap and Dissociations’ in Michael Lewis and others (eds), 
Handbook of Emotions (3rd edn, The Guilford Press 2008) 710. 
186 For anxiety, see Robert M Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst (Bodley Head 
2017) 34-35. 
187 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, ‘Limits of Criminal Law—Obscenity: A Test Case’ (1975) 
Working Paper 10, 18 < www.lareau-law.ca/LRCWP10.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018. 
188 This kind alarm is not a real public safety concern and thus the actor cannot be convicted of a public safety 
crime. The real criminality of the conduct lies in creating unreasonable fear among the public and thus 
breaching of the peace of the public. See the contamination of or interference with goods with intention of 
causing public alarm or anxiety (POA 1986, s 38).  
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insults, may disgust, 189  annoy, 190  alarm or distress viewers: sexual activity in a public 
place,191 insulting the national flag or emblem in public,192 publishing or stirring up hatred, 
discrimination or insult against an ethnic group, etc. 193  A further problem is that the 
categories of unpleasant states and corresponding acts need to be clearly defined to 
determine an unacceptable threshold of disrupting inner peace (see chapter 5).194 
b. Constitutional Consistency of Inner Peace 
Inner peace is an interest instrumental to smooth life. However, ‘we must be aware of the 
moral, cultural, and socio-economic nature of the interests recognised in a particular 
system’.195 Accordingly, there are three steps/elements for a certain social or individual want 
or need to be a criminally protectable interest: ‘there must be a socially founded factual 
interest’; ‘this interest must be socially recognised’; ‘its consistency with the constitutional 
value order must be demonstrated’.196 Although the first sociologically factual element has 
been shown – and the second socially recognised dimension can be seen in relevant laws – 
there are explicit disputes on whether the right to inner peace is consistent with the 
constitutional framework. It is contended that a ‘right not to be offended’ should not be 
recognised by the law otherwise the right to expression would be limited because of the 
unpopularity of the idea, although the right can be limited when it does not contribute to 
public debate or harms identifiable rights such as dignity, privacy or reputation.197 This idea 
                                                          
189 In emotional knowledge, there are nine lists of possible stimuli of disgust: ‘food, body products, animals, 
sexual behaviours, contact with death or corpses, violations of exterior envelope of the body (including gore 
and deformity), poor hygiene, interpersonal contamination (contact with unsavoury human being), and 
certain moral offenses.’ Paul Rozin and others, ‘Disgust’ in Michael Lewis and others (eds), Handbook of 
Emotions (3rd edn, The Guilford Press 2008) 757. Also see Robert M Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of 
Humans at Our Best and Worst (Bodley Head 2017) 41-42. 
190 Irritation or annoyance is a milder variant of anger while fury or rage is an intensified variant, see Scott 
Schieman, ‘Anger’ in Jan E Stets and Jonathan H Turner (eds), Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions 
(Springer 2006) 494. Anger is commonly elicited by e.g. insults, inequity, unfairness, verbal or physical 
aggression (495). 
191 SC Deb (B) 18 September 2003, col 289. 
192 See Chinese criminal law, s 299. This would be protected speech in some jurisdictions. But as will be argued 
in next subsection, this is not a problem of inner peace being a protectable interest. 
193 See POA 1986, Pt III. 
194 See Avlana K Eisenberg, ‘Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress’ (2015) 113 Mich L Rev 607, 647-49. 
195  Letizia Paoli and Victoria A Greenfield, ‘Harm: a Neglected Concept in Criminology, a Necessary 
Benchmark for Crime-Control Policy’ (2013) 21 Eu J Crime CL CJ 359, 369. 
196 See Albin Eser, ‘The Principle of ‘‘Harm’’ In the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of The 
Criminally Protected Legal Interests’ (1965-1966) 4 Duq U L Rev 345, 413. 
197 See Aatifa Khan, ‘A ‘’Right Not to Be Offended" under Article 10(2) ECHR? Concerns in the Construction 
of the "Rights of Others’’’ [2012] EHRLR 191, 199-201. 
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does not acknowledge that even if it were not ‘gratuitously offensive’ – viz. it is of public 
concern – the right can still be limited.  
To recognise the right not to be offended is not to outlaw every offence to inner peace, just 
as to recognise the right to dignity, privacy or reputation is not to protect those rights 
absolutely, and the same is true of the right to expression. Inner peace can be protected when 
the exercise of the right is an abuse of the right. Abuses of a right or liberty conflict with the 
constitutional spirit in fairly determining orderly co-existence and co-operation. Liberty 
limited by the rule of reciprocity ‘is the mother of order’.198 A liberty or right of person or 
group should be balanced with the same liberty or right of others and with the adverse 
consequences caused or risked by its exercising. The French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen 1789 classically shows this relation. Article IV and V together state 
that adverse consequences of actions and fair enjoyment of others can justify limiting 
freedom.199 Therefore, the right to free expression should not unfairly interfere with others’ 
right to free expression (there is other commercial solicitation, political and social 
communication), and other rights such as inner peace as well as the convenient and 
comfortable use of a given public place. 
Therefore, the recognition of the right to inner peace accords with the constitutional 
recognition of the right to expression. The core problem lies in how to thoroughly elaborate 
upon when the appeal to the ‘rights of others’ such as inner peace can override the right to 
expression – and not in refuting the recognition itself of inner peace. The law should not be 
expected to refuse to recognise inner peace as a legal interest just because the recognition 
challenges the protection of established rights. Instead, the law should focus on how to solve 
the potential conflicts between rights in a proportionate framework as suggested in chapters 
2 and 5. 
In summary, for facilities and places, comfort is the higher level of meaning for life quality, 
based on the convenience of use. For general conditions, the value is mainly the comfort of 
enjoying. For information, the focus is the convenience of access. Freedom from harassment 
and breaches of inner peace is another kind of comfort in achieving passive peace. These 
                                                          
198 See Herbert Spencer, ‘Co-operation: Its Laws and Principles’ 1885 1 THE SUN 1, 3-4. 
199 Article IV - Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural 
rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the enjoyment of these 
same rights. These borders can be determined only by the law. 
   Article V - The law has the right to forbid only actions harmful to society. Anything which is not forbidden 
by the law cannot be imped(ed), and no one can be constrained to do what it does not order. 
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cases may converge in the same case of disruption. For example, attaching a leaflet to a 
public facility such as a bus timetable amounts not only to aesthetic harm – an eyesore 
making the view less comfortable – but also causes inconvenience to effective acquisition 
of useful information of a public life facility. Its own content may be threatening, abusive or 
insulting and thus cause further harassment, alarm or distress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Public order as a protectable interest is an important criterion for determining a consistent 
and rational scope of crimes against public order. It should be narrowed to a consistent and 
rational scope. This chapter has argued, firstly, that public order can be narrowed as an 
interest. From the special perspective of everyday life, Feinberg’s theory of minimum 
welfare interests neglects a kind of interests for smooth life. Socio-legal perspectives make 
it clear that safety interests, which directly concern basic living, do not include various kinds 
of order interests – and thus life order interests in convenience, comfort and peace, separated 
from safety interests that are protected by English public order laws, can be construed as the 
public order interest.  
Secondly, in order to argue that the identified public order interests are protectable, I have 
refuted the idea of viewing public order as a collective interest, which cannot be reduced to 
interests of individuals – and then adopted Feinberg’s individualistic approach to analysing 
public interests in three types of case – but further clarified the test of being public as many 
individuals are actually or possibly affected in four cases. The de minimis problem may be 
solved by adhering to one or more standards of publicness of the life order interest. More 
importantly, de minimis is not absolutely binding in criminal legislation and the problem of 
de minimis can and even should be alternatively solved by the exercise of discretion within 
the criminal justice process.  
Lastly, the chapter has identified public order’s typical categories as life interests in using 
life places, facilities, enjoying general conditions, communicating and acquiring true 
information and maintaining exterior and inner peace. These life interests can be public order 
interests when the subject is multifold, indiscriminate or appear in a public context, rather 
than a particular one in private.
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Chapter 2 Harm and Offence in Public Order Crimes 
I. INTRODUCTION                                                                                     
Having identified interests in public order as life convenience, comfort and peace in some 
public occasions or contexts, this chapter considers what kind of infringements of these 
interests can justify criminalisation. I shall argue that the concepts of harm and offence in 
particular assist identifying infringements of public order interests: that is to say, such 
infringements should be either harmful or offensive in order for criminalisation to be 
justified. In developing my argument about harm and offence, I draw on the work of 
Feinberg, who has systematically analysed the moral limits of the criminal law.1 While 
Feinberg’s work is primarily organised around the harm principle, he argues that this should 
be supplemented by an ‘offence principle’ – particularly in the area of public order law – to 
allow the criminalisation of forms of conduct that, while not necessarily directly harmful, 
are nonetheless disruptive.2 I shall argue, however, that while these concepts provide a useful 
starting point, if they are to assist in developing and refining principles of criminalisation in 
respect of public order law, they will require further development in several key respects – 
not least to take account of public order as a protectable interest, as set out in the previous 
chapter.3  
This chapter will restate the concepts of ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ as two frameworks of 
criminalisation, which can be applied in identifying the scope and limits of public order 
crimes. I will argue that both harm and offence in public order need to be understood as 
setbacks to public order interests – and that such setbacks must be both factual and 
normative. Part II explores the concept of harm in public order. I will firstly examine the 
concept of a factual setback to interests (in the sense of physical ‘harm to others’ in public 
order crimes). Secondly, I will examine normative setback (wrongful harm in public order 
crimes). In this explanatory structure, not all disruptions of order will be deemed ‘harmful’, 
and thus we can limit the use of the harm principle in maintaining public order. Feinberg’s 
                                                          
1 See J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol 1: Harm to Others (OUP 1984), vol 2: Offense to 
Others (1965), vol 3: Harm to Self (1986), vol 4: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). 
2 See OTO 10-22. 
3 It is necessary for us to examine what, exactly, is meant by ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ in this context. Andrew von 
Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offence to Others’ (1986) 84 MiL 
700, 700. 
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offence principle requires the commission of wrongful serious offence to others. 4  The 
articulation of ‘wrongful’ ‘serious offence’ is superficially simple – but ambiguous and 
consequently multifarious types of offence to others may be asserted as justifying 
criminalisation in public order cases.5 I will argue in Part III that the concept of ‘offence’ to 
others for the purpose of the offence principle in criminalisation should firstly be limited to 
communicative affronts to others’ sensibility of inner peace – and secondly be normatively 
wrongful.  
II. HARM IN PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES 
This part will explain what the concept of harm is – on whose work it is based – and then 
consider why it is important in limiting and defining the scope of public order offences. It 
begins with a literature review, setting out the key elements of the concept in two dimensions: 
factual and normative. It then explains how ‘harm’ might be defined in these two dimensions 
for the purpose of public order law. 
(i) Introduction of Key Elements of Harm 
The origins of the harm principle are to be found in Mill’s On Liberty. Mill argued that:  
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering 
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection… the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.6  
For Mill, only the harm principle justifies criminalisation (at least in respect of competent 
adults). For Feinberg, it is one of several alternative justifications for criminalisation:  
It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is probably 
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the 
                                                          
4 See OTO 1-2. 
5 ‘The scope of … quality-of-life prohibitions [‘against ‘offensive’ conduct’] is potentially so broad, it is 
essential to develop principles that define and limit the scope.’ IROB Preface. 
6 OL 21-22. 
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one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other means that is equally effective 
at no greater cost to other values.7   
But for both, the prevention of harm to others is at most a necessary, and not a sufficient 
condition for criminalisation. Feinberg’s question regarding the existence of other means is 
part of the legislator’s cost-benefit analysis – not an inherent part of determining the scope 
of harm itself.8 The problem of assessing ‘other effective means’ will, therefore, not be 
discussed in this chapter, which instead focuses on the meaning of harm.9 
The harm principle has proved popular because of its simplicity of expression.10 But Mill 
did not define harm – and it is difficult to apply a principle when the meaning of its core 
element is unclear. Accepting that harm is a pre-requisite for criminalisation, people tend to 
falsely assert harm where none exists, in order to justify their instinctive feelings that 
something should be criminalised.11 Feinberg attempts to address some of the shortcomings 
of Mill’s classical account of the harm principle by defining harm firstly as a factual ‘setback 
to interest’ (non-normative simple harm) 12  – and secondly as an unjustifiable and 
inexcusable setback (normative wrongful harm).13 The first step is intended to ensure that 
the harm principle protects people’s interests and the second to ensure that the protection is 
morally defensible. However, these two steps are still abstract and imprecise. All types of 
adverse effects could potentially be described as ‘setbacks’ by someone seeking to justify 
criminalisation 14  – despite it being unclear whether they are normatively wrongful. 
Nonetheless, ‘the harm criterion is worth defending and developing because in the real world 
most criminal laws target genuine harm’.15 I will examine how the concept of harm can be 
defended and developed as an element of a test of justifiable criminalisation. 
Instead of focusing on whether harm is present in a given case, we should focus on the types 
of factual harm that the harm principle can recognise and society’s willingness to bear such 
                                                          
7 HTO 26. 
8 See Steven D Smith, ‘Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?’ (2006) 51 Am J Juris 1, 39-41. 
9 Although Feinberg’s harm principle and offence principle both require the necessity of criminalisation i.e. 
the lack of other ‘equally effective’ means ‘at no greater cost to other values’, Feinberg has not articulated 
the constituent in depth. In CHW pragmatic considerations are in a separate chapter (ch 11).  
10 See Steven D Smith, ‘Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?’ (2006) 51 Am J Juris 1, 6-9, 35-38. 
11 See Avani Mehta Sood and John M Darley, ‘The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalisation Goals’ 
(2012) 100 CLR 1313, 1320. 
12 See HTO 33-34. 
13 Ibid 34, 109. 
14 See Steven D Smith, ‘Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?’ (2006) 51 Am J Juris 1, 14-20; CHC, 49, 77; C 
McGlynn and E Rackley, ‘Criminalising Extreme Pornography: A Lost Opportunity’ [2009] Crim LR 245, 
257-58. 
15 RNTC 30. 
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harms (because there may be a competing claim of interest/harm).16 That is, we should look 
at the kinds of factual setback to an interest that can be recognised as harm for the purposes 
of the harm principle and the kinds of normative setback, which are morally unacceptable. I 
will argue that not all interests can be set back in the sense of being harmed. I will then 
contend that the concept of a normative setback should be interpreted as a wrongful setback 
in the absence of a justification of sufficient weight. 
(ii) Factual Setback  
This section looks at what kinds of factual setback to a public order interest constitute the 
harm of a public order offence. Feinberg limits the types of harm, which can justify 
criminalisation to setbacks to minimal welfare interests.17 But this section argues that they 
should be limited to objective setbacks to physical interests, and that setbacks to an interest 
should be consistently recognisable. 
a. Harm as Physical Setback to Interests  
As for the kind of interests that can be harmed, Feinberg limits such interests to those which 
are of sufficient importance for the setback to be of sufficient seriousness to justify coercion 
(‘restricting the liberty’ of others).18 For Feinberg, the concept of harm should be limited to 
setbacks to minimal welfare interests. In this way, the harm principle does not extend to non-
serious setbacks. Feinberg argues that unpleasant experiences – such as physical pains 
(pangs or aches), nonpainful forms of physical unpleasantness (chills or extreme heat), 
mental suffering (‘wounded’ feelings) and forms of offence, are generally not serious enough 
to qualify as ‘harm’, because they are not setbacks to welfare interests. It is only when they 
are ‘intense’/’severe’, ‘prolonged’, ‘recur continuously’ (‘constantly repeated’/ ‘constant 
and unrelenting’) or ‘occur at strategically untimely moments’ that they should be regarded 
as harmful.19 His concept of harm does not encompass either emotional setbacks or minor 
physical setbacks. As a result, aggressive conduct, which causes physical pains, such as 
                                                          
16 See Bernard E Harcourt, ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle’ (1999) 90 Crim L & Criminology 109, 113-
14. 
17 See HTO 51. 
18 Ibid 51. 
19 Ibid 46-47.  
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pangs, or disorderly conduct which causes physical discomforts, such as chills, is not 
harmful.20 
Obviously, if we continue to define harm after assessing its seriousness, the life order 
interests identified in chapter 1 cannot be harmed in the sense of Feinberg’s harm principle. 
They are not minimal welfare interests and so setbacks to them cannot be criminalised via 
the harm principle; other criminalisation principles must be relied on. As Feinberg argues, 
there is (typically) no interest in the avoidance of such states of minor physical discomforts 
and such states are evils of a kind different to harm.21 However, Feinberg only accepts harm 
and offence as evils that can justify criminalisation – and clearly setbacks to life convenience, 
comfort and peace (except inner peace) do not constitute offence. I have argued in chapter 1 
that public order is life convenience, comfort and peace and I will argue here that setbacks 
to these interests constitute harm.  
Given the difficulty of the narrow scope of harm in Feinberg’s theory, it is important to 
qualitatively define harm before assessing its seriousness. Interests that can be harmed have 
a special qualitative feature. ‘Harm involves a diminution of our resources, of the means and 
capacities that we can draw upon to pursue good lives.’ 22  The resources, means and 
capacities recognised by the harm principle are empirically physical ones. In my argument, 
‘physical’ does not refer only to bodily aspects.23 It should be understood from a negative 
perspective as non-psychological. More specifically, physical conditions are typically 
tangible capacities such as life, health, body integrity, freedom of movement and property. 
Non-typical physical conditions may include economic assets, mental health, 24  general 
natural conditions, information, etc. – which are intangible, yet still appropriately 
characterised as physical, rather than psychological.  
                                                          
20 Feinberg does admit that they are generally evils of their own kind, and could be interpreted as offence in 
offence principle, or other evils in alternative and similar liberty-limiting principles e.g. legal moralism. Ibid 
48-49. However, it will be argued that physical discomforts cannot be offensive under the operation of the 
offence principle (see III(ii)a). 
21 Ibid 215-16. 
22 A P Simester, Andreas von Hirsch, ‘On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation’ (2016) 10 Crim LP 
367, 378. 
23 ‘Physical’ here means the same as in a dictionary: relating to the body, material existence, material things or 
the sciences dealing with matter and energy (such as gravitational wave), rather than psychological or 
spiritual. 
24 In R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, the House of Lords held that where A made repeated silent telephone calls to 
B, and B suffered psychological damage (illness) because of that, B could be said to have suffered ‘bodily 
harm’ for the purposes of the criminal law. 
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Setbacks to these interests can be objectively analysed. In particular, tangible capacities 
include mental health and with it the ability to address certain problems and situations. 
Psychiatric injury or mental illness may be caused by ‘a sudden assault on the senses’ in the 
sense of ‘shock’ or by ‘a more drawn-out process’.25 Harmful mental disorder or illness – 
even if cannot be subjectively sensed by the victim himself when he is deprived of his mental 
functioning – can be objectively assessed by medical professionals. This judgement is itself 
sufficient to reach a conclusion of harm. In contrast, unpleasant feelings generally are not 
objective setbacks that exist independently of the individual subject’s own awareness. They 
are felt instantly. 
In sum, the ‘harm’ in the harm principle does not include purely emotional setbacks, but 
encompasses all objective setbacks to all physical interests. In the particular context of my 
account of public order as a protectable interest, this means that harm in public order should 
firstly be understood as objective disruptions to physical interests in life order. 
In order to develop this account, it is necessary to determine the kinds of order interests that 
are physical interests for the purposes of the harm principle. The objects of convenience and 
comfort in civil life include physically-visible facilities and places, invisible general 
conditions and information and external life peace (that is neither material nor energy but 
still physical). Physical inconvenience and discomfort is a kind of harm. Mobbing, riot or 
affray in public objectively interferes with people’s convenient use of a public place or 
facility, causing obstruction etc., and thus is obviously harmful disorder. The harmful 
dimension of disorderly begging or loitering will be examined in chapter 4. In this physical 
paradigm of harmed interests, Feinberg’s ‘disliked but not harmful’ experiences should be 
re-examined. 26  For example, non-painful physical unpleasantness, e.g. chills, stiffness, 
extremes of heat and cold, may be caused by public order crimes which are harmful to 
physical life comfort. 
Secondly, the requirement that a setback can be objectively analysed means that ‘mere 
sensuous assaults’27 – or affronts to physical senses – such as visual discomfort from seeing 
clashing colours, auditory discomfort from nails scratching loudly across a slate tablet or a 
portable radio emitting screeching sounds at maximum volume,28 should be re-examined as 
                                                          
25 See Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com DP 
No 120, 2002) 2. 
26 See HTO 46-49. 
27 OTO 15. 
28 Ibid 10-11. 
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harmful disruptions of life order. They all objectively set back physical comfort in general 
conditions of life. Noise harms us by its objectively measurable physical character of sound, 
volume or intrusiveness.29 Stenches, as another form of physical nuisance, are harmful 
affronts to olfactory comfort. As will be argued in the next part on offence, these affronts to 
senses do not constitute offence for the purposes of the offence principle. 
b. Legally Recognisable Setback 
The above objective setbacks to interests should be legally recognisable i.e. they should be 
clearly and consistently identifiable in legal practice, otherwise ambiguity and arbitrariness 
conflict with due process and fair warning.30 In the absence of any recognisable setback to 
protectable interests, there should be no enactment of offences against public order.31  
Setbacks to interests should be recognised in a special way when they are factually causal 
phenomena.32 To set back an interest ‘is to reverse its progress, to put it in a worse condition 
than it was formerly in’.33 We need, therefore, to find a starting point or baseline to analyse 
and explain the direction of advance or retreat.34 The counterfactual baseline should be 
adopted: the interest is set back when the subject is worse off regarding well-being than he 
would have otherwise been had the act not occurred.35 The baseline of the physical life 
conditions specified in chapter 1 can be consistently identified. For example, it is claimed 
that environmental laws exist either to ‘further the public health and safety’ – or to ‘protect 
the environment itself, for its aesthetic, recreational and other values’.36 Here, infringing on 
people’s life convenience and comfort by setting back an aesthetic or recreational condition 
of the environment can be recognised as harmful disorder. The baseline of such a life 
condition can be identified by environmental measurements. In short, to objectively set back 
                                                          
29 See R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 59. 
30 Fair labelling requires the ‘harm’ denounced be differentiable in types and degrees. See BOP 127. This 
requirement cannot be fulfilled if the setback itself is not consistently identifiable.  
31 For example, on the effect of the common injury of public nuisance, four questions should be answered: ‘(1) 
injury to whom (or to how many)? (2) what type of injury? (3) how great an injury? (4) for how long?’ See 
the Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com CP No 193, 2010), paras. 2.19-2.35.  
32 See M Zhang, Preliminarily on Legal Interests (CUPLP 2000) 165. 
33 HTO 53. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Thomas Søbirk Petersen, ‘Being Worse Off: But in Comparison with what? on the Baseline Problem of 
Harm and the Harm Principle’ (2014) 20 Res Publica 199, 208. 
36 See Daniel E Hall, Crminal Law and Procedure (6th edn, Delmar, Cengage Learning 2012) 223.  
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public order is to render life inconvenient or uncomfortable by influencing a baseline of a 
condition of an interest. 
Disruptions of public order can, however, sometimes be unclear. A notorious Taiwan case 
was when a protesting student who threw a slipper at the ‘premier’, which fell a meter away 
from him, was charged with having violated section 85 (1) of the Social Order Maintaining 
Law (‘using obviously inappropriate language or behavior towards an official on duty, 
although it does not reach the degree of violence or insult’) – and her lawyer argued that the 
law should not protect official authority in itself (the quality of having others’ belief and the 
freedom from doubt).37 Can setbacks to the official authority be recognised as harming 
public order? If yes, how should the baseline of the interest be identified? If setbacks to the 
official authority are not recognised as harming public order, is there another recognisable 
setback to a specific public order interest? 
I will argue that because setbacks to abstract collective interests such as official authority 
are difficult to recognise legally when in circumstances in which it is difficult to identify the 
baseline of the interest, setbacks to them do not constitute harm (to public order). However, 
the conduct which has an impact on authority or administration in some cases may involve 
recognisable setbacks to a public order interest of a type not specified in chapter 1.  
To identify a baseline of a condition of an interest such as the convenient use of a public 
place, we need firstly to find an embodiment or representation of the interest – for example, 
a public place such as a public square – and then identify a condition of this embodiment, 
such as its spacious capacity, and finally identify the baseline of the condition – such as the 
original capacity before the harmful conduct – to determine whether there is a setback. 
Therefore, the articulation itself of interests should not be obscure, otherwise the interest ‘is 
certainly unenlightening’38 – and its setbacks are ‘not preventable as a practical matter by 
the law’.39 For a collective interest such as respect for official authority, the specification of 
relevant setbacks is difficult and arbitrary because there is no further embodiment or 
representation of the interest.40 That is, the setbacks cannot be presented by ascertaining a 
baseline of a condition of an influenced or changed object such as a public facility, place or 
                                                          
37 See Wenlei Ding, ‘Female Student Fined for Throwing a Slipper to Taiwan Premier, Appeal Denied’ Chinese 
New Site (Beijing, 27 April 2014) <www.chinanews.com/tw/2014/04-27/6109978.shtml> accessed 29 May 
2018. Assault is not criminalised in Taiwan.  
38 HTO 56. 
39 Ibid 62. 
40 See Yongqian Wang, ‘On the Criminal Law Protection of Collective Legal Goods’ (2013) 4 GL Rev 67, 75, 
78. 
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environmental element. The affected official authority is not a specific embodiment itself. 
Even if it were, it is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly determine the original authority of 
an official position or organisation to consistently recognise relevant setbacks. In short, 
setbacks to collective goods such as authority itself are too obscure and arbitrary to measure, 
and so cannot be recognisably harmed. The harm principle thus should not recognise social 
harm to a collective good e.g. official authority as a justification for criminalisation.41  
That said, conduct which has an effect on such collective goods may involve recognisable 
setbacks to physical public order interests. Chapter 1 identified public order as life 
convenience, comfort and peace in general and set out six typical life order interests. There 
are other specific life order interests, setbacks to which may also be recognised as harm to 
public order. To return to the example of throwing a slipper at the ‘premier’, the conduct can 
be perceived as causing or risking disruptions to the continuation of the civil life activity at 
which that person is speaking. 
Persistently defying police order by, for example, repeated vandalism or naked rambling, 
leads to another question of how affecting legal authority or policing administration might 
disrupt public order. Persistent vandalism not only harms the convenient and/or comfortable 
use of a public facility or place, but also disrupts administrative work. That is, the conduct 
may cause not only the harm to the public, but its persistence forces the public authority to 
devote resources to its prevention, thus disrupting the work of the agency. Can this disruption, 
therefore, be seen as another kind of harm to public order? This question is even more 
complicated when we consider the example of naked rambling in which the obvious 
criminality is offence to others, but the further criminality is a risk of harm: 
… the applicant’s arrest, prosecution, conviction and imprisonment can be seen to have 
pursued the broader aim of seeking to ensure respect for the law in general, and thereby 
preventing the crime and disorder which would potentially ensue were the applicant 
permitted to continually and persistently flout the law with impunity because of his own 
personal, albeit sincerely held, opinion on nudity.42  
For the naked rambler’s conduct to amount to a public order crime, it must recognisably set 
back a public order interest. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights, from 
                                                          
41 Social harm has been rejected as a useless circular argument – see SCL 64. 
42 Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [158]. 
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which the above quote is taken, was not based solely on the need to protect respect for law: 
the naked rambling itself occasioned alarm to others and thus its discontinuation by the 
police prevented offence, while the persistence of such behaviour may provoke harmful 
disorder or crimes, and so its discontinuation may have prevented harm. Whether there is a 
normatively unacceptable risk of offence or harmful disorder, to be prevented by the specific 
policing activity, is a problem of imputation, to be discussed in the next chapter. Here, I will 
assume that the risks associated with the behaviour are normatively unacceptable – and 
therefore that the specific policing activity in question is a civil life activity to be protected 
from disruption.  
Defying public administration can recognisably set back a physical public order interest – 
specifically the smooth continuation of a specific policing activity. Public administration has 
the social function of protecting various interests of the public and thus has its own value in 
maintaining the agency’s smooth continuation of work or activities.43 Persistent defiance of 
policing causes not only a risk of alarm, disorder or crimes, but also harmful disruption to 
the specific police activity of preventing the risk of alarm, disorder or crimes. If people do 
not cooperate with the public agency by, for example, disregarding police warnings to 
disperse,44 or entering officially banned or restricted areas,45 the specific policing activity, 
as a civil life activity, is recognisably disrupted.  
Similarly, reporting false information to a public agency causes difficulties for that public 
agency in organising its work. A false allegation to an emergency service generally wastes 
or diverts personnel or resources. A false statement to any person who may wrongly believe 
they need help from an agency not only causes a risk of offence to the victim, but also a risk 
of harmful disruption to the activities of the agency.46  
In short, abstract authority or administration itself cannot be recognisably set back, but the 
smooth continuation of a specific administrative activity aimed at the prevention of offence, 
disorder and crimes can be recognisably disrupted. The activity is a civil life activity and 
                                                          
43 Public disorder, if left uncheck(ed), seems possibly or even likely to threaten personal and property safety 
and it was historically associated with a power to disperse. See Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The 
New Oxford Companion to Law (OUP 2008) 278. 
44 See Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, s 30(4).  
45 See Chinese policing law, s 50(4). 
46 See Summary Offence Act 1981 (NZ), s 24. Threats may disrupt civil administration activities, see Crimes 
Act 1961 (NZ), s 307A(2)(c). 
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needs to operate without resistance or disturbance. This is important in identifying the scope 
and limits of some public order crimes.47  
(iii) Normative Setback  
Although we can factually recognise an objective setback to a physical interest, this simple 
harm would not necessarily be normative harm for the purpose of the harm principle. 
Feinberg argues that in the case of a non-normative setback to interest (simple harm), if it is 
also indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable), then the harm is wrongful. 48  So for 
Feinberg, there are three separate elements of harm – ‘harming [in the sense of setting back 
an interest], wronging, and being at fault’.49 Wrong is ‘narrow’ and ‘normative’ harm.50 I 
will argue that a normative setback must be both wrongful (unjustifiable) and culpable 
(inexcusable), but I do not discuss culpability here. An objective setback must be 
normatively wrongful to limit the scope of harm in public order. 
There can be different possible approaches to the wrongfulness of harm. It has been argued 
that balancing conflicting interests is inherently not a part of determining harm. 51  But 
another approach is to argue that wrongful harm is simple harm that cannot be justified by a 
counter-interest. Invasions of interests ‘might well inflict harm in the non-normative sense 
of simple setback of interests’ – and the existence of objective harm to a physical interest is 
itself sufficient to presume the existence of a wrong, but the harm may be ‘justified by the 
priority rules’ so as not to be a legal wrong.52  The wrongfulness is considered in the 
balancing test – reasoning in the concept of being ‘bare[ly] wrongful’ – the reasons to do it 
being defeated by those not to.53 The opposed interests of the parties to an activity are to be 
balanced in deciding whether the setback is wrongful: how vital these interests are; the 
degree to which each is reinforced by other interests; and the inherent moral quality of each.54 
                                                          
47 This is a way to justify the criminalisation of obstructing a police officer in the execution of duty (Police Act 
1996, s 89(2)). The criminalisation of obstructing emergency workers (Emergency Workers (Obstruction) 
Act 2006, s 1) should be similarly justified. In Chinese Criminal Law, disrupting (specific) public 
service/function is the first crime against public order (s 277). 
48 See HTO 34.  
49 See Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offence to Others’ 
(1986) 84 Mich LR 700, 702. 
50 See HTO 33-35. 
51 See Steven D Smith, ‘Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?’ (2006) 51 Am J Juris 1, 39-41. The problem of 
wrongfulness may not be just the absence of a recognised justification, but broader than this (involving 
assessments of permissible conduct in civil order). Here I am replying to Feinberg’s argument of justification, 
not bringing in a new perspective of civil order, although this idea is really worth trying in another writing. 
52 See HTO 35. 
53 See J R Edwards, A P Simester, ‘Wrongfulness and Prohibitions’ (2014) 8 Crim LP 171, 171. 
54 See HTO 204-06. Feinberg says some interests are inherently unworthy such as the interests of peeping tom 
or sadist (see HTO 205-06). However, it is not a problem of immorality, but of generality. As he recognises 
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This normative wrongfulness of the objective setback concerns ‘larger debates in ethics, law 
and politics’ and ‘larger social, political, cultural and historical factors’.55  
Wrongfulness thus concerns itself with justifications. When the defender harms the attacker, 
the setback to the attacker’s personal interests is not wrongful because of the justification of 
self-defence. Excuses that affect the actor’s culpability or fault may not be relevant to 
whether the harm is wrongful. Feinberg has articulated ‘harming as wronging’ separately in 
chapter 3 of Harm to Others.56 But as von Hirsch notes, Feinberg ‘briefly lists the elements 
of culpability… then he has nothing more to say about these elements… Culpability must 
be addressed separately to have the visibility that it needs for adequate analysis’.57 For 
example, attacks by an insane person or a child are still wrongful, unjustifiably violating 
others’ personal rights. In such cases, those attacked can justifiably defend themselves; 
whether the actor can be excused is a separate question.58  
In the area of public order, therefore, not all factual disruptions of order are normatively 
wrongful. There may be a good reason to interfere with others’ smooth life – the normal use 
of a life facility, life place, regular enjoyment of general conditions, acquisition of 
information or general enjoyment of peace. This reason is about actions ‘reasonably to be 
expected in the normal course of life’ e.g. exercising freedom of expression or freedom of 
assembly and association.59 While major events may affect an individual’s normal use of a 
public place such as a square or a park, this factual harm may be justified by public interests 
in exercising, for example, the right to protest or freedom of assembly – meaning that there 
is no wrongful harm.60  
                                                          
in his accompanying note 8, there is difference between protectable interests and mere wants. Some rare 
persons’ inclusive ends in their own chosen happiness (see HTO 56) – such as the naked rambler’s belief in 
neutrality of public nudity – are not legally protectable because the law can and should only cater to 
generally/commonly recognised categorical interests, rather than subjectively claimed wants or ends, thus 
they naturally cannot compete with protectable interests in privacy, dignity etc. 
55 See Bernard E Harcourt, ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle’ (1999) 90 J Crim L & Criminology 109, 140, 
183. That is, wrongfulness engages with political and legal culture’s accounts of rights’ value. See Hamish 
Stewart, ‘Harms, Wrongs, and Set-backs in Feinberg’s Moral Limits of the Criminal Law’ (2001) 5 Buff 
Crim L Rev 47, 67. 
56  This conception of wrong focuses on ‘other-regarding violations’. See Antje du Bois-pedain, ‘The 
Wrongfulness Constraint in Criminalisation’ (2014) 8 Crim LP 149, 149-60. 
57 See Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offence to Others’ 
(1986) 84 Mich LR 700, 702.  
58 See R A Duff, ‘Harms and Wrongs’ (2001) 5 Buff Crim L Rev 13, 19. 
59 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com No 358, 2015) paras 3.60-3.61.  
60 Particularly on the defenses of human rights in public protests, see the legal guidance of prosecution: CPS, 
‘Public Protest’ <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_protests/#a05> accessed 29 May 2018. 
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Assessing the opposed interests of two sides is complex,61 and the process of balancing 
opposed interests should be a structured one,62 as will be further shown in applying the harm 
principle (see chapters 3 and 4). In this case, the justification offered by the actor may not 
be compelling enough to override concerns of disorder – and thus insufficient to resist the 
imposition of conditions or prohibition in cases of e.g. public processions or assemblies.63  
To sum up, the harm principle should focus on objective, recognisable and wrongful setbacks 
to physical interests. A good reason to consider criminalisation exists when there is an 
objective, recognisable setback to a physical-style protectable interest without a competent 
justification. This structured conception of harm can potentially limit the general scope of 
harm in public order crimes. This concept will be further elaborated in chapter 3 (fair 
imputation) and applied in analysing the criminalisation of specific public disorder cases 
such as begging and loitering in chapter 4.  
III. OFFENCE IN PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES 
This part will examine the concept of offence and how it is important in limiting 
criminalisation in public order. Beginning with a literature review which sets out the key 
factual and normative elements of the concept, it will explain in detail how ‘offence’ might 
be defined in these two dimensions for the purposes of public order law. 
(i) Introduction of Key Elements of Offence 
Many types of conduct might be considered offensive. The problem in this area is that 
defining offence in terms of the reactions of others may be overly broad – and it may be 
proper to preserve some space that allows individuals to challenge the scope of 
criminalisable offence. These issues can be particularly acute in relation to public order as it 
is frequently in public space or in relation to the forms of public conduct where these disputes 
occur. 
                                                          
61 For civil law ‘defences in a nuisance action’ that can be illuminating to criminal defenses, see John Bates, 
William Birtles and Charles Pugh, Liability for Environmental Harm (Tottel Publishing 2004), 22-25. On 
the other side, governments may administer public places such as streets to promote mobility and city 
prosperity (see Ron Levi, ‘Loitering in the City That Works’ in Markus D Dubber and Mariana Valverde 
(eds), Police and the Liberal State (Stanford General 2008) 199. 
62 For opposed interests in a nuisance activity, the balance of relative reasonableness to respective possessor, 
see Michael M Berger, ‘Nobody Loves an Airport’ (1970) 43 S Cal L Rev 631, 637-38. 
63 See Public Order Act 1986, ss 12-14A. 
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One approach is to regard offence as sufficing in itself to justify criminalisation. Feinberg 
argues that ‘it is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it 
is necessary to prevent serious offence to persons other than the actor and would be an 
effective means to that end if enacted’. 64 But Feinberg’s account seems to equate offence 
with affronts to sensibility.65 According to his account, the greater the scope of people who 
regard the conduct as offensive, the weaker the case to allow it.66 More importantly, it is not 
clear how exactly the scope of affronts should be limited or their seriousness judged.  
In contrast, von Hirsch does not consider the offence principle to be separate from the harm 
principle and suggests that immediate offence and ‘eventual harmful consequences’ be 
conditions of criminalisation.67 He provides ‘more a set of (valuable) tools for applying the 
Harm Principle in the context of offensive conduct rather than a truly distinctive principle’.68 
That is, he requires that criminalisable offence must risk remote harm such as prejudice to a 
person’s chances of employment or actual violence in the case of racial insult, or reactive 
harm such as restricted access to and enjoyment of public places in the case of public 
exhibitionism.69  The reason is that offence tends to be insufficiently serious to justify 
criminalisation by itself, particularly as freedom of expression requires a degree of social 
tolerance.70 I do not agree that to justify criminalisation, offence must risk harm. This is not, 
however, to argue for the criminalisation of all offensive conduct. Such criminalisation 
should be limited to serious offence.71 As argued in the next chapter, the imputation of 
remote harm of offence is not as obvious as assumed by von Hirsch.72 As for freedom of 
expression, it does call for some social tolerance, but I will suggest considering it in terms 
of limiting wrongful offence (see section (iii)), rather than as a factor inherent in determining 
the seriousness of the offence itself.  
                                                          
64 OTO xiii. 
65 See CHW 95; J D Hodson, The Ethics of Legal Coercion (D Reidel Publishing Company 1983) 144. 
66 See J Feinberg, ‘‘‘Harmless Immoralities’’ and Offensive Nuisance’ in Care and Trelogan (eds), Issues in 
Law and Morality (The Press of Case Western Reserve University 1973), 102. 
67 See Andreas von Hirsch, ‘Harm and Wrongdoing in Criminalisation Theory’ (2014) 8 Crim LP 245, 252.  
68 James Chalmers, ‘Review of CHW’ (2013) 17 Edin LR 279, 280. 
69 See CHW 114-18.  
70 Ibid 118, 120-22. 
71 See R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 78. In the cases of naked rambling 
and the Taiwanese insult (II(ii)b), I did not argue that offence should necessarily risk remote harm if it is to 
be criminalised, Remote harm might be imputed to aggravate the offence and that is another problem 
addressed in the next chapter (II(ii)b).  
72 See CHW 115-17. It is important to note that in Public Order Act 1936, s 5, there was ‘prohibition of 
offensive conduct (threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour) conducive to breaches of the peace’ 
– while in Public Order Act 1986, ss 4A and 5, the target is (likely) harassment, alarm or distress. 
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More importantly, the seriousness of offence is not a problem for present purposes. 
Determining the scale and threshold seriousness of criminalisable offence is mainly a 
question to be addressed in further studies (see chapter 5).73 Before assessing the seriousness 
of offence, it is necessary first to establish the qualitative criteria for identifying, and 
assessing the scope of, ‘offence’. ‘Too much legal commentary purports to evaluate 
something called “the offence principle” without first clarifying the nature of offence itself 
as ‘the central term in the inquiry’.’74 The common feature of all modes of offence is the 
causing of an unpleasant inner state that is inconvenient for the enjoyment of work or 
leisure.75 This unpleasant state sets back an interest:  
‘If harm is to be understood as a setback to one’s interests or one’s well-being, there is 
no good reason to exclude unpleasant feelings from the idea of harm. For unpleasant 
feelings erode well-being, and one has an interest in not experiencing them.’76 
In this quote, Tadros explicitly argues that offence sets back a protectable interest. Although 
he makes offence part of the harm principle that includes setbacks to all interests, this may 
be on the hypothesis that ‘unless a rather special and implausible objective list theory of 
well-being is accepted, the Offence Principle should be subsumed in the Harm Principle’.77 
If such a list theory of interests is arguable, we should separate offence from harm and not 
regard all setbacks to interests as constituting harm. Feinberg, in the first chapter of Harm to 
Others, defines harm as setbacks to interests – distinguishes between harms, hurts and 
offences – and finally introduces the concept of an interest network and identifies the object 
of harm as welfare interests.78 However, in Offence to Others he does not indicate what 
interests are legally protectable against offence. Harm and offence are two different evils 
that set back different protectable interests. I have argued for a list of physical conditions as 
objects of harm in Part II(ii)a and will now argue for non-physical conditions as objects of 
offence.  
                                                          
73 It is claimed that no social tolerance is suggested ‘if it gets to the point of adversely affecting many people’s 
lives’, see A P Simester, Andreas von Hirsch, ‘On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation’ (2016) 10 
Crim LP 367, 371. This seems to suggest that public offence is intolerable. But it is still possible to regulate 
offensive conduct which only affects one individual. Psychological affront itself can affect people’s life in 
some way, and there can be corresponding criminal regulation, at least in the name of other regulatory or 
administrative violation with a lesser label and sanction. 
74 Douglas Husak, ‘Disgust: Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB 94. 
75 See OTO 15-23. 
76 Victor Tadros, ‘Harm, Sovereignty and Prohibition’ (2011) 17 LT 35, 39 (emphasis added). 
77 Thomas Søbirk Petersen, ‘No Offence! On the Offence Principle and Some New Challenges’ (2016) 10 Crim 
LP 355, 355. 
78 See OTO 55-61. 
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There are, of course, other key elements of offence, although the exact number and 
understanding of these elements might well be different.79 This part will discuss how the 
concept of ‘offence to others’ should be interpreted and applied to offensive conduct. I will 
firstly define offence as a factual setback to inner peace. Secondly, this factual account of 
offence will be normatively examined by looking at when the offence is wrongful. 
(ii) Factual Setback 
I will argue in this section that as a factual setback to a protectable interest, offence is a 
breach of inner peace that is based on and mediated by normative sensibilities, the breach 
being caused by communication. I will then examine how these sensibility and 
communication mechanisms of offending others can shape the scope of offensive conduct. 
a. Inner Peace’s Mediated Affront  
Feinberg defines offence as a ‘disliked state of mind’,80 which might be taken to imply that 
liked states of mind are the interest to be protected from offence. However, he states that 
‘there is (typically) no interest in the avoidance of’ ‘disliked states of mind’, 81  while 
asserting that ‘generalized’ and minimally necessary ‘welfare interests’, including 
‘emotional stability, the absence of groundless anxieties and resentments’, once ‘blocked or 
damaged’, are ‘seriously harmed’. 82  I will consider whether momentary anxiety or 
resentment is a harm to emotional stability or is an offence to something. The concept of 
welfare interests is understood in ‘an interest network’ as having ‘the characteristics of bare 
minimality, stability, and durability’.83 Thus emotional stability’s setbacks are harm to a 
welfare interest only when they are sufficiently continuous; momentary interference does 
not constitute harm. However, it is still not clear what kind of interest is set back by a 
momentary interference. 
In Part I(ii)(a), it was argued that the scope of the harm principle is limited to physical 
interests. Here, for the purposes of the offence principle, non-physical inner peace is the 
                                                          
79 See OTO 2; Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of HTO and OTO’ (1986) 84 
Mich LR 700, 709-14; CHW 95-98. 
80 OTO 2. 
81 HTO 216. 
82 Ibid 37. 
83 See OTO 55-57. 
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interest set back by momentary interference.84 As argued in the previous chapter (IV(ii)a), 
every individual requires protection not only of their physical interests, but also the non-
physical conditions required for smooth life. Inner peace is a stable inner state without 
unreasonable annoyance, distress, alarm, fear, etc. This is the interest people have against 
offence. If offence does not setback this socially founded and recognised interest (inner 
peace), the offence principle would be thought of as hollow and thus unable to bear the 
substantive wrongfulness of offence.85  
Inner peace is breached on the level of internal sensibilities. The offence principle sees 
‘[conduct] norm violations as legitimate sources of punishable offence’.86 So the internal 
mechanism of how offence occurs is that the a person receiving a communication, by virtue 
of ‘normative sensibilities’ of safety, comfort and values,87 experiences a reaction to the 
communication, in the form of certain recognised mental states – fear, revulsion, disgust, 
shock, shame, embarrassment, anxiety, annoyance, boredom, frustration, resentment, 
humiliation or anger, as listed by Feinberg.88  These sensibilities are based on and thus 
mediated by ‘certain beliefs about an otherwise self-concerning action in order for the effect 
to be generated’.89  
This sensibility mechanism of offence can serve as an analytical framework for 
understanding the relationship between morality, decency, religion and public order, or 
rather when inner peace as an order interest can be found in and supported by social norms 
of morality, decency and religion. 90  In particular, it can provide a possible means of 
understanding that a gross violation of morals and decency in public constitutes an offence,91 
and a possible means of assessing the claim that the criminalisation of bestiality and of 
                                                          
84 In this sense, defining harm as setbacks to ‘interests’ is not sufficiently precise since interests here should be 
understood as all the conditions needed for well-being of individuals. The object of offence needs to be 
separated from that of harm. 
85 See RNTC 196-98. 
86 See Larry Alexander, ‘The Philosophy of Criminal Law’ in Jules L Coleman and others (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (OUP 2004) 864. 
87  Andwew von Hirsch and AP Simester, ‘Penalizing Offensive Behavior: Constitutive and Mediating 
Principles’ in IROB 123. For example, ‘we are taught to be disgusted by given stimuli through social 
referencing – that is, by watching and mimicking the reactions of adults.’ Douglas Husak, ‘Disgust: 
Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB 106. 
88 See OTO 11-13. 
89 M J Mulnix, ‘Harm, Rights, and Liberty: Towards a Non-Normative Reading of Mill’s Liberty Principle’ 
(2009) 6 J Mor Phil 196, 210. 
90 It is a legal policy for political values (drawn from morality, decency or religion rules) to be transformed 
into legal categories (such as sensibilities of inner peace). See Mauro Zamboni, The Policy of Law: A Legal 
Theoretical Framework (Hart Publishing 2007) ch 4. 
91 Wolfgang Wohlers, ‘Criminal Liability for Offensive Behaviour in Public Spaces’ in A P Simester and others 
(eds), Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Hart Publishing 2014) 249. 
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cruelty to animals is justified by virtue of the offensiveness to social values associated with 
such conduct.92  
As argued in Part II(ii)b, criminal law can and should only directly protect specific and 
substantive legal interests (such as inner peace) – rather than an abstract collective good 
(such as a social value). However, ‘some protection against offensive immorality may be 
achieved as a by-product of legislation that aims directly at something [such as affronts to 
sensibilities of inner peace] other than immorality’.93  This is because of the normative 
sensibility that connects morality and the law protecting inner peace. Inner peace is based 
on and mediated by sensibilities – and sensibilities may be in line with morality. When 
immoralities take place in public,94 they may result in affronts to sensibilities that are in 
accordance with morality, thus breaching others’ inner peace.  
Sensibilities may also align with decency. Decency is the quality of following accepted 
social propriety in public occasions.95 Mill believed that self-injury, if done publicly, was a 
violation of good manners, and this indecency caused offence to others and might rightfully 
be prohibited.96 He seems here to exceptionally accept offence based on indecency as a 
reason for prohibition. 97  In this case the offence is affronting others’ sensibilities by 
indecency. For example, conducting any indecent act in any place intending to insult or 
offend any person is a crime of ‘disorder’ in Canada.98 Another example is the notorious 
naked rambler, who was punished for fear and alarm resulting from ‘his naked state in 
public’.99 Further, the State may protect people from inadvertent offensive displays of sexual 
behaviour and eliminate cruelty to animals.100 Offensive displays cause offence to the inner 
                                                          
92 See R v Malmo-Levine [2003] 3 SCR 571 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
93 Louis B Schwartz, ‘Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code’ (1963) 63 Colum L Rev 669, 673. 
94 ‘Publicness rather than immorality is the heart of the concern.’ David Brown, Brown, Farrier, Neal and 
Weisbrot’s Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South Wales 
(Federation Press 2015) 83. In this sense we can support a suggestion of the1957 Wolfenden Report of ‘a 
realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business’. See 
Home Office, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Cmnd 247, 1957) para 
61. 
95 Decency crimes refer to matters intending and likely to shock and disgust others. See Simplification of 
Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law Com CP No 193, 2010) para 3.21. 
96 See OL 108-09. 
97 ‘Mill, however, did not distinguish harm from offense. He spoke of ‘‘other-regarding’’ and ‘‘self-regarding’’ 
acts.’ Judith Andre, ‘Review Essay / Regulating Offensive Acts’ (1986) 5 Crim Just Ethics 54, 55. Specific 
disruptions of order by public duel can be identified. The indecent act could be offensive when the act 
happens in public and causes another unreasonable ‘fear for his personal safety’, or fear of ‘unlawful 
violence’. Public Order Act 1986, ss 1 (Riot), 2 (Violent disorder), 3 (Affray), 4 (fear or provocation of 
violence). 
98 Indecent acts and nudity are a ‘disorderly conduct’ rather than ‘offences tending to corrupt morals’ in the 
code. See Canadian Criminal Code 1985, ss 173-174. 
99 See Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [158]. 
100 See Commonwealth v Bonadio 490 Pa 91, 415 A 2d 47 (1980).  
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peace of individuals, and cruelty to animals is offensive to others when it takes place in 
public.101 
Religious doctrines are another set of social rules on which sensibilities may be based. Some 
‘crimes against religion’ still exist for a reason such as the apprehended offence to others’ 
sensibilities of inner peace. Blasphemous libel (or blasphemy) is an example of a crime 
against religion that still exists in some countries such as New Zealand. Section 123 of New 
Zealand’s Crimes Act 1961 punishes blasphemous libel – though a bona fide opinion on a 
religious subject that is expressed in decent language cannot constitute a blasphemous 
libel.102 That assessing good faith and decent language is deemed to be ‘a question of fact’ 
in this law suggests that the crime exists not so much to uphold any religious value but a 
sociological interest. It is not the biblical authority that is to be protected. Rather, it appears 
that the inner peace (of the public) is being protected here. Affronts to sensibilities at the 
time of the conduct may be linked to public order and thus be regulated criminally. If 
‘published matter’ in bad faith or in indecent language is not curbed, people in good faith 
may be reasonably offended. In this case the offence to the sensibility of the inner peace of 
the public arises from the indecency in civil life.  
In short, so-called offenses against morality, decency or religion should either be classified 
as public order crimes (breaching others’ inner peace) – or decriminalised if they cannot be 
justified as public order crimes and when no alternative justification for criminalisation 
exists.103 
Having shown how offence is related to social norms, it is necessary to consider how the 
scope of offensive conduct is further limited. It follows from the mechanism of affronting 
sensibilities based on social norms that offence does not include affronts to senses or 
setbacks to other physical interests. Feinberg believes ‘offence’ to be all ‘universally disliked 
                                                          
101 Private cruelty to animals cannot, therefore, be criminalised on the basis of the offence principle; an 
alternative justification for criminalisation will be required. 
102 The statute provides: ‘(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year who publishes 
any blasphemous libel. (2) Whether any particular published matter is or is not a blasphemous libel is a 
question of fact. (3) It is not an offense against this section to express in good faith and in decent language, 
or to attempt to establish by arguments used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, any opinion 
whatever on any religious subject.’ 
103 In a modern democratic society, respect for morality and religion is no longer considered a good reason to 
criminalise such conduct as a separate crime category. See T Hornle, ‘Offensive Behavior and German Penal 
Law’ (2001) 5 Buff Crim LR 255, 278. Supporting blasphemy as a crime against religion is unrealistic and 
unjustified in a democratic multi-faith society. See Kimmo Nuotio, ‘Theories of Criminalisation and the 
Limits of Criminal Law: A Legal Cultural Approach’ in R A Duff and others (eds), The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law (OUP 2010) 251. The English crime of blasphemy was abolished by statute in 2008, and 
Scots law should do likewise. See SCL 446. 
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mental states’,104  and even to include ‘affronts to the senses’.105  However, most of the 
behaviour targeted by ASBOs – e.g. noise – has little to do with offence.106 Noise is a 
physical nuisance. This is ‘distinguishing offence from [physical] nuisance’. 107 Offence is a 
nuisance to life not because of any physical characteristic, but of the affront to inner 
normative sensibilities.108 It is in this respect that affronts to senses are immediate, while 
affronts to sensibilities are mediated (by inner normative processing of communication) – 
the former ‘can of course be harmful’.109 Audio or visual discomfort is an immediate harm 
to physical senses, rather than a mediated offence to sensibility.  
Nonetheless, harm, if instantaneously perceived by the victim, can simultaneously cause 
offence.110 A noise may be a harm to physical comfort; while at the same time leading to 
annoyance (if inconsiderate) or fear (if threatening), just as an assault primarily causes harm 
and secondarily causes offence. If a person only recognises the second evil caused by the 
conduct, he may characterise the conduct as offensive.111  
b. Communicative Affront  
After articulating the inner sensibility mechanism of offence, to further recognise how inner 
peace is offended, the external communication mechanism of offence ‘to others’ should be 
assessed. Simester and von Hirsch argue that offence is communicative and expressive.112 
The offender communicates with the affected by his conduct or language. It is the 
communication that results in offence.113 This direct external offending mechanism is an 
absolute requirement because, for the actor to be responsible for the offence, it should be the 
                                                          
104 See OTO 1. 
105 Ibid 10. 
106 Douglas Husak, ‘Disgust: Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB 95. 
107 CHW 104-05. 
108 This is why ‘the source of the dislike makes it a harm [offence exactly] in one case and not in the other’. 
Jonathan Wolff, ‘Mill, Indecency and the liberty Principle’ (1998) 10 Utilitas 1, 5. 
109 See R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 59. 
110 ‘Offended states of mind … are sometimes symptoms or consequences of prior or concurrent harms.’ HTO 
49. 
111 Ibid 60-61. 
112 See CHW 111, 120. 
113 There is criticism of the communicative feature (in the sense personal offence) whereby one can take 
offence for others – pornography may say something about, rather than to, women, and a racist speech may 
be delivered to an all-white audience, rather than directly to a black victim. See Tony Ward, ‘Review Crimes, 
Harms, and Wrongs’ (2012) 1 Aus & NZ J Crimino 138, 138-139. It depends on what is said about women 
in pornography to determine whether it is still direct offence to the male viewers. Racist speech to an all-
white audience can still be directly offensive to the audience. In the ‘Danish cartoon crisis’, ‘the cartoons 
were considered offensive by many Muslims and non-Muslims, for many reasons’ (Thomas Søbirk Petersen, 
‘No Offence! On the Offence Principle and Some New Challenges’ (2016) 10 Crim LP 355, 357). One 
reason may be that all people share some common basic values and thus all people are directly offended. 
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actor who initiates the communication to another. The communicative feature of offence 
determines the cases that can offend for the purpose of the offence principle, and the cases 
that cannot.  
Firstly, the communicative mechanism of offence determines the possible scope of offensive 
conduct in general. Feinberg’s ‘bus journey’ experiment is said to evidence his idea that the 
criminal law should only be concerned with offence when that offence occurs in public.114 
However, although ‘there are norms about proper conduct in public that are sources of 
offense’,115 ‘its being of public concern is a question of whether it harms [or offends] 
others’. 116  Receiving a communication is ‘part of the very reason for objecting to the 
conduct’.117 Private conduct directed at another person, but without any other member of 
the public being present, can still be offensive to the person at whom the conduct is directed 
and thus legitimately criminalised. For example, ‘one-on-one’ offensive or false messages 
are still criminally punishable despite the wrongful conduct lacking any public element.118 
It seems wrong to conclude that offence must be experienced in a public space in order for 
the community as a whole to have a substantial interest in regulating it,119 although offensive 
conduct against public order may have to take place in a public space for criminalisation to 
be justified.  
Publicness has many possible definitions. Here, I limit ‘public’ to ‘to others’ in the context 
of offence. After identifying the possible scope of offence in general, it is necessary to 
identify the kind of offence that is relevant for public order. If the offence were to be a public 
order problem (see public indecencies and insults in chapter 5), the offended should 
comprise an unspecified person, many persons or one specified person in a public occasion 
– according to the standards of publicness set out in the previous chapter (III(i)c). However, 
not all kinds of public communicative affront is going to be public order related. For example, 
spreading false rumours might be offensive, but only a matter of private wrong (slander) – 
or a criminal wrong to an individual (libel) – or it might be a matter of public order (hoaxes). 
The distinction is whether the public inner peace is set back directly or as a sub-effect of 
harm (to reputation for example). In the case of slander or libel, the individual may be 
                                                          
114 See SCL 85. 
115 Larry Alexander, ‘Harm, Offence, and Morality’ (1994) 7 Can JLJuris 199, 211. 
116 Jonathan Wolff, ‘Mill, Indecency and the liberty Principle’ (1998) 10 Utilitas 1, 6. 
117 Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of HTO and Offence to Others’ (1986) 84 
Mich LR 700, 712. 
118 See Malicious Communication Act 1988, s 1; Telecommunications Act 1984, s 43(1).  
119 See J Tasioulas, ‘Crimes of Offence’ in IROB 151. 
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offended (distressed), but that is an incidental effect of the direct harm to reputation – while 
in the case of hoaxes, the direct effect is offence (alarm) to the public inner peace.120  
Secondly, the communicative mechanism means mere thoughts of private immorality or 
knowledge after the fact cannot offend in the sense required by the offence principle.121 
Immoral conduct may be initially private but later become a matter of public knowledge and 
thus a public concern. However, the communicative mechanism of offence does not operate 
in respect of mere thought or knowledge. With the mere thought of private immorality, even 
if the immoral event were happening at the same time, there is no communication by the 
actor – in mere knowledge after the fact, the communication does lead to immediate offence, 
though there is no communication by the actor at the event. It is the imagination of the 
affected party, or the subsequent revelation, that leads to a loss of inner peace.  
This mechanism excludes from the scope of the criminal law private conduct which is 
disliked by some sections of the community. That is, people do have a right to inner peace 
for smooth life, but offence from others’ private behaviour cannot justify criminalisation 
because those ‘others’ do not communicatively cause the loss of inner peace. For example, 
same-sex sexual conduct in private,122 private incestuous behaviour and private possession 
or use of cannabis should not be regulated via the offence principle.123 In a Scottish case of 
breach of the peace, ‘simulating sex with a bicycle in the locked bedroom of the hostel’ did 
                                                          
120 Admittedly, being publicly communicative may not be the exclusive feature of public offence, but that case 
exists in transmitting information that causes harmful mental breakdown or sets back the interest of secrecy 
or reputation. 
121 Knowledge after the fact is bare knowledge that ‘neither [directly] sees nor hears’ ‘what other people do in 
private’, see SCL 85. Feinberg considers this to be a problem of abnormal susceptibilities (OTO 33), again 
in the problem of profound offence (OTO 60). 
122 ‘No harm [or offence] to the substantive interests of the community is involved in atypical sex practice in 
private between consenting adult partners.’ See American Law Institute: Model Penal Code, s 207.5—
Sodomy & Related Offenses. Comment <www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/UnitedStatesofAmerica/Model%20Penal%20Code%20United%20States%20of%20America%2019
62.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018. 
123 These evil-less (neither harmful nor offensive to others) wrongdoing are also believed that they need not to 
be criminalised based on a utilitarian cost/benefit analysis of consequences of enacting and enforcing a 
prohibition. See Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalisation: An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law 
(Springer-Science +Business Media, B V 1994) 220-25. 
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not communicate offence124 – in contrast to ‘simulating sex with an inanimate object’ in a 
public street or ‘in front of a crowd of people’.125  
After relating private immorality to the nature of offence in general, we need to consider 
cases involving a public element. Dealing with different kinds of public communicative 
affront is a more difficult question. For example, if the offence to the public were caused by 
third party’ revelation of the private incivility, then the public offence leads to an imputation 
problem of remote offence (see the next chapter, V(i)b).  
(iii) Normative Setback  
Factual breaches of inner peace do not necessarily constitute normative offence. To further 
limit the scope of offence, this section will examine how the communication mechanism of 
offence may lead to a normative problem of offence and how this problem can be 
progressively approached. 
Unlike physical harm, which could itself principally constitute the existence of a wrong, the 
determination of wrongfulness of offence is more complicated when the offence to others is 
committed by communication, with its frequent challenges being argued based on the 
reasonableness of the offensive conduct, mainly that the conduct is an exercise of freedom 
of expression. ‘There is a conceptual link between offence and expression.’126 This is how 
the communicative mechanism of offence may lead to a normative problem of offence. 
There are different understandings of the wrongfulness of offence. Feinberg requires the 
caused offence to be ‘wrongful’ i.e. ‘whenever an offended state is produced in another 
without justification or excuse’.127 ‘In this respect [of defining wrongfulness] there is a 
parallel with the harm principle.’128 As I argued in respect of wrongful harm, wrongfulness 
should concern itself only with justification, while excuse only affects a further question of 
                                                          
124  See ‘Bike sex man is placed on probation’ BBC News (London, 14 November 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7095134.stm> accessed 29 May 2018. But the 
accused was ultimately convicted. Whether there was a significant risk of his conduct being discovered by 
people entering his room is another problem of abstract risk addressed in the next chapter (IV(ii). It may 
have been determinative that cleaners were permitted to open residents’ rooms (BOP 112), but he was at 
most reckless. 
125  See ‘Bike case sparks legal debate’, BBC News (London, 16 November 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7098116.stm> accessed 29 May 2018. 
126 CHW 122. 
127 OTO 2.  
128 Ibid. 
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culpability. However, even for ‘justification’ Feinberg has not explicitly set out how 
‘unjustifiable’ should be understood in determining the wrongfulness of offence.  
In similar vein, others have argued that the wrong of offence should be seen in the feature 
of lack of consideration or disrespect for others, typically in cases of insulting conduct or 
exhibitionism.129  According to this theory, emphasising this lack of consideration is an 
effective way of limiting the scope of criminalisation.130 However, this unifying feature of 
‘a failure to treat others with due consideration and respect’ is too obscure to consistently 
determine the scope of wrongful offence.131 There is no specific approach to assess the due 
consideration and respect which should be taken in exercising freedom of expression. 
Among typical cases of wrongful conduct, 132  firstly, not all insulting conduct will be 
wrongful and worthy of criminalisation. Insulting ‘particular religions or the beliefs or 
practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its 
adherents’ is not prohibited or restricted in England.133 To take another example, section 5 
of the Public Order Act 1986 had previously also targeted ‘insulting’ conduct as do sections 
4 and 4A, but this word was deleted by section 57 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The 
test of ‘due consideration and respect’ cannot provide a clear reason for this change. 
Secondly, not all public behaviours that pre-empt others’ attention, such as exhibitionism, is 
wrongful.134 Consider events such as naked bike rides.135 How can the unifying but abstract 
idea of communicating disrespect and inconsideration clearly and consistently explain 
whether the offence in these cases is wrongful or not?  
Identifying the wrongfulness of offence requires the development of a framework of 
balancing interests. The wrong of criminal conduct should be understood as an unjustifiable 
negation of the interests of others. ‘A central premise for an adequate theory of 
criminalisation should be that the law must only regulate interpersonal relations.’136 The 
view taken by the actor is therefore not enough to deny the wrongfulness of the offence. For 
example, ‘unrestricted freedom of expression is neither essential of the quality of one’s life 
                                                          
129 See CHW 97-100.  
130 Ibid 95-97. 
131 Ibid 100. 
132 Ibid 97. 
133 POA 1986, 29J. 
134 See CHW 98. 
135  See W Noble, ‘In Pictures: London's World Naked Bike Ride 2018’, Londonist (London, 6 June 2018) 
<https://londonist.com/london/art-and-photography/in-pictures-london-s-world-naked-bike-ride-2018> 
accessed 15 June 2018. 
136 T Hörnle, ‘Theories of Criminalisation (Comments on CHW)’ (2016) 10 Crim LP 301, 307. 
66 
 
nor is it convincing as a moral right or as a legal right’.137 Similarly, the right not to be 
offended is not absolute. For example, ‘in the case of simple insulting, offensive remarks, 
freedom of speech can be of high importance as a possible justification’.138  
However, the framework is complicated. Many mediating factors are relevant to the 
seriousness of the offence or to the reasonableness of the conduct, as Feinberg articulates.139 
Identifying two clear lists of factors affecting the wrongfulness/acceptability of offence, and 
to attempt to balance them, is a significant step. However, Feinberg’s two lists of factors 
(see paragraphs below) that affects either the seriousness of the offence or the reasonableness 
of the conduct may be arbitrary: ‘there is … no clearly enunciated rationale explaining why 
his mediating principles [i.e. factors] are given the particular weight and interpretation he 
would prefer’.140 Moreover, the lists are too cumbersome to be applied consistently. I will 
argue that only some of the factors listed by Feinberg are relevant to a principled 
determination of wrong and that the lists should be restructured accordingly.  
On the seriousness of an offence, firstly, the magnitude of the offence is relevant to wrong.141 
That is to be balanced with the value of the conduct. It includes, as Feinberg suggests, 
intensity, duration and extent.142 But firstly, the meaning of ‘extent’ should be clarified: it is 
not the degree of the offensiveness, but the seriousness of the offence. A racist remark 
against a majority racial group is not ‘more seriously offensive’ conduct than one against a 
small racial minority.143 However, the resulting offence may be more serious because of its 
greater extent – involving more people – if the intensity of the offence is the same. Secondly, 
duration and extent are mainly quantitative criteria, while intensity is essentially qualitative. 
Nonetheless, an assessment of qualitative intensity may need to consider the category of 
offence reaction (see chapter 5).144  
Secondly, reasonable avoidability is, as Feinberg suggests, relevant to the assessment of 
wrongfulness.145 This relevance is because of social toleration – there should be reasonable 
                                                          
137 Ibid 309. 
138 T Hörnle, ‘Criminalising Behaviour to Protect Human Dignity’ (2012) 6 Crim LP 307, 318. 
139 See OTO 34, 44. 
140 Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offence to Others’, 
(1986) 84 Mich LR 700, 709. 
141 See OTO 26-31. 
142 Ibid 27-32. 
143  See Uma Narayan, ‘Offensive Conduct: What Is It and When May We Legally Regulate It?’ (PhD 
dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 1990) 162.  
144 The seriousness may also consider the strategic timing (such as during important ceremonies that may affect 
intensity) – as well as frequency. HTO 46-47. 
145 See OTO 32. 
67 
 
toleration towards others’ conduct most obviously by ready avoidance. Whether it is easy or 
difficult for the affected person to avoid the offence may affect the balance of interests of 
parties. When offence is easily avoided at no greater cost than the offence otherwise taken, 
there is no wrongful conduct.146 However, when it is difficult to avoid the offence, the wrong 
is not excluded and should be further examined. For example, in a case of a Nazi party 
demonstrating in a 60% Jewish community,147 ‘the objective circumstances are such that the 
target group is inescapably exposed to that offence’.148  
Thirdly, applying the volenti non fit injuria principle may result in the conclusion that there 
has been no setback to interest – or rather, no wrongful setback.149 In cases where conduct 
has been agreed to, there is either no setback to interest – or this setback is not wrongful 
because the affected party has voluntarily assumed the risk of offence, thus justifying the 
actor’s conduct.  
Fourthly, abnormal susceptibility on the part of the affected person is also relevant.150 When 
a reasonable person would not be offended, the actual reaction should be regarded as 
abnormal and no basis for a conclusion of offence. But when a reasonable person would be 
offended, but not as offended as an actual person was, the ‘seriousness is to be discounted’.151 
Abnormality will not be analysed here because, as the name suggests, only in exceptional 
cases will this problem be relevant in the determination of wrongfulness. It will be analysed 
in detail in the next chapter (III) as an initial problem of fair imputation. 
After considering the seriousness of the offence, the reasonableness of the offending conduct 
should be considered to determine the wrongfulness of the offence. The first factor of 
reasonableness is the personal importance of the conduct – that is, the extent to which the 
conduct was meaningful to the living and development of the actor.152 This is to assess the 
importance in his whole interest network. Although the specific meaning and value belongs 
exclusively to the actor, it should be generally recognised by others as morally 
unproblematic,153 e.g. the pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty, property, reputation and 
                                                          
146 ‘Ready avoidability’ is a threshold limit, see CHW 129. 
147 See OTO 86. 
148 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Speech, Media and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression (Palgrave 2001) 22.  
149 See OTO 32-33. 
150 Ibid 33-34. 
151 Ibid 35. 
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153 Ibid; Uma Narayan, ‘Offensive Conduct: What Is It and When May We Legally Regulate It?’ (PhD 
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power. If the conduct were only seen as important by the actor, the meaning of the conduct 
is a subjectively arbitrary claim of the actor, not socially recognised as important, such as 
the naked rambler’s personal value in expressing that public nudity is morally neutral154 – 
or an individual’s advocacy of the sexual freedom of school children.155 The conduct is 
normatively of little personal importance in his network of interests – and so the personal 
importance cannot override others’ protectable interest in avoiding offence. Further, 
extremism pursuits of violence, prejudice, hatred etc. are normatively of no personal 
importance.156  In contrast, personal importance in some cases could mean fundamental 
human rights that would operate as a competent justification. Fundamental rights here 
correspond with welfare interests that are necessary for basic living.157 Therefore, when the 
conduct – such as a beggar’s exposure of deformity in seeking help has personal importance 
to the actor to the degree of fundamental human rights, the personal importance could 
override the interests of another person in avoiding unpleasant mental states.158  
Secondly, social value, when high, could be a justification.159 Social value in this context 
should be understood as referring to cases where the conduct is of ‘social and political’ value 
to other citizens. 160  Social value means the conduct is valuable for others’ life and 
development, and thus its commonality of recognition is more obvious than that of personal 
importance. It means the personal importance is reinforced by others’ relevant interests – in 
this respect the ‘personally valuable conduct’ is part of the activity of ‘great deal of public 
value’.161 Freedom of expression is of this quality of advancing other interests. Its social 
value can be sufficiently enough to serve as a justification. ‘There exists a strong public 
interest in enabling such groups and individuals, outside the mainstream, to contribute to the 
public debate by disseminating information and ideas on matters of general public interest 
such as health and the environment.’162 Even ‘activities or modes of life that at first repel us 
might be worthwhile, although we would not engage in them ourselves’.163 However, in 
                                                          
154 ‘Having regard to the absence of support for such a choice in any known democratic society in the world.’ 
Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [184].  
155 See Turner v Kennedy (1972) SCCR Supp 30. 
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exceptional cases such as racial insults, the social value of extreme ideas being freely 
expressed by a very few groups and individuals cannot be recognised given ‘our firmest 
[‘moral’] convictions of ‘political equality and human dignity’.164 
Thirdly, the existence of alternative times and places for the conduct could be relevant to 
justification as Feinberg argues165 – or relevant to culpability. When the actor has no option 
but to choose the given means, time and place, he may be excused. The law does not force 
or expect anyone to do the impossible. When the actor has a choice, at no great cost, of 
another manner of expression which would avoid offence, but still chooses the offensive 
manner, the offense is unnecessary and thus wrong.166 Wrong in the context of the offence 
principle means on balance that the conduct unnecessarily breaches inner peace to which 
others have a right to. Consideration, as well as toleration, towards fellow members of the 
community is a necessary component of social civility. ‘In the specific context of the 
development and meaning of different types of public space’ we can determine ‘the 
appropriate uses of that space’ ‘and appropriate forms of conduct’. 167 This is a perspective 
of judging whether there are alternative opportunities, although not a standard itself of 
whether there is.168 
Fourthly, malice and spite themselves are not factors that affect the determination of 
wrongfulness of offence as suggested by Feinberg,169 but subjective aggravating factors of 
crime seriousness or constitutive culpability element of the crime.170 It may be claimed that 
because some categories of offence, or even all of them, are very minor, we should limit 
criminalisation to instances where the actor acts out of malice or spite. This is, however, 
unpersuasive if the objective seriousness is already recognised as very trivial – just as it is 
unreasonable to suggest that because a person’s subjective state is so evil that his trivial 
killing of an ant is to be punished. Wrongfulness is the normative conclusion that the 
                                                          
164 See Robert Amdur, ‘Review: Harm, Offence, and the Limits of Liberty’ (1985) 98 HLR 1946, 1958-59. 
165 See OTO 40. 
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169 See OTO 41-42. 
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justification, if any, is not weighty enough to counterbalance the seriousness of the breach 
of inner peace.171 It does not engage subjective malice or spite.172 
Fifthly, the nature of the locality means that, from the perspective of the actor, others act 
similarly in a given neighbourhood.173 Although the conduct is common there, this fact itself 
cannot justify the act, just as the fact of many people spitting in a slum does not mean that 
spitting is not wrongful. However, the fact that the act is ‘widely known to be common’ there 
could mean the reactor has voluntarily assumed the risk of the unpleasant mental state if he 
has a reasonable opportunity to avoid it but chooses not to. This situation does not apply a 
corollary of alternative opportunities of the actor as Feinberg suggests, 174  but that of 
reasonable avoidability of the offence and the volenti maxim.   
Therefore, only magnitude, personal importance and social value, avoidability and 
alternatives of the offensive conduct are relevant general considerations in assessing 
wrongfulness. Magnitude and avoidability should be balanced with personal and social 
meanings and the alternatives available to the actor. In particular, I have sought to combine 
the ready avoidability backed by social tolerance and the alternative opportunities backed by 
social consideration, in order to provide a more principled proportionality framework of 
balancing affronts to sensibility and freedom of expression. 175  Their more structured 
interaction will be set out in chapter 5.  
After articulating the offended interest, the offending mechanisms and the normative 
dimension, it can be concluded that offence, for the purposes of the offence principle, is a 
breach of others’ protectable inner peace without weighty justification, by communication 
processed by the reactor’s sensibilities based on social norms. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has restated concepts of harm and offence and has argued how they can be 
applied to limit public order crimes. Firstly, the harm principle and offence principle can be 
grounded by a clear, consistent concept and scope of harm and offence. Harm should be 
                                                          
171 Malice or spite may aggravate the seriousness of setback to inner peace only when the offended feels it. 
172 See J D Hodson, The Ethics of Legal Coercion (D Reidel Publishing Company 1983) 145. 
173 See OTO 42-44. 
174 Ibid 44. 
175 The ideas of social consideration (by the actor) and social tolerance (by others) towards communicative and 
expressive offence have thus been valued, holistically, by being embodied by specific factors (alternatives 
by the actor and avoidability by others) that can be balanced against each other. 
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understood as objective, recognisable and wrongful setbacks to physical interests and 
offence as communicative and wrongful setbacks to inner peace based on normative 
sensibilities.  
Obviously, harm and offence can and should be compared and contrasted in aspects of the 
interest which is set back – the way of setting-back – and the way of justifying. They will be 
discussed similarly with reference to rules of imputation in chapter 3. This parallel mode of 
discussion hopefully reveals more issues and leads to a more consistent approach to 
criminalisation than analysing the concepts of harm and offence separately. Based on the 
restated ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ in terms of criminalisation principles, a clear, consistent 
framework for limiting criminalisation can be identified: only when there is an evil (harm or 
offence) setting back a legal interest in a wrongful (i.e. unjustifiable) way, can 
criminalisation be justified.  
Accordingly, harm/offence to others’ interest in smooth life is the moral basis for forming 
and shaping rules of criminalising disruptions of public order. Inconvenience or discomfort 
or breach of life peace without competent justification is the factual and normative 
harm/offence of a public order crime. Arguments which seek to justify criminalisation in 
respect of public order should identify specific setbacks to public order interests (i.e. legally 
recognisable physical and non-physical nuisances against interests in quality of life), before 
moving to normatively balance the possible conflict of interests in social interaction. This 
position will be developed further in Chapter 3 and applied to disorderly conduct in Chapter 
4 and offensive conduct in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 Fair Imputation in Public Order Crimes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter argued that the state may criminalise conduct if it causes harmful 
disorder or offence in the absence of a justification of sufficient weight. It was assumed for 
the purposes of that chapter that if the disorder or offence were directly and necessarily 
caused by the conduct then there is no difficulty with imputing the result to the conduct. 
However, conduct may not be virtually certain to cause the result in every case although it 
does to some extent risk the result. That is, harm or offence may be ‘too remote and 
accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing … on the gravity of his offence’,1 or the risk 
of causing harm or offence may not be normatively linked to the behaviour. It is necessary 
to address the question of how we should assess the fairness of imputing harm/offence, or 
its danger to the conduct.2 What I mean by imputation here is not mere factual causation, but 
instead normative causation. What conditions are required to move from identifying a factual 
cause to recognising it as a normative cause? 
The theoretical problems of imputation in this context can be classified into three types. 
Firstly, the disorder or offence may have in fact been caused, or likely to have been caused, 
by the putative victim being unusually vulnerable to this type of conduct. In a case of the 
victim’s vulnerability the risk of the conduct causing disorder or offence may not be fairly 
imputable to the conduct. For example, if a passer-by were upset by viewing a ‘naked 
rambler’, can the alarm which they experience be fairly imputed to the naked rambling, or 
is it better explained by the abnormal vulnerability of the ‘victim’?3 In the second type of 
case, we might take the view that certain conduct is categorically harmful or offensive, but 
in a specific case the conduct might not have harmed or offended anyone, perhaps because 
others have not noticed it, or are not actually affected. For example, it may be that a naked 
rambler was recorded by a CCTV camera while walking through a small town at midnight 
and not actually observed by any passers-by. This type of case raises a problem of imputing 
                                                          
1 American Law Institute: Model Penal Code (1985), s 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) <www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-
of-force/western-europe-
others/UnitedStatesofAmerica/Model%20Penal%20Code%20United%20States%20of%20America%2019
62.pdf>accessed 29 May 2018. 
2 See HTO 192. Hence it may not be fair to criminalise the conduct. 
3 See Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [173]. 
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liability to the accused person on the basis of an abstract or hypothetical risk of disorder or 
offence, rather than any actually caused disorder or offence. Although we may recognise 
that naked rambling is generally offensive, it offended no others in this instance. Should the 
rambler be exempted from liability? Finally, if it were argued that conduct is only disorderly 
because it risks future disorder as a result of further conduct by oneself or others, should that 
disorder be imputed to the prior conduct? An example of this is a Scottish case of a 
transvestite walking in a red light area in Aberdeen, being found guilty of breach of the peace 
because the court held that his conduct created a risk that others might respond in a violent 
or disorderly way.4 In the case of the naked rambler, his conduct was considered to have 
been aggravated by ‘the crime and disorder which would potentially ensue’ because of the 
persistent offence to others.5 Is this kind of criminalisation or aggravation, which is based 
on imputation of remote disorder, fair or unfair? 
In developing a general approach to the problems of imputation which arise in public order 
cases of abnormal, abstract or remote risk, I will set out a new two-step process for dealing 
with problems of fair imputation based on Feinberg’s doctrines of dealing with cases of 
risking harm.6 In the first step, it is necessary to restate the formal rules for assessing whether 
the risk of causing disorder or offence is substantial. Then in the second step, it is necessary 
to substantively balance the risk against any related justifications for the conduct. I will then 
develop and illustrate this two-stage approach through an examination of each of the three 
problems of imputation set out above. 
Before doing so, it is necessary to briefly explain how this two-step process for fair 
imputation is different from the argument presented in chapter 2. We can see, after all, that 
the second step of fair imputation of the disorder/offence seems to overlap with the 
identification of wrongfulness of the conduct in terms of the justifiability of the conduct. At 
both stages (identification of the harm/offence and imputation), two steps are applied to 
determine whether we should attribute liability to the actor. In every case it will be necessary 
to ask the substantive question, but in some further cases it will also be necessary to consider 
the question of imputation – which is not focused on general questions, but instead on 
whether a particular individual created a particular risk and whether that was justified.  
                                                          
4 See Stewart v Lockhart 1990 SCCR 390. 
5 See Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [158]. 
6 See HTO 216. 
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II. A TWO-STEP APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF IMPUTATION 
Two main approaches have been suggested in the existing literature for addressing 
imputation problems, but I will argue that these are not sufficiently consistent and clear. 
Feinberg argues that because statutes must ‘be formulated in general and simple terms’ – 
and protected people must ‘be presumed to have standard vulnerabilities’ – ‘other people’s 
vigorous but normally harmless activities’ can only be limited when they are ‘deliberate and 
malicious’.7 However, his general approach is not strictly applied in his analysis of specific 
cases. Feinberg offers two examples of this pragmatic approach to the problem of normally 
innocuous conduct causing harmful disorder. When a person suffers from the ringing of a 
church bell, the ‘convulsions’ of ‘a hypersensitive individual’ cannot be imputed to the 
ringing because that ‘is harmless to persons of normal susceptibility’, ‘has social value (or 
at least no disvalue)’ and its performance is ‘normal and faultless’ – but in contrast, ‘ringing 
bells’ ‘all over New England’ would be harassment if it were done ‘for no respectable 
purpose’ and was ‘deliberately malicious’.8 Feinberg in these two specific cases weighs the 
formal regularity of the reaction, the substantive value or purpose of the conduct and even 
the subjective state of mind of the actor.  
The identification of some specific factors may assist in determining imputation. But, 
although each factor seems itself clear in its meaning, Feinberg’s account contains no 
coherent articulation of how one or more of these different factors should consistently affect 
the imputation process. It is not clear why he arbitrarily considers some factors – such as the 
formal regularity of the reaction in the former case of ringing a church bell – and then other 
factors, such as the subjective state of mind of the actor who rings bells ‘all over New 
England’. There is no general concept that can consistently and coherently unify and 
structure these factors.  
A second kind of approach gives rise to similar problems of inconsistency. Simester and von 
Hirsch base their approach on a general and abstract requirement of wrongfulness9 – and 
further consider some classes of endangerment offences (such as offences of abstract risk), 
mediation interventions (by further conduct) and conjunctive harms and their respective 
particular governing principles of imputation.10 The general concept of wrongfulness is 
                                                          
7 Ibid 192-93. 
8 Ibid 192-93. 
9 See CHW 71. 
10 Ibid 75-88. 
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supplemented by three particular principles that deal with the different types of problems of 
imputation. That is, for imputation in cases of abstract risk, an ‘obligation of cooperation 
among participants in mutual activity’ can account for the wrongfulness requirement;11 in 
imputing further risks, ‘some types of normative involvement’ of advocacy, encouragement 
and imitations and assistance can account for the wrongfulness requirement12  – and in 
imputing conjunctive harm, ‘a scheme of cooperation requiring joint effort’ may account for 
the wrongfulness requirement.13  
In short, in every kind of case of imputation there seems to be a different principle at work 
in flexibly judging the wrongfulness of the risky conduct, but the different principles are not 
specific and clear in themselves. Each is too abstract to be applied consistently. Moreover, 
it is not clear how the general requirement of wrongfulness is embodied in Simester and von 
Hirsch’s three particular principles. In the absence of a clear basis for embodying this general 
requirement by particular principles, there is no clear guidance on how abstract wrongfulness 
should be assessed in the context of other problems of imputation. For example, it is not 
clear how the particular principle of judging wrongfulness should be in the imputation of 
abnormal risks. Last, but not least, this approach of imputation seems to consistently 
emphasise the requirement of wrongfulness, and thus underestimate the requirement of 
assessing the risk itself, though in specific cases of imputation Simester and von Hirsch 
explicitly admit that ‘of course, the probabilities also count’.14 
I would argue that both the assessment of the risk itself and the wrongfulness of the risky 
conduct are relevant factors that affect imputation – and that we should account for the risk 
itself before moving to the assessment of wrongfulness. This argument is based on, and is a 
development of, Feinberg’s approach. Although he did not propose a clear and consistent 
approach to the imputation of abnormal risks – as shown above – Feinberg has nevertheless 
identified the correct general approach. In assessing the criminalisation of risky conduct – 
that is conduct that is ‘neither perfectly harmless nor directly and necessarily harmful’ – 
Feinberg proposes that ‘the greater the gravity of a possible harm’ and/or ‘the greater the 
probability of harm’, ‘the greater the magnitude of the risk of harm’ and thus the stronger 
the case for prohibiting the conduct; meanwhile, ‘the more valuable (useful) the dangerous 
conduct, both to the actor and to others, the more reasonable it is to take the risk’, and ‘the 
                                                          
11 Ibid 78. 
12 Ibid 79-85 
13 Ibid 86. 
14 Ibid 83 (emphasis in original). 
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more reasonable the risk of harm (the danger), the weaker is the case for prohibiting the 
conduct that creates it’.15 I will instead structure Feinberg’s serial rules into two tiers –  
suggesting that in some cases it is unnecessary to consider the rules in the second tier. My 
main contribution, therefore, is not to suggest an approach substantively different from 
Feinberg’s general approach (that considers a series of rules at the same time) – but to show 
how the serial rules should be considered in a clear and efficient way.  
In the first tier, the higher the level of the risk, the stronger the case for imputing the result 
to the conduct. Whether there is more or less risk is determined by the seriousness of the 
disorder/offence and the probability of the disorder/offence being realised.16 The factors 
affecting the level of the risk are, therefore, principally seriousness and probability. However, 
in each of the three problems of imputation identified above, a different emphasis may be 
put on different factors, with the way the two factors interact in determining the level of the 
risk being variable in different cases. Typically, if the probability were very low – such as 
in cases of abnormal vulnerability and offensive conduct provoking disorder – there seems 
to be no need to assess whether the risked disorder/offence is very serious, because it is fair 
to say that the negligible risk (e.g. of one being offended by common conduct of approaching 
to beg or another being provoked to act violently or disorderly in a case of coming across a 
transvestite) should not be imputed to the conduct. In other cases of imputation, both the 
seriousness and probability factors will be analysed to determine whether the level of risk is 
substantial enough to arrive at a preliminary conclusion of imputation.  
In the second tier, even where the risk of disorder is substantial, it may still be unfair to 
impute the result to the conduct because it may depend on the acceptability of the risk or 
rather, the justifiability of the conduct. This is to say that the value of the conduct may 
exclude the imputation of the result to the conduct. This second step requires a balancing of 
the personal importance and social value of the conduct, if such value were asserted, and 
the substantial risk of the disorder/offence. The value/use of the conduct, as will be shown, 
may appear in different forms in each of the three imputation problems set out above. In 
cases of vulnerability in particular, it will take the form of an overriding constitutional value 
such as equality in some cases of homosexuals’ public kissing that offends a passer-by or a 
Christian’s barbequing that offends a Hindu vegetarian neighbour, while in other cases of 
                                                          
15 See HTO 216 (emphasis in original). 
16 Ibid. 
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imputation the value of the risky conduct may be insufficient to outweigh the substantial risk 
of the conduct. 
In this filtering structure, the relationship between the formal test of substantial risk and the 
substantive test of value can be examined step by step. When the level of risk is not 
substantial – because of low probability and/or trivial seriousness – it cannot reasonably be 
imputed. On the other hand, when the level of risk is substantial, it may still be not imputable, 
for failing the substantive test of personal value and social meaning of the conduct. In short, 
the formal test of substantial risk is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for imputation 
– in some cases there may be no need to further consider the substantive test to deny the 
conclusion of imputation. This general two-tier approach is clearer than von Hirsch and 
Simester’s approach of emphasising abstract wrongfulness – and more efficient than 
Feinberg’s approach of indiscriminately considering a range of factors in the case of 
abnormal vulnerability e.g. the convulsions of an individual hypersensitive to the ringing of 
a church bell. In the next three parts, I will illustrate how this approach can be applied in to 
each of the problems of imputation identified at the start of this chapter. 
III. ABNORMAL VULNERABILITY  
A person’s life activities may cause or risk disorder or offence to vulnerable people. 
Abnormal vulnerability gives rise to a problem of imputation because the disorder or offence 
results from the personal characteristics of the victim. Legal systems may develop their own 
approaches for dealing with this kind of problem. The problem of imputation in cases of 
abnormal vulnerability may be dealt with by the conventional test of a ‘reasonable person’. 
I will argue that this test should be replaced by the two-tier approach set out above.  
An illustration of the application of the reasonable person test can be seen in a Scottish case 
of a breach of the peace committed by approaching people to beg. The court used an 
objective test to determine, upon the facts, the likelihood of alarm being caused: 
In assessing whether conduct [approaching people to beg] is capable of being classified 
as breach of the peace the court must apply an objective test to determine whether, upon 
the facts, the conduct was likely to cause alarm or fear. Of course, if such alarm or fear is 
actually caused, that may be strong evidence that the conduct meets the test but it cannot 
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be conclusive, since the subjective reactions of the alleged victims may vary according to 
their temperament and are thus merely indicators.17 
The court asked whether a reasonable person in that situation would have been alarmed by 
the conduct of the accused and, having concluded they would not have been, quashed the 
conviction. The Scottish test for breach of the peace focuses only on the formal 
characteristics of the conduct. That requires a judgment to be made on the part of the fact-
finder. However, it does not provide an insight on how to judge a reasonable person’s 
reaction. This ambiguity will lead to inconsistent decision-making. 
It seems this test adopts conventional reasoning that if the reaction of others is to be imputed 
to the conduct, the reaction of the affected person should be that of a reasonable person,18 as 
the reaction of ‘the normal person in his position’.19 That is, when a reasonable person would 
react as the victim, the reaction of the actual victim is reasonable and can be fairly imputed 
to the conduct in question. Besides, the crime can be committed without there being any 
victim who was alarmed, provided that a reasonable person would have been. An English 
example of applying a ‘reasonable person’ test is the use of ‘a person of reasonable firmness 
at the scene’ in riot, violent disorder or affray.20 However, the ‘reasonable person’ concept 
is too vague to be consistently applied.  
Gardner has argued that the notion of ‘a reasonable person’ ‘used to set standards in so many 
corners of the law’ has ‘many faces’.21 It may adopt ‘customary standards’ (‘prevailing 
social norms’) 22  – or ‘specialised standards’ ‘that are specific to particular trades or 
professions or (more generally) roles’23– or it may personalise the impersonal by considering 
the particular condition of a particular defendant (as exculpatory or sympathetic).24 These 
standards of reasonableness are problematic – not readily workable in some imputation 
scenarios identified above. 
                                                          
17 Donaldson (James) v Vannet 1998 SLT 957, 959.  
18 See Michael G A Christie, Breach Of the Peace (Butterworths 1990) 105. 
19 HTO 50. 
20 POA 1986, ss 1-3. 
21 See John Gardner, ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ (2015) 131 LQR 563, 564. For more 
references, see Alan D Miller & Ronen Perry, ‘The Reasonable Person’ (2012) 87 NYUL Rev 323; Frédéric 
G Sourgens, ‘Reason and Reasonability: The Common Necessary Diversity of the Common Law’ (2015) 
67 MeL Rev 73. 
22 See John Gardner, ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ (2015) 131 LQR 563, 575. 
23 Ibid, 576. 
24 Ibid 578. 
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When ‘reasonable’ is used in the sense of ‘customary’ (one of the ‘faces’ identified by 
Gardner), it refers to a prevailing social norm. In the present context, this would mean 
identifying a majoritarian group of people (normally the general public) who are likely to 
react in the same way to the conduct in question.25 However, in favouring majoritarian social 
norms, this approach may fail to protect minorities. If the conduct in question affects the life 
convenience, comfort or peace only of a particular group of people, that group’s reaction 
may not be regarded as reasonable because their response differs from the majoritarian one. 
This version of the ‘reasonable person’ is, therefore, under-inclusive of comparator groups, 
and so we may have to consider the other ‘faces’ of a ‘reasonable person’. 
When ‘reasonable’ is used in the sense of ‘specialised’, it adopts a social norm of a special 
section of the community. This does not require the identification of a majoritarian group, 
and so this standard is more inclusive of particular comparator groups than the ‘customary’ 
face. However, this standard is designed ‘for more or less specialized pursuits calling for 
more or less specialized competence’, such as civil engineer, neurosurgeon, etc. 26  The 
standard refers only to social norms which are specific to a trade, profession or other general 
social roles. This does not mean that there is a legal rule for every specialised pursuit. Some 
social roles are probably not sufficiently general as a trade or profession and thus it is not 
‘tolerably clear that there is one’ ‘legal rule’.27 As a result, it is not clear how the witnesses 
should be expected to react. That is, this standard still does not cover some comparator 
groups. The law has to find other standard of reasonability. 
Lastly, when ‘reasonableness’ is used in the sense of ‘personalised’, the liability may or may 
not be imputed to the actor because of his special characteristic. Feinberg might argue that 
because the naked rambler, from his previous arrests, must know that others would be 
alarmed such that he can easily avoid the alarm, the reaction of others should be imputed to 
him – just as he argues that if a waiter knows the allergy of a customer to salt but still serves 
the customer with salty food, the allergic reaction should be imputed to the waiter.28 The 
conclusion in these cases seems correct, but the reasoning is not and it may lead to 
unreasonable conclusions. If the imputation of a reaction depends on whether the actor 
knows the likelihood of the reaction and he can readily avoid it, then if anyone tells the 
transvestite about the likelihood of alarming others, the transvestite should limit his choice 
                                                          
25 Ibid 575-76. 
26 Ibid 577. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See HTO 192-93. 
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because he could easily avoid transvestitism in public places where it may alarm others. 
However, imputation of the response should be objective and ‘impersonal’, not bending to 
‘the varying personal characteristics of those who are judged by them’,29 because otherwise 
there would be no steady but only arbitrary or contingent imputation. 
In short, the ‘customary’ test seems clear and objective, but too limited in imputation – while 
the personalised test tends to be subjective and arbitrary. Comparatively, the ‘specialised’ 
test seems more appropriate, but is still insufficiently inclusive of comparator people and 
should be optimised on the basis proposed in the following section. It is also burdensome to 
choose one particular standard, rather than another, of the reasonable person in a given case.  
Alternatively, I will argue for an approach which I will call ‘structured imputation’, 
comprising a formal test and a substantive test. Firstly, I will suggest the objective test of 
‘parallel people’ to assess the social reasonability of imputing the abnormal reaction. The 
test is mainly used to make the decision of no imputation, not of definite imputation. We 
should first judge whether the reaction is reasonable on the basis of the relevant social norm 
i.e. whether the objective risk of disorder/offence is substantial or very low. If low, it is not 
imputable. If so, there may be a further step to determine whether imputation is reasonable: 
I will substantively assess the result of the formal test against constitutional values to finally 
determine the normative reasonability of imputation.         
(i) Formal Test of Parallel People  
The reasonable reaction should be within the bounds of what is socially reasonable. 
Reasonableness in this context should be assessed on the basis of social norms – by the 
method of assessing the reaction of a hypothetical group of people if they follow relevant 
social norms. In this way, legislators and judges need to imagine positioning themselves 
within this group of people in order to determine what a reasonable reaction would be. This 
group of people who observe the same kind of social norms in a given occasion can be 
described as ‘parallel people’. This test is drawn from that used for judging subjective 
                                                          
29 John Gardner, ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ (2015) 131 LQR 563, 578. The actor’s special 
characteristic is a standard of imputing liability, not of imputing reaction. The objective imputation of the 
reaction is a part (premise) of imputing the liability (culpability) to the actor. When the reaction can be 
imputed to the act, if the actor should have known or been aware of this probability, liability can be imputed 
to him. A person who kills his wife because he thinks that would help her go to the paradise should still be 
imputed the consequence of her death and the liability of culpable crime, though his liability may be 
mitigated. These two are separated and progressive imputation problems. But Feinberg seems to mix fair 
imputation of reaction and that of liability. 
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negligence and recklessness in Chinese law, where a court must ask whether the parallel 
people of the actor could have predicted and controlled the result of the actor’s conduct.30 
But the rationale of this test has not been previously articulated. 
a. Social Rules and the Formal Reasonableness of Parallel People  
The notion of parallel people is objective and workable because it refers to norms of social 
interaction in deciding whether the risk of the disorder or offence reaction is substantial or 
very low.31 The manner in which social norms develop and operate explains why the parallel 
people test is socially reasonable. ‘Interaction generates habits; perceived, they become 
reciprocal expectations; in addition to their purely predictive and anticipatory nature, 
sensitivity to them endows them with a constraining or even an obligatory character.’32 As 
it is probable that parallel people would be harmed or offended in a context of social 
interaction, it is reasonable for the reactor to react according to the established social rule.  
However, there may be cases where the reaction is abnormal. These might include, for 
example, cases where the social rule was not binding on the conduct of others; was not 
flouted; or was violated, albeit not as significantly as the reaction implies.33 In these cases, 
the possibility of others being harmed or offended in the same context is very low and the 
reaction is not objectively predictable according to the social rule. The reactor has no parallel 
people who would react similarly, and thus this reaction should not be imputed to the conduct. 
Otherwise, there would be no consensus on how a person could plan his conduct to avoid 
harmful or offensive results, and behavioral freedom would be restricted arbitrarily and 
substantially. Moreover, it would be morally unacceptable to punish people for unpredictable 
and uncontrollable results. 
Therefore, when disorder or offence is caused or risked, we need to consider whether the 
reactor has a group of parallel people who would react in the same way according to a social 
rule of that group. For example, in the case of approaching to beg,34 the approach is carried 
                                                          
30 See Mingkai Zhang, Criminal Law (4th edn, Law Press 2011) 266. 
31 This version of a reasonable person is similar to conventional objective understanding of ‘a communally 
situated human being’. See RNTC 205-06. 
32 Dennis H Wrong, The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society (HUP 1995) 48. 
33 See R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 63. 
34 Donaldson (James) v Vannet 1998 SLT 957. 
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out with the obvious motivation (to beg) that is conventionally predictable and innocuous, 
and objectively unlikely to cause alarm or fear.  
Parallel people exist in all cases of social interactions with a social rule. To return to the 
naked rambling case, at that time it was possible to know the social rule in that area: when 
the conduct was ‘in or near one of the main streets of a busy town’ ‘in a brazen fashion’ with 
‘no obvious explanation or reason’ but ‘children and vulnerable old people’ and there was 
evidence that some were alarmed,35 it was socially probable that a group of comparable 
people would be alarmed. Thus the reaction could reasonably be imputed.36  
b. Complicated Cases of Applying the Test 
In applying the parallel people test, the key is to judge the probability of a group of 
comparable people reacting similarly. This may be complicated in some cases. Firstly, it 
should be observed that changes of objective life conditions affect the possibility of harm 
and offence, thus changing the social norms of parallel people. Fellow members of a 
community can develop adaptability in civil life. Thus the effect of the conduct on a general 
life condition may no longer be physically adverse. For example, with urban living, people 
become used to increased noise in traffic,37 construction, amusement and other life aspects 
without their life convenience being unbearably affected.38 The possibility of a circumstance 
causing harmful disruption has changed. In this example, harassment or discomfort caused 
or risked to a sensitive person by noise would now be seen as abnormal, despite having been 
normal some decades previously.  
Similarly, the possibility of a particular behaviour causing offence to a group of parallel 
people may change significantly. An offensive act may come to be considered neutral or 
even desirable. For example, in the case of the transvestism previously mentioned, there 
might have been a substantial risk of offending others at that time.39 Nowadays it might be 
                                                          
35 See Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [80]. 
36 And the actor knew this, so culpability can be imputed to him. The individual subjective belief may deserve 
sympathy and relieve liability: a court may consider the particular belief of the actor that public nakedness 
is neutral and thus mitigate his liability.  
37 See Michael M Berger, ‘Nobody Loves an Airport’ (1970) 43 S Cal L Rev 631, 707. 
38 The Scottish Government, ‘Review of Antisocial Behaviour Noise Regime: Call for Evidence’ (May 2014), 
10-11 <www.gov.scot/Resource/0044/00449775.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018. 
39 As will be argued in next part, even if the reaction were reasonable, the decision may still be wrong because 
of the second (constitutional) factor affecting the reasonability. There is another problem of remote harm of 
offence if we are to impute the irritated conflict. This concern of pandering to violence will be discussed 
later on (IViii).  
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difficult to discern the social rule prevailing three decades previously in that district of 
Aberdeen. However, in today’s diverse society, social reactions have changed significantly 
and this kind of act would not be likely to lead to such offence to the parallel people there.  
Another problem in applying the parallel people test may arise in public administration. A 
group of parallel people such as the police tend not to be genuinely offended by behaviours 
that usually offend the general public, though they may profess otherwise in evidence at a 
criminal law. A group of people such as police officers, compared with the general public, 
may tolerably endure levels of harassment, alarm or distress caused by threatening, abusive, 
insulting words or behavior or disorderly behavior,40 because they are specifically tasked 
with and should be focusing on tackling disorder. It seems that in normal circumstances they 
would not be or should not be expected to be offended by swearing where an ordinary 
member of the public might. It seems appropriate for the court to hold that truculently using 
bad language while refusing to cooperate with officials is not by itself a breach of the peace.41 
However, officers might still consider the conduct harmful or offensive – and thus there is 
an imputation problem of whether harassment, alarm or distress caused or risked to an officer 
can be reasonably be imputed to a threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior or 
disorderly behavior.  
The offender may still be liable even if the specific officer has not been alarmed, provided 
that the parallel people test is satisfied. When the group of parallel people are less likely to 
react in the normal or expected way because of their experience of performing their function, 
it is still possible to apply the parallel people test to argue that the original hypothetical 
reaction should be imputed. Admittedly, we may treat public officials differently from 
ordinary citizens because ‘the distinction between public and private action is crucial to an 
understanding of the scope of constitutional rights and the protection they afford to 
citizens’.42 But this does not justify treating police as being exempt from protection against 
disorderly or offensive conduct by citizens.43 Officials, even highly trained ones, are human 
beings. When facing conduct which is threatening, abusive or insulting to an ordinary person, 
if not for carrying out their tasks, the police would still have a reason to react as fellow 
                                                          
40 Mere insults are mainly name-calling. See Tamara Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and 
Public Nuisance: Empirical and Theoretical Analyses’ (2005) 24 U Queensland LJ 123, 142.  
41 See Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65 [20]. 
42 Malcolm Thorburn, ‘Two Conceptions of Equality before the (Criminal) Law’ in Francois Tanguay-Renaud 
and James Stribopoulos (eds) Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the 
Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 20.  
43 Some defence agents believed that Logan v Jessop 1987 SCCR 604 gave ‘individuals carte blanche to swear 
at the police with impunity’. BOP 28. 
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citizens. It is not implicit in their service that they must accept groundless or improper harm 
or offence. The police may have high endurance for concentrating on policing tasks, but not 
for simple tolerance of incivilities. Therefore, even though in fact the conduct does not 
disrupt or offend the police, we should still presume the normalcy of causing disruption or 
offence to the police. In this way, the behaviour or language directing solely at police officers 
may still be considered likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. It should not be the law 
that ‘a police officer [is] not to be regarded as a person liable to be affected by disorderly 
conduct’.44 
(ii) Substantive Test of Constitutional Values  
Decision-making based on the social rule of parallel people makes for an efficient test – 
there is probably a group of parallel people, whether majoritarian or not, who would react in 
that way in that context. However, the formal test is self-regarding because the parallel 
people are inside the same group as the person observing the conduct. So, the problem is 
this: if it is judged that a group of parallel people is likely to be harmed or offended by e.g. 
transvestitism or homosexual intimacy, then such a reaction may always be imputed to the 
conduct of other groups of people and the scope of criminal liability may be too broad.  
In the following sections, I will discuss how the reaction of parallel people may be 
normatively not imputable because the social rule on which this reaction is based is 
constitutionally invalid. I will argue that if the conduct has a substantive constitutional value, 
the reaction of the parallel people may be normatively unreasonable and thus not imputable. 
a. Offence to Parallel People 
Offence may result from cultural diversity and sensitivity. A Hindu vegetarian may be 
offended by a Christian neighbour’s barbequing meat in his backyard. 45  Homosexuals 
publicly kissing may offend some passers-by. The formal rule of parallel people would 
appear to suggest that offence should be objectively attributed in such cases because there is 
probably a group of parallel people who would react in the same way. 
But even if a consensus supporting such a reaction exists, the reaction may be based on 
prejudice, assumption, personal aversion, parrot-like repetition, insincerity or 
                                                          
44 Saltman v Allan 1989 SLT 262, 264. 
45 See David W Shoemaker, ‘‘‘Dirty Words’’ and the Offense Principle’ (2000) 19 L Phil 545, 554. 
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inconsistency. 46  A group of people labels the conduct offensive and then engineer its 
criminalisation.47 This formal labelling may lead to illegitimate criminalisation. Referring 
solely to a specific moral or religious sensibility is not a legitimate way of establishing 
imputation.48  
I would argue that it is not enough for there to be a reason to take offence – instead, an 
acceptable reason to take offence is required.49 Legislators must provide a good reason to 
turn an emotional reaction into a legal position.50 The parallel people test determines whether 
the offence is socially reasonable, but it is then necessary to decide whether it is normatively 
reasonable for that offence to be imputed to the conduct. That is, the social rule (of sensibility) 
is necessary but not sufficient for imputation; in cases where the validity of the rule is 
disputed, we should further consider whether it should be legally supported. A legislator 
should try to ‘enforce a distinct, and fundamentally important, part of his community’s 
morality’.51 But it is a problem to identify the form of morality that is arguably appropriate 
in a multicultural, pluralistic society.52  
‘The law rests upon diverse reasonability paradigms’,53 such as welfare maximization, equal 
freedom and an ethic of care.54 One way of assessing the reasonability of a reaction is to 
follow the suggestion that a social rule identified by means of the parallel people test should 
be examined to assess whether it can survive moral challenges grounded in individuality, 
dignity, equity or pluralism.55 The moral challenges should derive from constitutional values, 
because in a multicultural, pluralistic society, every group of members enjoys its own rights 
and freedoms whose limits are the constitutional boundaries of others’ rights and freedoms. 
This method examines the compatibility of the social rule of the parallel people with a 
fundamental value of a society.  
                                                          
46 See Ronald M Dworkin, ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’ (1966) 75 Yale LJ 986, 1000-001; J 
D Hodson, The Ethics of Legal Coercion (D Reidel Publishing Company 1983) 149. 
47 See BOP 88. 
48 See David W Shoemaker, ‘‘‘Dirty Words’’ and the Offense Principle’ (2000) 19 L Phil 545, 560-61. 
49  See Uma Narayan, ‘Offensive Conduct: What Is It and When May We Legally Regulate It?’ (PhD 
dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 1990) 160-61. 
50 See Ronald M Dworkin, ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’ (1966) 75 Yale LJ 986, 995-96. 
51 Ibid 1002. 
52  See Tamara Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance: Empirical and 
Theoretical Analyses’ (2005) 24 U Queensland L J 123, 144. 
53 Frédéric G Sourgens, ‘Reason and Reasonability: The Common Necessary Diversity of the Common Law’ 
(2015) 67 MeL Rev 73, 129. 
54 See Alan D Miller & Ronen Perry, ‘The Reasonable Person’ (2012) 87 NYUL Rev 323, 391. 
55  See Uma Narayan, ‘Offensive Conduct: What Is It and When May We Legally Regulate It?’ (PhD 
dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 1990) 190-92. 
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The process of determining the constitutional validity of a social rule in question can be 
difficult and controversial.56 Here I will exemplify the process by applying constitutional 
equality. A substantive constitutional rule tends to be others-regarding – a fundamental value 
like equality is usually effective in interpersonal/across-group relations. As Feinberg argues, 
for ‘personal autonomy’, ‘when two persons each have interests in how one of them lives 
his life, the interests of the one whose life it is [‘personal interests’], are the more important 
[than ‘external interests’]’.57 To preserve community traditions at the cost of others’ interests 
is to treat other people as means, or rather, ‘elements’ of one’s ‘environment’.58 Even if an 
adverse reaction to transvestitism were considered socially reasonable decades previously, 
it may no longer be so, it being increasingly accepted that individual clothing should be a 
part of freedom of expression or sexual autonomy. 59  Equal protection of a degree of 
individuality would be in everyone’s constitutionally valid interest. Further, prioritising the 
religious belief that homosexuality is a sin over others’ interests would be wrong on this 
approach because of the notion of equality – in so far that homosexual persons have equal 
rights to public expression of intimacy.60 Similarly, individuals have equal rights to religious 
belief and practice and thus cooking and eating meat in one’s own backyard is not wrongful. 
In short, a community’s intolerance of certain conduct may fail a constitutional challenge of 
equality, in which case no imputation of offence can be made.  
b. Harmful Disruption to Parallel People 
After looking at how the socially reasonable reaction of being offended by neighbours’ life 
activities can be constitutionally unreasonable in some cases, I will argue that the socially 
reasonable reaction of being harmed may also be constitutionally unreasonable. It is socially 
reasonable for the people inside a group to react similarly, claiming harmful disruption to 
their life by the activity of a neighbouring group. However, such life activities can be 
constitutionally protected.  
                                                          
56 In different cultural settings, the same interest might have different values or even not be recognised at all. 
See Nina Peršak, ‘Using ‘Quality of Life’ to Legitimate Criminal Law Intervention: Gauging Gravity, 
Defining Disorder’ in A P Simester and others (eds), Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas von 
Hirsch (Hart Publishing 2014) 239. 
57 J Feinberg, ‘Harm to Others—A Rejoinder’ (1986) 5 Crim Just Ethics 16, 29. 
58 See HW 67-68; see Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalisation: An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal 
Law (Springer-Science +Business Media, B V 1994) 225-26. 
59 Or a part of ‘self-expression and freedom of choice’. Paul Roberts, ‘Penal Offence in Question: Some 
Reference Points for Interdisciplinary Conversation’ in IROB 22. 
60 See Obergefell v Hodges 576 US ___ (2015).  
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For example, dwellers in villages or slums inside the same city may burn coal or wood while 
other city dwellers use cleaner fuels such as gas or electricity. Those other city dwellers may 
suffer inconvenient and uncomfortable air conditions as a result of the coal or wood being 
burnt. Imputing this life disruption to the burning of coal or wood can be problematic. Rules 
of imputing air pollution in similar cases can be followed. In harmful disruption, arising 
from different lifestyles and topographic features, it is possible that even neighboring groups 
of people have different starting points for a life condition becoming inconvenient and 
depend on different conditions to recover from an uncomfortable life condition. In China, if 
suburban farmers do not seasonally burn straw, they will suffer economic loss that they 
perceive as more important and unbearable than temporarily diminished air quality. 
However, city residents do not want to endure this seasonal air pollution because they have 
a worse baseline of air quality and a limited recovery time. Two parallel rules for city 
dwellers and neighboring farmers unavoidably conflict in such a case. We cannot say which 
rule itself is unreasonable – a drawback of the ‘parallel people’ approach that may be 
corrected by a substantive test.  
Substantively, when the rule of farmers’ air quality is affecting city dwellers, there should 
be balancing of priorities. It is suggested that the authorities should organise controlled 
burning, rather than having farmers pay to process the straw in other costly ways.61 The gain 
of farming and the cost of processing straw involves farmers’ property rights and even living 
rights that may be prioritised over others’ right to health or to enjoy merely seasonal comfort. 
Thus, there may be no imputable inconvenience or discomfort to be targeted.62 
To sum up, we can progressively solve the objective imputation problem of claimed disorder 
or offence by first applying the formal test of parallel people and then, if necessary, the 
substantive test of constitutional values. 
IV. ABSTRACT RISK  
Having explained how the law should deal with those cases where the conduct in question 
usually causes or risks no disorder but may abnormally have that effect, it is now necessary 
to consider reversely, those cases where there is an ‘abstract risk’ in ‘specific instances of 
                                                          
61 See Zhian Wang, ‘A Microcosmic Investigation of Fog and Haze’ <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/24494561> 
accessed 29 May 2018.  
62 To make the imputation valid, therefore, the city should compensate the farmers to control the burning and 
to tackle the straw otherwise. When farmers stray from this arrangement, there is imputable disorder 
disturbing public convenience and comfort. 
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generally harmful activities’ that ‘are sometimes themselves quite harmless’.63 For example, 
begging another person within the immediate vicinity of an ATM or entrance to a bank 
usually risks harmful obstruction,64 defying police orders typically risks harmful disorder, 
and indecent conduct in a public place (e.g. naked rambling) risks offence to others. However, 
we should ask whether the categorical prohibition is legitimate – specifically, whether the 
imputation of the abstract risk to all cases involving that kind of conduct is reasonable. Also, 
how should the law deal with those cases where there is in fact no harm or offence? I will 
argue that a two-tier approach can be applied to answer the question. 
(i) Abstract Risk of Harmful Disorder 
While the problem of abstract risk in preventative criminalisation has been discussed in 
existing scholarship, this work has focused on other areas (such as public safety), rather than 
public order. 65  In this section, I will describe how an abstract risk to public safety is 
approached – and demonstrate how the approach can be adapted to address an abstract risk 
to public order, specifically in begging cases involving ‘captive’ targets (focused on their 
business and unable to easily ignore the approaching person) and in cases of defying police 
orders. 
a. Formal Test of Substantial Risk 
The first step, as noted above, is applying the formal test of whether or not there is a 
substantial risk of harm or disorder. Feinberg has proposed doctrinal rules to assess the 
severity of the risk: (1) the more serious the possible harm, the less probable its realisation 
need be to justify the criminal prohibition of the conduct; (2) the more probable the harm, 
the less serious the harm need be to justify the prohibition. 66  This can submit to a 
mathematical formulation – viz., this is a product (‘×’) style calculation (risk = seriousness 
× probability). The gravity of the risk depends on the interaction of seriousness and 
probability.  
                                                          
63 See HTO 193. ‘Crimes of implicit risk creation’ ‘consist of conduct that legislatures regard as sufficiently 
risky to justify categorical prohibition’. Peter Westen, ‘The Ontological Problem of ‘‘Risk’’ and 
‘‘Endangerment’’ in Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of 
Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 325. 
64 Vancouver (city) By-law 8309, s 70A(1); Municipal Code of Chicago, s 8-4-025 (Aggressive Panhandling). 
65 See HTO 193-98; CHW 75-79. 
66 See HTO 216. 
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In cases of public safety, the criminalisation of an abstract risk generally involves an 
application of rule (1): As grave harm to a significant interest is risked, no high probability 
is required of the harm occuring. Grave harm is risked to: (a) a qualitatively exclusive and 
significant personal safety interest or (b) multiple other legal interests. For example, drunk 
driving or speeding risks the occurrence of grave harm (mainly, but not exclusively, to 
personal safety). This harm is deemed sufficiently grave that no emphasis is placed on 
probability. For example, ‘driving with quite low blood alcohol levels (0.2 pro mil or more)’ 
is still prohibited in Sweden.67  
In analysing public disorder, by comparison, the gravity of risked harm has fallen on (b), i.e. 
the multiple subjects of the endangered legal interest. Public order usually refers to a 
multitude of bearers of an interest rather than an exclusive and significant personal safety 
interest. In public disorder, the risk should be prohibited because the interest in life 
convenience, comfort and peace – though not as significant as safety interests at the 
individual level – can be significant when a large number of potential victims is involved. 
For example, begging within a specified vicinity (10 m or 10 feet) of an ATM or entrances 
to specified public places does not require the commission of actual obstruction to justify 
the imposition of a criminal penalty.68 Moreover, this conduct itself is regarded by legislators 
as constituting high risk to many people’s comfortable or convenient passage. Therefore, the 
risk of disorderly obstruction is substantial.  
b. Substantive Test of Competent Justification 
After considering the first stage (the assessment of formal risk) it is then necessary to proceed 
to the second step: that is, whether there is a competent justification for the conduct. A 
calculation of the risk may be followed by an assessment of its acceptability – a balancing 
exercise involving the personal and social importance of the interests in engaging in the risky 
behaviour and of the competing interests which are endangered. Properly, the law should 
protect the interest which is relatively more important. This will require an assessment and 
comparison of the importance of each (i.e. the personal value of the conduct and the interest 
endangered by the conduct) in terms of the interest network of the possessor, and the extent 
                                                          
67 CHW 58. 
68 Vancouver (city) By-law 8309, s 70A(1); Municipal Code of Chicago, s 8-4-025 (Aggressive Panhandling). 
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to which each might be reinforced by other interests (i.e. social meanings) and their 
respective inherent moral quality.69   
In the case of approaching another person in the vicinity of an ATM or public entrance, the 
conflicting interests will be the actor’s freedom to approach people without true harm being 
caused to public comfort or convenience – and the public interest in avoiding harm from 
truly obstructive behaviours. In this context, the respective importance of each interest to 
each party may be hard to compare, but the former is reinforced by an individual’s right to 
expression of their plight. However, the former is morally less justified given the following 
pragmatic consideration. The characteristic of abstract risks so preferred by legislators and 
prosecutors is that they are easy to detect and prosecute without necessarily proving the 
existence of significant risks in the individual case. 70  Speed limits are an acceptable 
regulation of abstract risk partly because it may be hard to differentiate risky speeding from 
non-risky speeding in individual cases.  
In assessing abstract risk to public order, this pragmatic consideration operates similarly. In 
cases of approaching in the specified vicinity of an ATM or public entrance, the police 
cannot easily differentiate obstructive approaching from peaceful approaching. Moreover, 
those approached in such situations may not have alternative means to avoid or alleviate 
inconvenience. In contrast, approaching could be easily conducted much less obstructively 
in alternative places without a ‘captive’ audience. The failure to adopt the easy alternative is 
immoral inconsideration in social cooperation. This test of moral consideration overrides the 
test of reinforcing interests, and thus the prohibition is justified.  
Imputing abstract risk in legislation to all cases of such conduct should be done according to 
the two steps set out above, but as for abstract risk, in justice there may be a further 
possibility of equitably exempting liability. In cases of abstract risk, the kind of conduct is 
already presumed by the legislation to be risky, so the prosecution does not have to prove 
that the conduct was risky. However, if the accused could show in a specific case that his 
conduct was not risky, then he should be acquitted, because the sacrifice of his behavioral 
                                                          
69 See HTO 191, 204. As argued in Chapter 2 (II(iii)), the morality quality of the interest should not be 
understood as that the interest is inherently unworthy/immoral. Here I will interpret it as representing 
immoral consideration in social cooperation. 
70 And even ulterior intent. See Peter Westen, ‘The Ontological Problem of ‘‘Risk’’ and ‘’Endangerment’’ in 
Criminal Law’ in R A Duff, Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 
325. 
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freedom is not necessary.71 This ‘abstract (legislation)/specific (justice)’ division is also 
important in public order administration. For example, protesters may be accused of 
obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty because of defying a police 
instruction to move.72 Defying administrative orders leads to an abstract (rather than specific) 
risk of public disorder.73 It usually risks public disorder but may (exceptionally) risk no 
disorder at all. One such case was where the police mistakenly thought that a road was a 
public highway but it transpired that it was (as the protesters had correctly believed) 
private.74  
The existence of the offence of obstructing a police officer is not or should not be a blind 
grant of power to the police. When a police instruction is not objectively justifiable, the 
refusal to comply should surely not be treated as having actually risked disorder.75 Further, 
though in the case above there was some factual basis for the assessment of risk, this meant 
only that the dispersal order and procedural arrest were objectively reasonable measures – 
and not an abuse of rights or infringement of people’s freedom. It is still insufficient to 
criminalise objectively non-risky conduct.76 If substantive liability were to be imposed on a 
person, that person should indeed have abused freedom and risked harm. 
An ‘abstract/specific’ balance should be applied in criminalising the generally risky 
obstruction of administration. For the statutory offence of obstructing a police officer in the 
execution of their duty, 77  the risked public disorder may not be significant, but the 
probability is generally high, such that the risk of public disorder is still sufficiently grave 
as to justify categorical prohibition of obstructing police orders. However, the freedom to go 
about lawful business without harming others is vital. Institutionally, it is preferable to 
nurture people’s critical ability in a democratic polity than nurture blind obedience to 
authority. It should therefore be a statutory defence for the accused to show that his 
                                                          
71 In the case of ‘repeatedly causing his car to skid by handbrake turns in a frozen car park late in evening and 
near to residential property’ (Horsburgh (Bryan John) v Russell 1994 JC 117), the actor may prove there is 
no other car there or approaching in order to evade liability, if the law aims for safety and convenient use of 
the place. 
72 See Police Act 1996, s 89(2). 
73 It may not risk ‘serious disturbance to the community’ and breach of the peace. See BOP 28-29. 
74 See McCann v Crown Prosecution Service [2015] EWHC 2461 (Admin). 
75 See BOP 29-30; Miller v Thomson [2009] HCJAC 4 [13]– [14]. 
76 The supportive view, however, is the mainstream justice practice. See Dilys Tausz, ‘Obstructing a Police 
Officer in the Execution of Duty’ [2016] Crim LR 59 (note), 60-61. The appeal court recognised the statutory 
charge under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, i.e. defying police orders, as ‘normal practice’. Miller v 
Thomson [2009] HCJAC 4. 
77 See Police Act 1996, s 89(2). 
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disobedience of a police order did not risk causing disorder.78 Otherwise, courts ‘can impose 
court-created impossibility defences’ – ‘unless judges and/or juries fear that harmful, 
counterfactual conditions could have occurred’, the accused should be acquitted.79  The 
existence of such a defence would mean that risky obstruction would generally be prohibited 
in legislation, but allow for non-risky defiance (exceptionally) permitted in justice.80 It is a 
desirable balance of police powers and citizen freedoms in public order administration. 
(ii) Abstract Risk of Offence 
Feinberg has only analysed an abstract risk of harm.81 I would further consider an abstract 
risk of offence in circumstances in which a potentially offensive behaviour has occurred in 
a public place and has not offended anybody at the time, because there were no witness, but 
has been detected subsequently having been captured on CCTV or eye witnesses have not 
been personally offended. Generally, some people may ex ante conclude that nudity and/or 
sex in a public place could offend a member of the public – the act carries a high possibility 
of offence to others. However, it seems that if there were no possibility of offence having 
been caused at the time, the behaviour should not be punished. The accused may claim that 
‘there was no risk of offending others, so why punish me?’ For example, suppose two 
persons have sex at night in a public place82 – or the naked rambler strolls through a town at 
midnight – all recorded by a CCTV camera but not witnessed at the time. Or an indecent 
behaviour takes place within a car by the roadside obscured by its tinted windows, such that 
the behaviour cannot be observed by passers-by, but is discovered by a policeman while 
carrying out other tasks. This section will discuss how legislation and justice should play 
different roles in determining the scope of liability in the case only of an abstract risk of 
offence.  
It is difficult to determine whether there was such a possibility of offending others in an 
individual case. More importantly, no one could guarantee that at the time of the offensive 
                                                          
78 For example, ‘it shall be an offence for any person, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, to fail to 
comply with a direction’. Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994, s 8(2). 
79 See Peter Westen, ‘The Ontological Problem of ‘‘Risk’’ and ‘‘Endangerment’’ in Criminal Law’ in RA Duff 
and Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 326. 
80  As Lord Hamilton states, ‘there appears to have been nothing in the particular circumstances of the 
appellant’s conduct [‘to refuse to co-operate’] which made it … likely to be a catalyst for any serious 
disturbance…’ Hamilton v Higson 2002 Scot (D) 39/12 [15]. 
81 See HTO 193-202. 
82 The video of having sex in a fitting room just shows that the sex itself did not offend others at the time. See 
Chen J, ‘Uploader of Indecent Video of Fitting Room of Uniq in Sanlitun Put in Custody’ Xinhuanet 
(Beijing, 19 July 2015) <http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2015-07/19/c_1115970930.htm> accessed 29 
May 2018. 
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behavior, no other people would observe it. ‘The answer lies in counterfactual judgments of 
a kind that cannot be verified’.83 Therefore, legislation focuses prospectively on general 
categorisation of public offensive conduct, e.g. nudity in a public place or sex in a public 
place. It does not retrospectively address the circumstantial conditions of specific conduct. 
The grave risk of offending others is presumed and needs to be examined below.  
To preventatively criminalise a risky act, the risk of the evil being realised should be 
regarded as high or the risked evil be deemed grave. However, purely offensive crimes are 
‘a petty misdemeanor’ and ‘only a violation’.84 The possible gravity of the offence itself may 
be too small to justify preventative criminalisation. But judged ex ante by legislators, nudity 
and/or sex in a public place or in a place which is visible or accessible to the public carries 
a fairly high probability of being witnessed, and the risked offence (to many people) is 
serious. This risk is thus sufficiently serious to justify legislative prohibition of nudity and/or 
sex in a public place.  
Secondly, similar to the case of harmful disorder (obstruction) above, the abstract risk of 
offence cannot be overridden by a justification of the conduct. The actor can readily access 
other venues, while the public do not have alternative opportunities to avoid the offence and 
the police do not have the means or resources not to target all public nudity or sex. A lack 
of social consideration by the actor means that there is no necessity or expectation of social 
tolerance in this context.    
However, the assessment of risk in a specific case differs from that in legislation. As in cases 
of risk of disorder, there may be the further possibility that after establishing the reasonability 
of categorical imputation in legislation, the actor may still try to prove that there was no 
specific possibility. He might cite a defence of impossibility that is legally explicit or court-
created, and the court may or may not accept this defence.85 This is a reasonably effective 
and efficient interaction between legislators, judges and actors. In the case of having sex in 
a car which cannot be viewed from the road, one can reasonably argue that there is no 
specific possibility of the offensive conduct being observed, so the actors should not be 
                                                          
83 Peter Westen, ‘The Ontological Problem of ‘‘Risk’’ and ‘‘Endangerment’’ in Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and 
Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 326-27. 
84 See OTO 4. 
85 For example, ‘having regard to all the circumstances’, the behaviour ‘is likely to cause serious offence to 
any person who is, or might reasonably be expected to be, aware of such behviour’. Criminal Justice (Public 
Order) Act, 1994, s 5(3) (Ireland) (emphasis added). 
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punished.86 In contrast, having sex in a public place or rambling naked through a town cannot 
be reasonably regarded as involving no probability of discovery.  
It should be clear that it is not reasonable to expect law-makers to identify in advance every 
single incidence where there is a risk of offence. A common law crime may only define the 
consequential evil or risk. For example, the Scottish crime of breach of the peace requires 
the potential for ‘serious disturbance to the community’.87 It does not ex ante refer to any 
specific types of conduct, such as nudity in public or public cruelty to animals. Thus, the 
court often emphasises the public nature of the locus to presume the grave risk in the conduct, 
but has sometimes required that ‘there was plainly a realistic risk of the conduct being 
discovered’.88 The court swings between an abstract risk and a specific risk of disturbing the 
community. This inconsistency can cause huge controversy and be burdensome in judicial 
practice. The crime would be better framed as a common law crime of specific risk without 
explicit conduct types89 – or a statutory crime of abstract risk by specifying conduct types.90 
To sum up, after considering the severity of the risk and balancing possible justifications of 
the conduct, we may impute the abstract risk (of causing disorder or offence) to a category 
of conduct by legislation, but may need to allow for exceptional judicial exemption in a 
specific case of impossibility of realising the risk. This approach to the criminalisation of 
conduct of an abstract risk should be explicitly reflected in legislating for offences of abstract 
risk and applied in judicial practice. 
V. REMOTE RISK   
As well as direct endangerment offences (offences, discussed above, defined by reference to 
abstract risks inherent in the conduct itself), the law also recognises indirect endangerment 
offences where ‘the [remote] harm would ensue only given further, wrongful actions by the 
                                                          
86 As argued in the last section on public order administration, there was some factual basis for the assessment 
of risks and this can justify procedural measures by the police.  
87 Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65. 
88 See BOP 112-13.  
89 Standing in a doorway of a bar and repeatedly rubbing private parts over clothing amounted to a breach of 
the peace, because it was apparent from the video that ‘at one point the outline of his penis was visible 
through his trousers’, and ‘for part of the time a young woman was standing within two or three feet of the 
appellant and people passed by on the pavement, including a group of teenagers’. See Halcrow v Shanks 
[2012] HCJAC 23. 
90 For the categorization of the conduct, see BOP 145ff. 
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agent or by others’.91 This section will examine the problem of remote risk in two particular 
situations and consider when the remote disorder or offence can be fairly imputed.  
(i) Remote Offence 
A person may engage in conduct that is non-offensive in itself, but in circumstances where 
it is alleged that the conduct creates a future risk of further offensive behavior e.g. teenagers 
loitering in public. Alternatively, the actor may engage in conduct that offends no one at the 
time but where the discovery that the conduct has taken place might cause offence to the 
public at some future point. In these cases, it is necessary to consider whether the remote 
offence can be imputed to the conduct.  
a. Further Offensive Conduct 
Teenagers may gather in a public place in a way which ‘make[s] it possible or likely that the 
actor (or someone else) engage in further behavior that is offensive’.92 Simester and von 
Hirsch claim that criminalisation is only appropriate in instances of immediate offence and 
that there should be no intervention to prevent remote offence, e.g. the presence of youths 
or begging on a street corner cannot be criminalised because of likely further offensive 
behavior by the actor or others.93 This claim requires careful examination. We know from 
Feinberg’s ‘risk acceptance’ doctrine that the greater the possible evil and/or the higher 
probability of the evil, the more persuasive the case for criminal intervention.94 Offence to 
inner peace is generally minor and even trivial. Therefore, if the risk of offence were to be 
accepted, the probability needs to be very high. However, in cases of teenagers congregating 
in public or begging in public, it may be difficult to prove that such conduct is very likely to 
lead to further offensive behavior – and, in the absence of such evidence, it might be argued 
that there is no substantial risk of offence. There is thus no need to further consider ‘the 
[competing] effect of a prohibition on liberty and, particularly, on freedom of movement’.95  
A contrasting example is making or possessing extremist materials. This might lead to 
further behaviour, specifically its exhibition, that would seriously offend others. Making 
materials propogating extremism such as violence, hatred or prejudice is categorically 
                                                          
91 R A Duff, ‘Criminalising Endangerment’ (2005) 65 La L Rev 941, 963 (emphasis added). 
92 CHW 130. 
93 Ibid 130-31. 
94 See HTO 216. 
95 CHW 130. 
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criminalised.96 I would argue that the criminalisation of the making or possessing such 
material is justified. Public embodiments of extremism can cause serious offence to the 
public – and it is inherently probable that making or possessing such material is liable to lead 
to its exhibition and therefore offence. The risk is therefore grave enough to initiate the 
consideration of criminalisation.  
Secondly, there is little counterbalancing value in the production of extremist material – the 
personal importance and social value of freely expressing extremist ideas cannot be 
normatively recognised respected.97 Therefore, the remote offence of the further conduct of 
public extremism can be imputed to the earlier conduct of making. That is, the conduct of 
making can be preventatively criminalised. On the similar basis of remote offence, the 
conduct of possessing racially, religiously or sexually inflammatory material can be 
preventatively criminalised before the onward conduct of publishing or distributing.98 
b. Knowledge after the Fact and Serious Offence to the Public 
Another problem of imputing remote offence is that where conduct causes public outcry or 
indignation, this tends to be regarded as a separate factor justifying criminalisation or 
amounting to an aggravating factor in criminal sentencing, especially in China.99 This kind 
of imputation issue is common when ‘immoral’ or ‘abnormal’ behaviours are disclosed by 
third parties, causing serious offence to the public. In Chapter 2, it was explained that the 
communicative mechanism in the offence principle means that in ex post bare knowledge 
cases, the conduct itself does not cause offence – while here the problem is that the conduct 
may be criminalised or aggravated simply by the further serious offence caused to the public. 
Feinberg argues that private immoralities such as flag desecration, if revealed by others, 
such as a voyeuristic landlord and to the extent that they cause serious offence to the 
community, should not be punished via the offence principle, because the revelation is 
beyond the actor’s control and the offence is not inherently wrongful.100 I will systematically 
apply the general two-step approach to consider how social impact after the private or public 
conduct can be an independent evil in the criminalisation consideration – that is, how remote 
                                                          
96 Anti-Terrorism Act (China 2015), s 80 (2); Criminal Law (China), s 120C. 
97 See Ch 2, III(iii). 
98 Public Order Act 1986, ss 23, 29G. These provisions aim to prevent hatr(ed), but I am here aiming to prevent 
serious offence. 
99 Such as in crimes by taking advantage of duty, see Zhilong Guo, ‘Systematic Turn of Crime Quantitative 
Standards in Information Age’ (2015) 6 Oriental L Rev 114, 121. 
100 See OTO, 62, 69. 
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public offence, which results from the actions of third parties in revealing the conduct, can 
be imputed to the earlier conduct. 
The revelation may arise from the actions of an ordinary person. For example, ‘Grandpa Bi’, 
a Chinese television personality, was revealed by a fellow diner during a meal to have 
satirized, insulted and criticized Chairman Mao and the Red Army.101 Alternatively, a public 
authority might reveal the act. Consider the case of ‘Uncle Qu’, famous for monitoring the 
private use of official vehicles in Guangzhou, who was revealed by the Hunan Police to have 
used prostitutes.102 But for these third-party disclosures, there would have been no social 
impact at all resulting from the actor’s conduct. But the consequences of such actions might 
have been contingent (the actor was exceptionally caught and reported) or even been the 
subject of manipulation (e.g. by the media).  
The conduct may in other cases take place in public and cause serious offence to additional 
people as a result of further revelations still. A recent statutory example of social influence 
as imputable remote offence was the Tourist Incivilities Regulation by the China Bureau of 
Tourism, which provides that if certain specified behaviours (disrupting public transport 
order; disturbing public environment and hygiene; violating social customs of the destination 
and ethnic life habits; damaging cultural relics and historic sites; participating in gambling, 
pornography etc.) cause serious social negative influence (i.e. social outcry or indignation), 
even if they do not result in the imposition of administrative penalty or a court determination, 
they will be labelled as ‘tourist incivilities’ and may be reported to the police, customs, traffic 
departments and banks. Such reports can be as serious as a criminal record.103 That is, these 
public or private uncivil behaviors can be punished severely when they cause serious social 
negative influence. The problem is that a specified behaviour may affront the public at the 
time – and, additionally, offend more people still as a result of the actions of others in 
disclosing the conduct. In the latter case, it is necessary to ask whether the imputation of the 
further offence to the earlier behaviour is reasonable. 
Firstly, we should assess whether there is little probability of causing a public outcry. The 
gravity of the remote offence to the public suffices, but if that probability were little, the risk 
                                                          
101 Enhu Du, ‘Fujian Bi may be Discontinued His Program for Four Days’ Sohu News (Beijing, 8 April 2015) 
<http://news.sohu.com/20150408/n410957193.shtml> accessed 29 May 2018. 
102 ‘Uncle Qu Has Given up Accusing Changsha Police for the Incident of Going Whoring’ Sina News (Beijing, 
14 April 2015) <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2015-04-14/133631716212.shtml> accessed 29 May 2018. 
103 See Qing Zhong, ‘Nation Bureau of Tourism: Six Incivilities of Tourists will be Blacklisted’ China New 
Site (Beijing, 7 April 2015) <http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2015/04-07/7187025.shtml> accessed 29 
May 2018. 
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is not enough to justify the imputation of the social outcry. Many of the enumerated tourist 
incivilities (disrupting public transport tool order; disturbing public environment and 
hygiene; violating destination social customs and ethnic life habits; damaging cultural relics 
and historic sites) tend to be public in character, and thus there is a substantial probability of 
their revelation and a resultant social outcry. Other incivilities such as gambling or 
prostitution (as in Uncle Qu’s case), although notionally private, are highly likely to be 
detected and revealed in China at least, because the conduct is illegal. In contrast, when the 
revelation was not under the control of the original actor – such as in the case of Grandpa Bi 
who may have made reasonable efforts to avoid communication to the public by asking 
others present not to disseminate the video – there is little probability of offending the public, 
and so the imputation of the later social outcry is not acceptable.  
Secondly, the revelation should not be substantively illegitimate. The earlier action may be 
of a competent value, rendering the subsequent revelation unreasonable. We should compare 
the importance and moral validity of the interests concerned. In the case of Grandpa Bi, the 
revelation was against both the law of privacy and a breach of trust. In the case of going 
whoring, the police acted under the relevant policing law. The revelation in the case of 
Grandpa Bi is unethical and should not be recognized – out of respect for the civilising 
function or to avoid a moral credibility collapse of the criminal law.104 Similarly, if ‘Uncle 
Qu’ were in a jurisdiction that does not outlaw going whoring, this could exonerate him from 
the later influence, because a person’s private life should not be scrutinised and revealed to 
the public.105 However, participation in incivilities such as gambling or pornography, though 
usually private, can still have imputed to the participation the remote offence as an 
aggravation of the conduct – if the conduct itself involved evils such as exploitation that can 
justify the search and revelation by the police.  
Obviously, the lower the probability of offending the public, the more unreasonable the 
revelation – and thus the more unreasonable any imputation of the social outcry. That is, 
private immoralities generally cannot be punished because of uncontrollable and 
unreasonable revelations by others – while public incivilities can have the remote offence 
imputed to them, because the actor should assume the risk when he chooses to engage in the 
                                                          
104 Maybe it accords with the Party discipline if revealed only to the Party when the player is a Party member 
subject to the discipline of belief and loyalty. 
105 The revelation also could be illegal if he were set up by the police as he claimed: the former act itself is not 
to be proved because of the unacceptability of ‘the fruit of the poisonous tree’. 
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relevant conduct in public – and the uncivil conduct itself is prohibited partly to prevent 
offence to others.  
(ii) Remote Harm of Offence 
Offence may also cause harm. Provocation is a typical case of offence leading to remote 
harm.106 As Feinberg expresses it: 
Offended states of mind, even intense ones, are not in themselves harms; but … they are 
sometimes symptoms or consequences of prior or concurrent harms, and more often, the 
causes of subsequent harms, as for example, when provoked ill will leads to violence or 
riot.107 
The latter half of the sentence shows that offence may risk harm (to public order).108 Section 
5 of the POA 1936 formerly criminalised offensive conduct conducive to breaches of the 
peace.109 In Scotland breach of the peace has been used to criminalise transvestitism in 
circumstances where it was regarded as risking disorder 110 – and also naked rambling which 
was regarded as risking disorder.111 In short, the ‘disorderly potential of disapproval’ is a 
problem of regulating indecency in a public place.112 Assessing this disorderly potential in 
order to justify criminalisation (if the offensive conduct itself were not serious enough) or 
its aggravation (if serious enough) is problematic.113 
Because the remote harm to public order is insignificant and uncertain, the imputation of the 
risk to the conduct should be denied.114  Regarding the significance of remote harm here, 
even if the possible conflict occurs, it generally would not risk serious disturbance to public 
                                                          
106 It should be clear that by ‘remote’ the harm is not caused by the current conduct – but by the further conduct. 
So, it does not matter whether the harm is immediate, if only it is caused by the further conduct. 
107 HTO 49. 
108 The first half shows that harm could accompany or risk offence. It is still a pattern of a serious evil risking 
a lesser evil, just like a broken bone risking a less serious hurt. 
109 Breach of the peace in English criminal law generally refers to some danger to the person or imminent, 
severe attack of a dwelling house. See Thorpe v Dpp [2006] IEHC 319 [5.1]. 
110 See Stewart v Lockhart 1990 SCCR 390. 
111 Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [158]. 
112 See Lindsay Farmer, ‘Disgust, Respect, and the Criminalisation of Offense’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H 
Kramer, Mark R Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP 2011) 284-85. 
113 For example, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 
criminalised offensive or threatening behaviour likely to incite public disorder at certain football matches (s 
1, now repealed). 
114 After balancing relevant restraint’s onerousness with relevant offence seriousness and likelihood, some 
remote harm may be rightly imputed. See R A Duff, ‘Criminalising Endangerment’ (2005) 65 La L Rev 
941, 965. 
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life – because these conflicts typically involve only quarrelling and ordinary pushing rather 
than fierce fighting. But sometimes, there may be disorder affecting the public and the 
gravity seems to be enough to justify preventative interference. 
However, no specific, clear proof could be provided for the probability of that grave harm. 
There is generally only a speculative probability that abstract peace would be breached.115 
In cases where the police are insulted, ‘intervention’ by a third party is ‘unlikely’.116 In the 
case of public transvestitism, the likeliness of causing a conflict may not be specific, but 
speculative and contingent. ‘There would now need to be clearer evidence of the likelihood 
of a disturbance.’ 117  However, it is very difficult to know in advance whether remote 
disturbance would result from a given instance of offensive conduct. Self-disciplined victims 
are unlikely to react physically and will instead resort to law enforcement. Victims who are 
less self-disciplined and more susceptible to offensive behaviours are more likely to react in 
a manner causing disturbance. Imputing presumed conflict may risk pandering to violence. 
In extreme cases of offending – such as aggressive abuse,118 persistent offence or extreme 
insult – there is the substantial possibility of a physical conflict disturbing the civil life of 
others.119 Extreme offensive conduct will be met with virtually zero social tolerance, making 
the relationship between the offence and the risk of further disorder much more certain 
(substantial certainty). The identification of extreme offence has two principal directions. 
Substantively, extreme offence includes conduct of preaching or threatening violence, 
stirring-up hatred or prejudice that challenges the fundamental rights of others to be free 
from discrimination – and is thus of extremely high social unacceptability. Secondly there 
are some formal texts that assist in determining whether the offense is extreme or not. 
Extreme insults are basically notorious internationally – and are prescribed in international 
texts,120 which underlines international expectation of what is not tolerable. This is a good 
way for domestic criminalisation to draw on resources from international endeavours. Also, 
national constitutions assist in determining extremity. Some states in the USA once 
prohibited public disrespect or mutilation of the American flag in order to deter provocative 
                                                          
115 See BOP 107-09. 
116 Coleman v Power and Others [2004] HCA 39 [9]. In [200] it is claimed that ‘others who might hear 
[insulting police] would be reasonably to be provoked to physical retaliation’.  
117 BOP 109. 
118 For example, D entered a pub frequented by rival football fans and abused them. Ibid 107. 
119 Another way to presume probability is seen in section 4 of POA 1986 which specifies the certainty by 
requiring either subjective intention to provoke or objective likeliness to believe the certainty. But it is 
difficult to judge when there is subjective intention or objective likeliness.  
120 See e.g. Council of Europe, Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred: Finding Answers in a Democratic Society 
(Council Europe Publishing 2010). 
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acts that could result in public brawls.121  Such legislation prohibited offensive conduct 
which risks harmful disorder. The presumed substantial likelihood of immediate 
confrontation made it necessary for the state to interfere in advance.122 However, respect for 
free speech with its explicit constitutional protections may mean that there is scope to 
challenge this presumed degree of possibility in the absence of a clear constitutional 
provision protecting the national flag.123 In contrast, national symbols and ethnic equality 
are expressly protected in the Chinese Constitution124 – and under the Criminal Law it is a 
crime to insult these cherished symbols in public and to stir up ethnic hatred or prejudice.125  
Obviously, the more extreme the offence, the more grave and probable the risk of harmful 
disorder is. Where football supporters aggressively abuse a rival team, the possible harm is 
as great as serious violence and the probability is high and immediate.126 Thus, the risk of 
harm to public order is serious enough for considering criminalisation. The immediacy of 
the realisation of the probability is important. Even if the offence were extreme, if the 
conflict were not urgent – such as in the case of a racist graffiti left by a departed actor – the 
possible conflict should not be imputed to aggravate the offensive conduct, because the 
offended can and should seek other remedies.127  
Secondly, it follows from the extremity of the offence that the conduct has little 
acknowledgeable personal importance and social value.128 That is, the extreme offence is 
rarely justifiable. Therefore, the remote harm is imputable to the offensive conduct.129  
In short, remote harms of offence should generally not be imputed. When there is 
substantially certain causation of immediate harmful disorder we can justifiably attribute the 
                                                          
121 See Robert Force, ‘Decriminalisation of BOP Statutes: A Nonpenal Approach to Order Maintenance’ (1972) 
46 Tul L Rev 367, 388-89. 
122 Free speech with explicit constitutional protection may challenge this presumed degree of possibility when 
there is no clear constitutional provision protecting the national flag.  
123 The Supreme Court protected burning American flag as symbolic speech in Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 
(1989). 
124 See respectively ch 4 and s 4. 
125 See s 299 and s 249. Although s 249 provides a crime against personal right and civil right, as will be argued 
in ch 5 (IV(ii)), it should be understood as a crime against public order. Here I want to make it clear that the 
constitutional provision means that the kind of insult is extreme enough to presume in criminal law the 
substantial certainty of provoking disorder.  
126 See BOP 107.  
127 The extreme offence itself is sufficient to justify criminalisation. 
128 See Ch 2, III(iii). 
129 However, it is claimed that the harm is caused by others’ freely chosen act and it is those others who ought 
to be arrested. See BOP 107-08. However, advocacy, encouragement and assistance all face voluntary others, 
but all the actors of them should be responsible for remote harm from voluntary others. There is no exception 
why provocation’s actor should not be responsible for remote harm from voluntary others. Even if there is 
others’ voluntary act, there can be normative involvement of the former actor. 
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risk to offensive conduct. The repeal of section 5 of POA 1936 was thus a sensible 
development.130 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The problem of fair imputation should be taken seriously in criminalising public order crimes. 
This chapter has systematically examined issues around imputing and preventing 
disorder/offence – and has sought to develop a consistent approach to these questions. Firstly, 
imputation problems lie not only in abstract risks and abnormal risks that are both in the 
current conduct itself, but also in remote risks by the further conduct. Secondly, to look at 
fair imputation broadly, imputation problems around harm should be developed as 
imputation problems relating to harm and offence. Rather than only focusing on the 
imputation problems of harm as Feinberg does, it is necessary to consider seriously the 
question of how offence (as the other kind of setback to interests than harm) affects the whole 
system of imputation. In this way, this chapter has identified new problems of imputing 
abstract risk of offence, remote risk of offence and remote harm of offence. 
In respect of all the imputation problems discussed here, a structured approach is proposed. 
The first test is formal: i.e. whether the parallel people would react in the same way, or 
whether the risk, compounded out of possible gravity and its probability, is sufficiently 
severe. The second test is of substantive justification: i.e. whether the parallel people’s 
reaction is still not justified or whether the severe risk is still acceptable, given the personal 
importance and social values of the conduct. This general approach of categorically imputing 
abnormal, abstract and remote risks of disorder and offence remains to be theoretically 
elaborated in the light of legislative and judicial experience. 
                                                          
130 Public Order Act 1986, s 40(3), Sch 3. 
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Chapter 4 Disorderly Begging and Loitering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the first three chapters of this thesis, I identified and discussed some general issues 
surrounding the specification of public order as an interest, issues about the nature of harm 
and offence and issues about the imputation of harm and offence, and thus identified certain 
principles which should apply in the identification of public order crimes. In this and the 
following chapter I will apply these principles to specific public order problems. I will 
examine the relationship between harm and disorder in relation to specific issues of 
disorderly conduct. The next chapter will look at offence in relation to specific issues of 
offensive conduct. The aim is to clarify the argument and to show how the principles I have 
identified can assist in addressing some difficult issues in public order law. 
In the first three chapters, I posited a broad hierarchical framework for applying the harm 
principle so as to define and limit the scope of public order crimes. However, limiting the 
scope of public order law poses practical problems, as there are multifarious offences against 
public order, which the courts have tended to use indiscriminately. In order to deal with 
problems in practice, we need to identify some typical public order problems so as to think 
through the application of the principles. Problems can arise with the frequent use of ‘catch-
all’ common law offences – such as public nuisance in England and breach of the peace in 
Scotland – to deal with disorderly conduct in public places related to begging and loitering 
and the the application of the law is not clearly defined.1 By clarifying the situations and 
problems in the criminalisation of begging and loitering, this chapter will address the 
imputable and wrongful harms involved, in order to demonstrate how the identified 
principles can help determine the valid scope of specific public order crimes. The 
examination of these two offences can hopefully exemplify how the harm principle can be 
effective in the simplification of relevant common law crimes and in the criminalisation of 
other forms of conduct.2  
                                                          
1 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law 
Com No 358, 2015). In Scotland, the common law crime breach of the peace is suggested to be restated as 
‘a more clearly defined statutory offence’, see BOP 137. 
2 Other similar or accompanied behaviours compromising public place order – e.g. public drunkenness and 
solicitation – will be analysed accordingly. In Australia, there are problems of offences undermining the 
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The chapter is in two main parts. Part II examines the criminalisation of begging and part III 
the criminalisation of loitering. Each part has four sections. The respective first sections will 
look at how different jurisdictions have approached the criminalisation of these kinds of 
conduct. I will criticise existing approaches as being unclear and inconsistent, and unable to 
assess the asserted harmfulness of the conduct. The second section will then show how the 
kinds of harmfulness which are sometimes claimed by the law can be consistently rebutted 
from the perspective of the harm principle. In the third section I will then begin to apply the 
approach that I have developed in the first three chapters to rethink the factual harms 
involved in begging/loitering (the first step in the two-stage test that I have developed). I 
will look at how to identify some real intrusions in three forms of begging (passive, active 
and aggressive), and loitering’s harms in three situations (present, remote and suspected). 
Then, in the fourth and final sections, I will demonstrate the valid scope of criminalisation 
of begging/loitering, by addressing the question of the wrongfulness of the harm/offence, i.e. 
balancing conflicting interests. 
II. THE CRIMINALISATION OF DISORDERLY BEGGING  
Begging may pose problems of public order and indeed is frequently criminalised. However, 
different jurisdictions take different approaches to the criminalisation of begging, such that 
anti-begging laws can either be over-inclusive or under-inclusive. From a starting point of 
assessing different approaches to the criminalisation of begging, I shall progressively 
establish consistent and coherent arguments in support of criminalising some begging 
behaviours, while not criminalising others.  
(i) Inconsistent Approaches to Criminalising Begging 
It is possible to identify three broad approaches to the criminalisation of begging – while this 
section will set out and generally review. Different approaches to the criminalisation of 
begging similarly accept that some specified interferences of begging are justified as 
opposed to a general ban. However, it is unclear how these justifiable interferences should 
be distinguished from those which are not justifiable. 
                                                          
quality of community use of public places e.g. public nuisance, begging, willful exposure and public 
drunkenness, see Nicole Dixon, ‘Reform of Vagrancy Laws in Queensland: The Summary Offences Bill 
2004 (Qld)’ (Queensland Parliamentary Library, RBR 06/2005), 11-21 
<www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/explore/ResearchPublications/ResearchBriefs/2005/200506.pdf> 
accessed 29 May 2018. 
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In England, begging itself was historically targeted by the Vagrancy Act 1824 as a threat to 
social order: ‘…every person wandering abroad, or placing himself or herself in any public 
place, street, highway, court, or passage, to beg or gather alms… shall be deemed an idle 
and disorderly person within the true intent and meaning of this Act…’. The 1824 Act was 
enacted in the context of displaced people, without any visible means of support, being seen 
as a threat to the established order: ‘The terms of vagrancy and vagrants have universally 
implied that those so labelled not only are wanderers without homes but are also likely to 
participate in criminal activity.’3 This prohibition sounds strict, but the Crown Prosecution 
Service does not provide legal guidance on the prosecution of begging or vagrancy. 4 
Begging itself is rarely prosecuted, at least under this Act. This reflects something of a 
historical transition. The general criminalisation of vagrancy has been discredited because it 
appears to target economic or social status rather than conduct. Contemporary criminal law 
is usually directed instead at specific conduct associated with homelessness, such as begging.  
Current legal practice focuses on finding aspects of begging that could lead to harmful or 
offensive nuisance in public places, rather than the actual begging itself. So, begging itself 
is not unlawful, but conduct associated with begging may be unlawful. The associated 
conduct can be covered by common law crimes such as public nuisance in England to 
maintain public order. But the standard of a behaviour constituting public nuisance is not 
clear. Though a key rationale in nuisance law is that people soliciting or begging block 
pavements and interfere with rights of passage, it is not clear whether there are other cases 
of begging causing nuisance and what they might be. This approach provides a flexible tool 
to deal with different forms of disorderly begging conduct and may accordingly confer the 
authority with an arbitrary discretion. For example, it has been claimed that beggars commit 
other crimes such as theft, robbery or assault: ‘the majority’ of beggars ‘are often caught up 
in much more serious crime’.5 Or it might be claimed that begging may encourage others to 
engage in serious crimes in the area.6 In such cases, it is not clear whether the nuisance 
approach only applies to the harmfulness of begging itself or whether it also applies to other 
related harms of begging. That is, it is not clear how the related harms of begging should be 
tackled. In addition, beggars have often been thought to pretend to be poor and to cheat 
                                                          
3 Jim Baumohl, ‘Vagrancy’ in David Levinson (ed), Encyclopedia of Homelessness (Vol 2) (Sage Publications, 
2004), 583. 
4 There is no result of searching either ‘begging’ or ‘vagrancy’ on the website of the Crown Prosecution Service 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/> accessed 1 June 2017. 
5 See Home Office, Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti-Social Behaviour (Cm 5778, 
2003) para 3.41. 
6 Ibid para 1.8. 
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people,7 a belief which has changed scarcely in centuries.8 But fraud is not a public order 
problem. It is not clear how the problem of fraudulent begging should be tackled.9 
In the Republic of Ireland, which follows the same basic common law model as England, 
the statutory law does specify cases of nuisance in which begging is criminalised. Section 2 
of the Irish Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 2011 provides that ‘a person who, while 
begging in any place—(a) harasses, intimidates, assaults or threatens any other person or 
persons, or (b) obstructs the passage of persons or vehicles, is guilty of an offence’.10 This 
provision tries to specify begging cases that cause nuisance but its phraseology may still be 
problematic. ‘Harassing’ is ambiguously inclusive. It is not clear whether it requires repeat 
acts. More importantly, while the provision focuses on harmful conduct, it fails to reveal the 
protected interests. It is unclear what type of (public order) interest is harmed or endangered; 
nor is it clear whether it aims to protect physical comfort or inner peace, or is for other 
purposes, such as allowing free movement on the streets. As a result, it may be unclear what 
forms of begging constitute harassment and thus should be prohibited. The prohibition of 
some begging conduct may thus be arbitrary.  
In short, the first approach above targets the (possible) nuisance, rather than begging itself. 
It focuses on finding types of begging that could lead to harmful or offensive nuisance in 
                                                          
7 See R Humphreys, No Fixed Abode: A History of Response to the Roofless and Rootless in Britain (Macmillan 
Press 1999) 17. 
8 See A Erskine and I McIntosh, ‘Why Begging Offends: Historical Perspectives and Continuities’ in H Dean 
(ed), Begging Questions: Street-level Economic Activity and Social Policy Failure (The Policy Press 1999) 
29-30. 
9 In UK, another approach may be worthy of attention. In Scotland, although the Vagrancy Act 1824 does not 
apply, common law crimes such as breach of the peace may target some instances of begging. For example, 
D was found by two police officers to approach people and many appeared to be alarmed and D on some 
occasions walked along the approached for some distance. The court held that begging did not constitute a 
breach of the peace, it was the manner which was relevant in establishing by an objective test of whether 
the conduct was likely to cause fear and alarm. See Donaldson (James) v Vannet 1998 SLT 957. So, the 
harmfulness of begging seems to be the causing of alarm to others. But this approach of targeting alarm still 
cannot answer clearly whether they are other harmfulness of begging that should be targeted. This problem 
also exists in another approach of targeting begging that should cause alarm, distress or harassment by civil 
orders. Although there may still be total ban of begging by one person in the form of the imposition of an 
injunction (see Lorie Charlesworth, ‘Readings of Begging: The Legal Response to Begging Considered in 
Its Modern and Historical Context’ (2006) 15 NottLJ 1, 2-3), ASBOs tend to be granted against only some 
begging behaviours likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress (A criminal behaviour order (CBO) 
(preventing the causation of harassment, alarm or distress) replaces an ASBO on conviction. See Anti-social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 22). A five-year ASBO that prohibited A from ‘causing 
harassment, nuisance or annoyance by seeking to beg’ on any train or railway station within the M25 
motorway boundary was breached and thus A was punished; the Court of Appeal confirmed that in respect 
of ‘a first offender’, sentencing for an ASBO breach should ‘primarily reflect the harassment, alarm or 
distress involved’ (R v Fagan (Paul Patrick) [2010] EWCA Crim 2449). It is not clear if there is another 
harmfulness of begging that can be criminally targeted. Even for these harms of alarm, distress and 
harassment, it is not clear what kind of begging conduct can be regarded as harmful. 
10 And it is liable, on summary conviction, to a class E fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one 
month or both. 
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public places. However, it is unclear what type of (public order) interest is harmed or 
endangered. Consequently, it would not be clear what types of begging should be prohibited 
– some types may still be arbitrarily banned.11 
The second type of approach can be found in China. Here, begging was strictly regulated in 
order to control population movement between urban and rural areas. Vagrants and beggars 
in cities were routinely detained and repatriated to their hometown. This was a coercive 
measure against the flow of people from rural to urban areas, an aspect of economic planning 
and urban crime prevention. However, in 2003 a graduate wrongly suspected of vagrancy 
was beaten to death in detention, and following the social and academic outcry over the 
infringements of personal rights implicit in this all-encompassing approach, this regulation 
was abolished.12 The current policing law articulates the harmful conduct of begging under 
reference to section 41 in the chapter on personal and/or property interests: ‘Begging by 
importuning, forcibly begging or by any other means of disturbing any person shall be 
detained for no more than 5 days or shall be given a warning.’ Now only begging conduct 
that importunes, forces or disturbs others is prohibited. So, it seems that only begging 
conduct that disturbs others’ exercise of personal and/or property rights is prohibited. 
Begging is thus regulated mainly for the purpose of protecting personal and/or property 
rights – and not for other purposes such as maintaining public order. The Chinese approach 
has not fully identified the kinds of protectable interests which might expect to be involved 
(such as public order), so the arbitrary indication of protected interests (personal/property 
rights) may in practice lead to an arbitrary scope of prohibited forms of begging: ‘any other 
means’ may be seen as ‘disturbing any person’. For example, begging may be seen by a local 
authority as an ‘eyesore’ harmful to a city’s image and aesthetics and thus beggars may be 
expelled from that city.13 In this case begging is in fact prohibited for purposes beyond 
                                                          
11 As argued in Chapter 2 (II(ii)b), The harm principle firstly requires a recognisable setback to a physical 
interest. A criminal law provision should prevent specified setbacks to a particular interest. ‘For reasons of 
legal security, it is vitally important to specify, in the crime definition, the harm to be prevented. This is the 
only method by which the harm requirement can be given the more effective protection of the legality 
principle.’ Albin Eser, ‘The Principle of ‘‘Harm’’ In the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of The 
Criminally Protected Legal Interests’ (1965-1966) 4 Duq UL Rev 345, 385. The specified harm to a 
particular interest is the nature of a crime. ‘It constitutes a triumph of freedom if every punishment is derived 
from the particular nature of the crime. Nothing arbitrary remains.’ Thomas Vormbaum and Michael 
Bohlander (eds), A Modern History of German Criminal Law (Margaret Hiley (tr), Springer 2014) 35. 
12 Detention and Repatriation Measures of Urban Vagrants and Beggars by the National Council (1982-2003) 
in 2003 was replaced by Aiding Administration Measures of Vagrants and Beggars without Livelihood in 
Cities, in which aiding is a welfare choice of beggars i.e. beggars can choose whether go to the special 
welfare institution for assistance. 
13 Section 24 of the Foushan City Appearance Standard 2012 prohibits begging and sleeping in public places. 
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personal/property rights and it is not clear whether the purposes are valid reasons to justify 
prohibition. 
The American approach, as the third type of approach, recognises panhandling (begging) as 
a protected form of expression. The beggar is free to communicate their own economic 
situation and appeal for assistance, ‘calling his condition to the attention of the general 
public’.14 Peaceful begging is permitted and an absolute ban prohibited.15 The New York 
District Court has ruled that ‘the interest in permitting free speech and the message begging 
sends about our society predominates’ – and thus ‘a total ban on a conduct’ of begging ‘with 
an expressive component’ ‘is deemed unconstitutional’.16 However, ‘while courts generally 
recognise panhandling as protected expression, they give a significant amount of discretion 
to local governments to impose partial restraints’.17 It is still unclear what kind of partial ban 
is valid. 18  It means that in practice begging may still be substantially and arbitrarily 
prohibited. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex has concluded that ‘no 
compelling State interest has been demonstrated that would warrant punishing a beggar’s 
peaceful communication with his or her fellow citizens in a public place [i.e. ‘he does not 
approach or threaten anyone either physically or verbally, and he does not block any 
sidewalk or any store entrance’]’ and ‘these types of bans are not lightly permitted’.19 The 
decision implicates the possibility of banning harmful begging behaviours of approaching, 
threatening, obstructing, etc. But it is still unclear whether any harm caused by such conduct 
is wrongful, or if only some such harms are. That is, it is unclear when a restriction of the 
manner of approaching, for example, is reasonable, though we can claim that ‘a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction’ is permitted, e.g. ‘a regulation prohibiting all solicitation 
in a ten-block radius from Grand Central Station during the rush hour’.20 For example, in 
some places begging may be regarded as offensive, triggering psychological discomfort to 
some people, because they assume that beggars are too lazy to deserve the giving of money, 
                                                          
14 Loper v New York City Police Dept 802 F Supp 1029 (SDNY 1992). See also McLaughlin v Lowell 140 F 
Supp 3d 177, 184 (D Mass 2015). 
15 See Loper v New York City Police Dept 802 F Supp 1029 (SDNY 1992). ‘Begging is protected expression, 
and total prohibitions are unconstitutional.’ Nate Vogel, ‘The Fundraisers, The Beggars, And the Hungry: 
The First Amendment Rights to Solicit Donations, To Beg for Money, And to Share Food’ (2012) 15 U Pa 
J L & Soc Change 537, 543. 
16 See Loper v New York City Police Dept 802 F Supp 1029 (SDNY 1992). 
17 Nate Vogel, ‘The Fundraisers, The Beggars, And the Hungry: The First Amendment Rights to Solicit 
Donations, To Beg for Money, And to Share Food’ (2012) 15 U Pa J L & Soc Change 537, 550. 
18 See Drew Sena, ‘A Constitutional Critique on the Criminalization of Panhandling in Washington State’ 2017 
41 Seattle U LR 287, 309. 
19 See Craig Benefit v City of Cambridge & others 424 Mass 918 (1997). 
20 Loper v New York City Police Dept 802 F Supp 1029 (SDNY 1992). 
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an intrusion of privacy, or simply bothersome.21  It has been claimed that ‘the sight of 
homeless people lined up on the street is not conducive to attracting new businesses and 
customers’.22 In these cases, it is not clear whether the begging is peaceful enough that it 
should be free from prohibition. Although the American approach of protecting free speech 
does not clearly list specific forms of begging that can be criminalised, certain cities such as 
Chicago have enacted ordinances that detail criminalised conduct. The Chicago style of 
prescription is to exclude passive begging from criminalisation and criminalise begging in 
specified locations or by specified intimidating manners.23 The scope of criminalisation is 
clear, but the rationale for the delimitation by listing locations, for example, is not clear, and 
thus it appears that the scope may be arbitrary.  
In Canada begging is also recognised as a form of protected expression, but the law permits 
the prohibition of forms of begging (obstructive begging) that are in conflict with the 
principal purpose of passage through the streets (i.e. efficient and safe movement).24 Here, a 
factual harm of obstruction is identified and the harm is identified as wrongful when it sets 
back the principal interest of movement. The Canadian test of obstructing movement is 
clearer than the broad American discretion. Vancouver defines “obstruction” of the safe and 
efficient passage of pedestrians in five very specific ways.25 It seems, therefore, that other 
ways are not wrongful. But legislatively it is not clear how these wrongful ways are 
differentiated from the other non-wrongful ways. Though this provision seems 
comprehensive in covering some conduct on the street, it neglects other places. Obviously, 
harmful begging should be regulated in other places. But it is not clear how a way of begging 
                                                          
21 See R C Ellickson, ‘Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-
Space Zoning’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ 1165, 1181.  
22 The National Coalition for the Homeless and The National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, ‘A 
Dream Denied: The Criminalisation of Homelessness in U.S. Cities’, 36 (National Homeless, January 2006) 
<www.nationalhomeless.org/crimreport/report.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018. 
23 See Municipal Code of Chicago, s 8-4-025 (Aggressive Panhandling).  
24 The Supreme Court of British Columbia, in Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of BC v Vancouver (City) 2002 
BCSC 105, held that obstructive or aggressive panhandling is justifiably limited on the basis of its inhibiting 
efficient and safe movement as the dominant purpose/use of streets. This included the potential obstruction 
in areas within 10 metres of an ATM or bank/trust company entrance; one exercising freedom to expression 
should adjust ‘means of communicating’ to ‘the principal function or intended purpose’ of a public place. 
25 See Vancouver (city) By-law 8309, s 70A(1): “cause an obstruction” means 
    (a) to sit or lie on a street in a manner which obstructs or impedes the convenient passage of any pedestrian 
traffic in a street, in the course of solicitation, (b) to continue to solicit from or otherwise harass a pedestrian 
after that person has made a negative initial response to the solicitation or has otherwise indicated a refusal, 
(c) to physically approach and solicit from a pedestrian as a member of a group of three or more persons, 
(d) to solicit on a street within 10 m of (i) an entrance to a bank, credit union or trust company, or (ii) an 
automated teller machine, or (e) to solicit from an occupant of a motor vehicle in a manner which obstructs 
or impedes the convenient passage of any vehicular traffic in a street. 
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might be wrongful in other places. And the broader problem is: can the right to free 
movement always override the freedom to expression, making the panhandling wrongful? 
In short, the specific approaches listed above are illuminating, but do not categorise 
prohibited begging behaviour according to clear or consistent criteria. The English approach 
targets begging conduct that could cause public nuisance, the Irish approach targets begging 
conduct that could cause specific forms of nuisance, the Chinese approach targets begging 
conduct that should infringe personal/property rights, while the North American approach 
targets begging conduct that is non-peaceful. Inconsistencies are obvious between the 
different approaches – and within the same jurisdiction, the inconsistency of criminalisation 
practice can still appear because none of the tests of criminalisation is itself sufficiently clear. 
The underlying problem, as I shall argue in the next section, is that there has been no attempt 
to clearly articulate the underlying harm(s).  
(ii) Claimed Harmfulness of Begging  
As we saw in the last part, the claimed harms associated with begging fall into three main 
types: crimes of begging itself; further crimes committed by beggars; and crimes committed 
by others induced by the presence or conduct of beggars. I shall look at these in turn to show 
that the claimed harmfulness of begging either does not consist in factual setbacks to 
protectable interests or is not wrongful.  
a. Crimes of Begging Itself 
Begging has been regarded as fraudulent, offensive or an eyesore or even harmful to 
commercial attraction. Some beggars may pretend to be miserable and helpless and use this 
fraudulent pretence to achieve help.26 However, despite some fraudulent cases, may still 
want to assist, such that it is hardly reasonable to prevent begging by criminalisation.27 The 
normative reason for this view is that if a decision to provide assistance is voluntary and 
informed, then there is no fraud. However, there remains the concern that because a person 
may be unable to differentiate those begging fraudulently and those doing so honestly, he 
                                                          
26 Beggars were thought to be fraudulent, as mentioned (II(i)), see R Humphreys, No Fixed Abode: A History 
of Response to the Roofless and Rootless in Britain (Macmillan Press 1999) 17. This belief has changed 
little over hundreds of years, see A Erskine and I McIntosh, ‘Why Begging Offends: Historical Perspectives 
and Continuities’ in H Dean (ed), Begging Questions: Street-level Economic Activity and Social Policy 
Failure (Policy Press 1999) 29-30.  
27 Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for Criminalising 
Begging’ (2009) 73J Crim L 212, 227. 
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has to accept the risk of being cheated to help those genuinely in need. In this case, there is 
no real voluntariness. But the state should merely punish fraudulent begging, not all begging. 
Otherwise, honest beggars are punished for others’ fraudulent begging. The regulation of 
abstract risks commends a relatively high probability given that the risked harm to property 
is not significant. Virtually all beggars are poor.28 Thus the likelihood of fraudulent begging 
is not sufficiently grave as to justify targeting all begging.  
Begging may be offensive, triggering psychological discomfort to some people, because they 
assume that it reflects laziness, is intrusive to privacy or simply bothersome.29 However, 
only some beggars do not deserve the gain. Thus, this offence should not be attributed to all 
begging. Similarly, only some begging is harmful to privacy or bothersome. It is not 
reasonable to be offended by all begging behaviours. As the offence is not attributed, there 
is no need to consider further whether the offence is wrongful or not. To refute claimed 
offence, it is argued that ‘a polite request for assistance does not wrong anyone. The passer-
by can easily ignore the solicitation and walk on’.30  However, the ease of avoiding or 
terminating the offensive contact is only one factor affecting the seriousness of that 
offence.31 It does not by itself result in the absence of wrongfulness, e.g. trivial offence is 
still wrongful if it is unnecessary.32  
There is another motivation for governments to limit begging. Cynically, they may seek to 
remove the ‘eyesore’ of begging as an in order to improve a city’s image, because beggars 
will be perceived as spoiling public places. 33  Firstly, aesthetic unpleasantness is not a 
problem of taking offence,34 because there is no communication to offend others. Further, it 
is not harmful to a protectable interest which can be referable to the fundamental values of 
a society. Aesthetic value is meaningful to people’s life in physical comfort. If a public place 
                                                          
28 See Roger Hopkins Burke, ‘Tolerance or Intolerance? The Policing of Begging in the Urban Context’ in 
Hartley Dean (ed), Begging Questions: Street Level Economic Activity and Social Policy Failure (The 
Policy Press 1999) 229. 
29 See R C Ellickson, ‘Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-
Space Zoning’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ 1165, 1181.  
30 Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for Criminalising 
Begging’ (2009) 73J Crim L 212, 231. 
31 See OTO 32. 
32 For the role of the alternative to avoid the offence in deciding wrongfulness of an offence, see next chapter 
(III(iii)b). 
33 As mentioned (II(i)), section 24 of the Foushan City Appearance Standard 2012 prohibits begging and 
sleeping in public places. For American illustrations such as Tacoma, Wash., Mun. Code (2007) ch 8.13A, 
s 010, see Drew Sena, ‘A Constitutional Critique on the Criminalization of Panhandling in Washington State’ 
(2017) 41 Seattle U LR 287, 292. 
34  Cf Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for 
Criminalising Begging’ (2009) 73 J Crim L 212, 232. 
112 
 
is deemed less beautiful and enjoyable than previously, people’s comfort in using that place 
is harmed. Activities such as camping may not interfere with others’ movement, but they 
can alter the original appearance of a location to the extent that they could be seen as 
aesthetically harmful. However, the aesthetic value of a city should only lie in the physical 
appearance of public places, not of the persons who occupy them. Otherwise, an ordinary 
person’s appearance, authentic or handmade, will be only used about pleasing others. What 
an individual wears and the personal effects they carry are an integral part of their autonomy. 
If a type of beauty such as city image specifically excludes those citizens who come into 
conflict with this type of beauty, then it breaches a general human right to equal participation 
in social activities and thus should not be deemed protectable. Beggars should not be 
punished for their own lack of external or superficial ‘beauty’ in a public place, but only for 
the adverse effects of their special conduct on the beauty of a public place.  
City comfort may have alternative objectives, e.g. attracting new businesses and customers.35 
Commercial attraction is generally protectable, but any harm to it in this context is justified 
by the exercise of the competing right to be there. 36  Therefore, it is a presumptuous 
misconception to think that criminally forbidding homeless persons using commercial or 
tourist districts could justifiably improve the aesthetic comfort of these areas. 
b. Further Crimes by Beggars 
It has been claimed that beggars have a propensity commit other crimes such as theft, robbery 
or assault. 37  However, firstly, no remote harm can be normatively established in this 
particular context. It is difficult to argue that begging itself concretely creates further harmful 
behaviours, that is, it is difficult to prove that begging itself is a necessary or sufficient 
condition for further harm. 
Secondly, though it has been claimed that ‘the majority’ of beggars ‘are often caught up in 
much more serious crime’,38 there is no abstract risk to be prevented. In cases involving 
abstract risk, the probability of harm inherently exists in the conduct itself (e.g. drunk-
                                                          
35 As mentioned (II(i)), ‘the sight of homeless people lined up on the street is not conducive to attracting new 
businesses and customers.’ The National Coalition for the Homeless and The National Law Center on 
Homelessness & Poverty, ‘A Dream Denied: The Criminalisation of Homelessness in U.S. Cities’, 36 
(National Homeless, January 2006) <www.nationalhomeless.org/crimreport/report.pdf> accessed 29 May 
2018. 
36 See (iv). 
37 See Home Office, Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti-social Behaviour (Cm 5778, 
2003) para 3.41. 
38 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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driving) but begging itself does not include the risk of other crimes being committed. 
Criminal law should only substantially target dangerous conduct rather than status.39 There 
is, therefore, no normative basis to preventatively criminalise the abstract risk presented by 
all beggars. Moreover, criminalisation of abstract risk is generally justified on the basis that 
the specifically risky (drunk driving) conduct is difficult to differentiate from other 
specifically non-risky or marginally safe (drunk driving) conduct – or that differentiation 
would be at an unreasonable cost. In section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, begging is placed 
alongside offences of rogueing and vagabonding. Such behaviour may typically accompany 
begging. However, as such behaviour is easy to differentiate from begging, which itself is 
an exercise of the right to freedom of expression, it should be criminalised separately from 
begging.40  
c. Crimes by Others  
It has been claimed that begging may encourage others to engage in serious crimes in the 
area concerned.41 The basis of this claim is the notorious broken window theory – that is, if 
visible minor disorder and incivility are not dealt with in a community, more serious crimes 
will ensue.42 But this theory is disputed.43 Even if it were empirically proved, criminological 
findings should be assessed normatively and only selectively – and not necessarily accepted 
in criminal law. If begging is to be regulated criminally because of the consequence of 
serious crimes by others, then a legitimate basis for imputation of this remote harm must be 
established.  
But this harm is too remote to be attributed. The prospect of inadvertent influence on others 
demonstrates no normative involvement.44 Criminal law does not loosely accept such remote 
harm based on too extensive ‘but-for’ causation. Factual causation cannot be fairly imputed 
because begging generally has not raised the risk by a legally important degree (no high 
                                                          
39 Every group of people identifiable by their status – whether public sector or white-collar workers – is likely 
to have some of its members committing crimes to varying extents. However, no one would suggest these 
status groups should be preventatively targeted. 
40 It is the reasons for begging e.g. desperation leading to begging-related crimes – thus extra-legal responses 
should target the reason while legal measures should target the differentiable crimes.   
41 See Home Office, Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti-social Behaviour (Cm 5778, 
2003) para 1.8. 
42 See J Q Wilson and G Kelling, ‘Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety’ (1982) 3 Atlantic 
Monthly 29. 
43  See Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for 
Criminalising Begging’ (2009) 73J Crim L 212, 224, 226. 
44 See Dennis J Baker, ‘The Moral Limits of Criminalising Remote Harms’ (2007) 10 New Crim L Rev 370, 
390. 
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probability) – and nor has it done so in a legally-forbidden way (the risk is justifiable) when 
the conduct concerned is a lawful exercise of freedom.45 The state should directly punish 
serious crimes by others. No one would seriously argue that if increased exposure of body 
parts in summer increases sex offences then the exposure should be punished – or that if 
carrying more cash increases acquisitive crime then the carrying should be punished. 
(iii) Harms of Begging 
The harms of begging are mainly the adverse effects on safety and amenity in public places.46 
In this section I will apply the harm principle in order to identify the harms of begging in a 
more systematic way. Identifying factual setbacks to interests is the first step of my test of 
criminalising some types of begging.  
It has been claimed that criminal law should be tailored to only prohibit ‘genuinely 
aggressive and intimidating’ begging such as ‘begging in trains and near ATMs’.47 However, 
‘genuinely aggressive and intimidating’ is a cumbersome formulation rather than a workable 
normative standard. I will argue that begging may constitute different kinds of public 
disorder, but that this will depend on the form of the begging. We can identify three different 
forms: 48  passive (sitting or standing); active (approaching); and aggressive (following, 
repeatedly asking or threatening). This categorisation allows us ‘to gain an objective profile 
and understanding of the extent and nature of begging’49 – and will help us analyse begging 
in a normatively constructive way. My aim here is to see whether a particular form (passive, 
active or aggressive) is substantively peaceful, intruding on no one’ interests 50  – or is 
substantively harmful, intruding on others’ interests (in public order). As a result of this 
analysis, it will be shown that begging in an aggressive manner is obviously intrusive, while 
the active approaching and especially the passive manners needs further consideration. 
                                                          
45 There is a ‘lack of creation of legally relevant danger’ when’ D acts lawfully’. See Michael Bohlander, 
Principles of German Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 50. 
46 See P Lynch, ‘Understanding and Responding to Begging’ (2005) 29 MULR 518, 554. 
47 See Dennis J Baker, Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 240. 
48 See Michael Horn and others, A Question of Begging: A Study of The Extent and Nature of Begging in The 
City of Melbourne (Hanover Welfare Services 2001) 9. 
49 Ibid 24. 
50 Facing a peaceful act, another person does not have to or should not reasonbly react in a non-passive manner. 
See Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of BC v Vancouver (City) 2002 BCSC 105 [301]. 
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a. Passive Begging  
Forms of passive begging (without moving) can be peaceful and cause no harm e.g. most 
obviously standing or sitting in a spacious street or pavement. However, there are other 
forms of conduct that can be harmful. When a beggar remains static (standing, sitting, lying) 
in a point on a street, road, passageway or pavement, lying would be the most disturbing 
manner, because it involves the occupation of greater ground space and is most likely to be 
outside a moving person’s field of vision. When the ground space is occupied, users of public 
space experience inconvenience in avoiding that space. This is a type of public disorder. 
When one person lies outside another’s field of vision, the passer-by may stumble (or try to 
avoid touching the body of the beggar) and thus suffer injury to their person or property. 
This is a public security concern. In short, lying to beg is a nuisance both to public order and 
public security – and thus could be a candidate for criminal prohibition. 
Comparatively, standing would be much more convenient and safer for the users of public 
places than lying. It is usually not an impediment to passage. Sitting is an intermediate 
category and its probable nuisance value depends on other factors such as the layout of a 
location. If the street were spacious, sitting may be permitted because by-passes would not 
need to reroute. However, case by case judgments may increase enforcement costs. A total 
ban on sitting in public areas could be economical in enforcement. However, it would be 
disproportionate. The costs of case-by-case enforcement should not override people’s right 
to sit, which is harmful to no-one in a spacious place. The costs are not as enormous as that 
of differentiating safe drunk driving and speeding from the dangerous, in so far that the 
number of sitting beggars is a limited, readily-ascertainable quantity in contrast to undetected 
cases of drunk driving and speeding. The assessments of a location’s capacity seem easier 
than the assessment of a driver’s capacity of safe driving. 
Therefore, when one begs on streets or sidewalks, the conduct of staying by the wall/guard 
rail avoids blocking the movement of other users of public passages. If one stands or sits in 
the middle of a street or sidewalk, the degree of inconvenience suffered by other users will 
depend on how crowded the area is.  
Public life peace has other aspects that may be intruded by other passive manners of calling 
attention to oneself. If a beggar uses crying, singing, clothing, pictures or words to draw 
attention to or express their own individual miserable story, their conduct may offend against 
general sensual comfort or psychological comfort – when the sound is of a high volume, it 
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may be a type of noise nuisance against audio comfort; when the content expressed is 
offensive, it is against inner peace.51 
Another passive yet intrusive manner of begging should be assessed. ‘If a beggar corners a 
captive audience at an ATM, this would have an intimidatory effect and would not be 
tolerable’.52 Through this offence to psychological comfort, civil life is disrupted. When a 
beggar sits beside an ATM, a user may be worried about the security of their personal 
information or money or both.53 Their alarm is reasonably predictable because a beggar is 
someone eager for money without equitable exchange and in this case of sitting beside an 
ATM the user’s money is immediately accessible. Valuable property should not be displayed, 
because it is an important privacy issue that concerns not only property safety but also 
personal safety. The anxiety is unnecessarily caused offence and could be easily avoided by 
the beggar.54 Although the sitting is passive, it is not necessarily peaceful. Rather, it is 
genuinely intrusive to users in causing anxiety through presence.55 So, passive begging 
behaviours may still be harmful in some cases and can at this stage be seen as suitable 
candidates for criminalisation.  
b. Active Begging  
Merely walking by a beggar causes no harm – just as walking by other pedestrians does not. 
It would be more acceptable to move in the middle of a street or pavement when it does not 
involve blocking the movement of public road users. If a beggar actively approaches a target, 
this disturbs others’ convenient use of that public place by stopping or slowing down their 
                                                          
51 Such as breach of the peace by begging and making comments to passers-by, see Daly (James Anthony) v 
Vannet 1999 SCCR 346. Shouting and/or swearing is easily to be regarded amounted to breach of the peace, 
physically and/or psychologically, see BOP 154-56. A foul-smelly beggar may offend olfactory comfort 
and may even exert danger to public health security. Though the beggar has done nothing, he is culpable by 
the omission of keeping poor hygiene. The wrongfulness may be denied because the beggar has no choice 
of hygiene.  
52 Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for Criminalising 
Begging’ (2009) 73J Crim L 212, 238. 
53 There is a difference between the beggar who simply sits there and the one who actively makes requests or 
demands of ATM users. However, even other users should not be too close to the one using the ATM. The 
exclusion zone could be broader than other users because of likely accumulation of beggars aside an ATM 
when there seems to be the possibility of greater gains than other places. 
54  The offence is not fear, because the ‘subjectively experienced’ intimidation usually does not reach 
‘threatening degree’. See Roger Hopkins Burke, ‘Tolerance or Intolerance? The Policing of Begging in the 
Urban Context’ in Hartley Dean (ed), Begging Questions: Street Level Economic Activity and Social Policy 
Failure (The Policy Press 1999) 230. 
55 It is also obstructive – see Ch 3 (III(i)a). 
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pace. However, its wrongfulness can be controversial, such that it will be further analysed 
in the next section.  
Other forms of active conduct can be harmful. As well as streets, passages and sidewalks, 
possible begging venues or destinations include a highway and moving public facilities 
(public transportation). In these ‘captive’ cases, active begging causes intrusion (unsafety, 
inconvenience, embarrassment) that cannot be easily avoided. 
Self-evidently, vehicles move more quickly and stop less readily than pedestrians. Begging 
from cars on the road creates huge safety concerns for drivers and their passengers. In 
intersections with traffic lights, people may also find beggars symbolically cleaning 
windows of stopping cars at traffic lights and asking for money.56 ‘Washing of car windows 
in traffic (squeegeeing)’ is ‘soliciting aggressively’.57 Although a ‘stationary’ vehicle does 
not move, its driver in this scenario is already trying to be cautious, with crowded space, to 
start moving. The distractive action of a beggar aggravates the situation, substantially 
increasing the accident risk.58  People in charge of vehicles are disturbed and thus the 
problem is mainly a security concern. 
Still, begging could take place in relatively closed and confined spaces, such as public 
transport e.g. buses, subway trains or railway carriages. Busking on public transport is a 
form of approaching a captive target audience.59 It disrupts the quiet use of public transport 
and makes other passengers uncomfortable. When the transport is crowded, the targeted 
passengers cannot easily ignore the begging or leave. The journey is rendered uncomfortable. 
Even if the transport were not crowded and the targeted passenger could easily ignore the 
beggar or leave, that element of inconvenience remains. In public transport, the proper or 
preferred state of a passenger is to be firmly fixed in position, whether sitting or standing, 
rather than moving. If a passenger has to move because he wishes or needs to leave the 
beggar, he suffers unnecessary inconvenience. This is different from an open space scenario, 
where people are generally in motion and so need take no extra effort to avoid the begging. 
Moreover, the vehicle itself may (or may about to be) in motion. If the approached passenger 
has to move more frequently, then there is greater risk of injury or damage to the person or 
                                                          
56 It is criminalised in India to clean vehicles at red lights. See D Mukherjee, ‘Laws for Beggars, Justice for 
Whom: A Critical Review of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act 1959’ (2008) 12 Intl JHR 279, 282. 
57 See Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of BC v Vancouver (City) 2002 BCSC 105 [308]. 
58 Whether to punish those giving money is another question. 
59 It is a criminal offence in India. See D Mukherjee, ‘Laws for Beggars, Justice for Whom: A Critical Review 
of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act 1959’ (2008) 12 Intl JHR 279, 282. 
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property. In general, begging in public transport is a concern in terms of both public order 
and public security. 
The Home Office has recognised the embarrassment caused to the approached.60 However, 
the offence should be quantitatively assessed in terms of its seriousness. The ease of avoiding 
or terminating offence affects the seriousness of that offence.61 In open spaces, even if one 
could not easily ignore and leave the beggar, other pedestrians are passing quickly, so the 
approached would not feel pressured as he would if he were watched by other passengers. 
However, in public transport, begging places substantial social pressure on the targeted 
passenger because other passengers remain in the vicinity and observe him. It is via this 
social psychology that inner comfort is breached.62  Therefore, even if a person merely 
silently announces their intention to beg by the use of written words, it still pressures and 
discomforts near-by passengers.  
Public transportation will be owned by a private company or a public agency. Though they 
may have a public function and facilitate social life, they will have a private (profit) function 
that begging indirectly interfered. Begging on public transport may lead to people avoiding 
it. Exercising alternative choices will harm the operation of the transportation business and 
the property rights of the owner/operator.  
Finally, operation of transport providers or retail premises can be disrupted by begging inside 
or even immediately outside. Public order is disrupted. While a shop is open to the public, it 
differs from streets or squares open to public. A shop is open to the public almost exclusively 
for shopping, while streets or squares are open for other general social activities. When a 
beggar enters a store or begging information is communicated, the commercial 
operation/service is disrupted. In comparison, a home is for private or family life and people 
inside are rendered even more captive still if confronted by a beggar. Door-to-door begging 
is an intolerable disruption of private life comfort and peace and thus is a type of disruption 
of public order. Even one solitary knock on the door of a family by one beggar is a disruption 
of their life peace. These harms establish that there is a prima facie argument for 
                                                          
60 See Home Office, Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti-social Behaviour (Cm 5778, 
2003) para 3.40. 
61 See OTO 32. 
62 Of course, this social psychology works in a community with a substantial section of members who value 
giving to the weak. 
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criminalisation. If they are further confirmed as wrongful in the next section, an argument 
for criminalisation can be made. 
c. Aggressive Begging 
The begging behaviours hitherto examined tend not to be very aggressive in character 
(except begging by traffic ‘squeegeeing’) – and thus may not be obviously intrusive to legal 
interests. I will examine obviously intrusive begging conduct that consists in approaching 
others in a disorderly way (importuning), or in abusive, insulting or threatening forms 
(forcible pulling or begging in groups). These behaviours in England can be covered by 
sections 4A and 5 of the POA 1986. Section 41 of the Chinese policing law lists aggressively 
troubling ways of importuning and forcible begging. Clearly, there is a prima facie case for 
criminalisation, although in some instances this may not be only a matter of public order 
because the harm here mainly targets personal rights. 
The Chinese criterion of importuning or force is a rigid standard of regulating intrusive 
begging. Disorderly importuning refers to begging after an explicit or implicit refusal, in the 
manner of blocking, accompanying or following in a discourse. Generally, this requires at 
least two instances. But in the manner of following that is itself consistent, even if the person 
followed did not expressly order or request the beggar to desist, the manner could still be 
identified as importuning, dependent on the length of time or route involved. When a beggar 
follows a passenger, it is a form of harassment and stalking that is invasive of privacy, pre-
empts attention (disrupting life peace) and breaches inner peace. In one case, the actor 
approached a number of people walking alongside over a distance.63 Here, the approaching 
itself may not be sufficient to cause fear and alarm,64 but its persistent manner may be.65 
Forcible begging is threatening and thus aggressive. An extreme case might involve the use 
of direct force on the targeted person, such as pulling. Indeed, the very act of touching 
constitute assault.66 When a beggar pulls a passenger, not only is their normal use of the 
place disrupted, but their personal safety is endangered. Another case of forcible begging 
may avoid direct touching, but the detention of the targeted person. Two or more beggars 
                                                          
63 See Donaldson v Vannet 1998 SLT 957. 
64 Ibid 959. 
65 Persistent following is generally deemed to be a breach of the peace, see BOP 150. 
66 W had approached members of the public, offered to shake hands with them, patted them on the shoulder 
and then asked for money, the conduct was deemed likely to cause alarm or apprehension on the part of the 
public and thus amounted to breach of the peace, see Wyness v Lockhart 1992 SCCR 808. The offering itself 
is enough to disturb convenience of free passing and the patting itself is unacceptable force against person. 
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moving towards the same target causes inconvenience in the normal use of a public place 
and creates a potentially alarming state undermining psychological comfort.  
In sum, by the application of the first step of my test, I have identified some initial candidates 
for criminalisation. Intrusiveness can be a sufficient standard to allow peaceful begging such 
as passively standing/sitting by the wall/guard rail that causes no harm, while considering 
the prohibition of other conduct such as slowing passers-by by active approaching, 
stopping/blocking passers-by by sitting/lying/objects, following passers-by, pulling passers-
by or begging in a group – each of which is likely to constitute a interference with the 
convenient use of public places/facilities, a breach of inner peace, an invasion of privacy or 
even endangerment of safety. These cases of intrusion on interests should be further 
normatively examined to assess whether or not the criminal law should be engaged. 
(iv) Wrongful Begging Behaviours  
After this analysis of begging in terms of factual setbacks to (public order) interests, this 
section applies the second step of my posited test for criminalisation. Here I will structurally 
balance conflicting interests in the cases of intrusive begging identified above, in order to 
show how criminalisation might be further limited by considering the wrongfulness of the 
conduct.  
Not every expression is protected. Structurally, conflicting interests should be balanced so 
as to identify wrongful and thus criminalisable intrusions. Freedom of expression and the 
right to avoid intrusive begging in public places are necessarily opposed interests, defined 
by Feinberg as the interest in avoiding the harm from an activity and the interest in engaging 
it.67 People who beg, busk or solicit indeed express something. Those who disorderly use 
public places may claim a right to express, but the right not to be intrusively communicated 
with by others surely limits the means of expression. As an ‘atomistic self-governing 
individual’ (autonomous bounded self), ‘the right to pass freely’ is necessary for 
circulation.68  
In conducting the balancing exercise, consideration should be given to how ‘vital’ each 
interest in the interest network of its possessor actually is – and the degree to which each is 
                                                          
67 See HTO 203. 
68 See N Blomley, ‘The Right to Pass Freely: Circulation, Begging, and The Bounded Self’ (2010) 19 S&LS 
331, 331. 
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reinforced by other private and public interests and their inherent moral quality.69 Expression 
involves the exercise of a political right in the network, while convenience and comfort is a 
life right. It is hard to say which is more important. For others or for society generally, both 
values are comparable. Intrusive expression is important for the actor to seek support and 
for others to know social facts and for humanity as a whole to flourish,70  while peaceful 
passing is important for the actor to conveniently and comfortably use the public place, for 
relevant parties to interact efficiently with the actor and for the whole city to be economically 
efficient and socially attractive.71  
However, consideration of the moral quality of an interest should result in a favourable 
outcome for the targeted, because no one should unnecessarily sacrifice others’ interests for 
their own. If other comparably effective alternatives but less intrusive forms of expression 
are readily available, it is hardly moral to sacrifice others’ interests, even if less important, 
for one’s own. It is the aggressive soliciting person who initiates the conflict of interests. 
Therefore, the conflict should be limited by the actor to what is necessary.72 Everyone enjoys 
the right to freedom to expression, but the means by which this is to be achieved should be 
reasonable and not sacrifice others’ interests unnecessarily. Otherwise, this will lead to an 
inequality in respecting of the interests of different subjects – the interest of the subject who 
exercise freedom to expression would be indiscriminately prioritised over the interests of all 
others.  
Therefore, aggressive manners are clearly not acceptable. Aggressive means of solicitation 
are too intrusive to the interests of others. They could and should be easily avoided. It is not 
that ‘obstructive panhandling’ ‘cannot promote those underlying [personal and social] 
values’,73 e.g. ‘it is also in the audience’s interest to be exposed to expression even when it 
                                                          
69 See HTO 217.  
70 ‘The nature of the principles and values underlying the vigilant protection of free expression in a society 
such as ours’ are: ‘(1) [others’] seeking and attaining the truth…; (2) [own] participation in social and 
political decision-making …; and (3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human 
flourishing ….’ Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG) [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 577 [612]. See also 
Committee for Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 1 SCR 139, 77 DLR (4th) 385 [459]. 
71 ‘Movement and activity’ is aesthetically valuable and ‘inherently productive for the state and its residents’. 
See Ron Levi, ‘Loitering in the City That Works’ in Markus D Dubber and Mariana Valverde (eds), Police 
and the Liberal State (Stanford General 2008) 198. 
72 Similarly, in so far that it is the state which initiates the regulation of begging, the regulation should be 
limited to what is necessary. A blanket ban of begging ends the right to begging peacefully, leaving no 
ample alternative means of communication. See Hill v Colorado 530 US 703, 726-27 (2000). 
73 See Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of BC v Vancouver (City) 2002 BCSC 105 [18]. 
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may come in unwelcome forms’.74 It is just there are other reasonably useful means by which 
a person can express their plight.  
But to what extent could intrusive manners be punished? On begging only, it may be claimed 
that active approaching is still intrusive and should be criminalised. However, if people see 
begging as a specific type of solicitation, 75  would they still believe that all solicitation 
involving active approaching should be punished? Perhaps not. Actively distributing 
religious, political, social or even commercial leaflets or soliciting charitable contributions 
may be considered acceptable.76 If such uninvited approaching were to be totally forbidden, 
no initiation of active interaction from a stranger would be permitted. This is scarcely 
consistent with the general needs of social interaction and cooperation. More importantly, a 
passer-by can easily ignore polite solicitation for assistance and walk on. 77  Active 
approaching usually does not force others to reroute – they can still pass freely. It is not 
compulsory for others to listen – once they refuse, whether explicitly or implicitly, the 
freedom of expression finishes. This solution strikes an acceptable balance between freedom 
of expression and public convenience and comfort. In this sense, simple active approaching, 
though intrusive, is not wrongful. Exceptionally, its occurrence in the close vicinity to a 
public entrance determines that the begging is not ordinary active approaching, but a form 
of aggressive begging in a relatively captive situation where the target cannot easily ignore 
the solicitation and walk on.78 Then it seems active solicitation should generally be permitted, 
subject to limitations in some cases.79  
However, if there were too many solicitations by beggars in a public place, a passer-by would 
be substantially disturbed in the convenient use of that place because the passer-by would 
be the subject of repeat approaches in the same public place by the same beggar and for other 
beggars – such that there can be corresponding limitations to prevent the accumulative 
harm.80 Other soliciting behaviours are not as prevalent as begging and tend not to cause this 
                                                          
74 Loper v New York City Police Dept 802 F Supp 1029 (SDNY 1992) 1042-043. 
75 Broadening the context to that of a person seeks help/attention is a good way to avoid ‘disfavoring a particular 
message communicated by a particular class of individuals’. See Drew Sena, ‘A Constitutional Critique on 
the Criminalization of Panhandling in Washington State’ (2017) 41 Seattle U LR 287, 307-08. 
76 After all, this is the essence of journalism.  
77 Dennis J Baker, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Historical and Contemporary Justifications for Criminalising 
Begging’ (2009) 73J Crim L 212, 231.  
78 See Municipal Code of Chicago, s 8-4-025 (Aggressive Panhandling). 
79 Similarly, general ban of street performance and art vending except for 11 specified locations is ‘substantially 
broader than necessary’. See State of Florida v O’Daniels 2005 WL 2373437 (Fla App 3 Dist). 
80 Conjunctive/accumulative harm arises from the combination of others’ similar acts that are not morally 
distinct from each other. Preventative regulation of accumulative harm can be justified in ‘a scheme of 
cooperation requiring joint action (or, more precisely, joint desistence)’ to avoid substantially probable harm 
to others, by doing no or less part for own part not to be combined with others’ parts to become (that) 
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concern. With accumulative begging, the relevant test to limit expression – ‘that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner’81 – is exceptionally 
met. This accumulative harm shall be considered in being of allowing as a stating proposition, 
approaching by beggars in public places, but with the problem solved by time control (such 
as rush hour) and/or venue controls (such as a central business district). In the solution, there 
may still be discomfort,82 but it is reduced to an acceptable degree and is manageable.  
Lastly, begging should be conducted in a fashion compatible with and balanced against the 
principal function or intended purpose of a public place.83 The principal function or intended 
purpose of a public place determines its design and use. It is vital to effective urban planning 
and functioning. So, harm to it is in principle disproportionate, resulting in unequal and 
unethical use, unless there were clear and present countering considerations. It is in this sense 
that we can understand that ‘the pedestrian is not imagined as open to encounter’ – and that 
‘the sidewalk, more generally, is not a forum for expressive liberties, but a conduit of flow.’84 
However, the principal function or intended purpose of a public place may change over time 
and its evolution is justified by the democratic process and the making of reasonable overall 
arrangements. For example, the United States Supreme Court has considered whether places 
such as sidewalks and parks traditionally operate as public fora to decide whether they are 
places suitable for expression.85 This consideration is not always effective – if city planners 
democratically change the long-standing arrangements and the venues for such public 
channels of expression, tradition is no longer a binding guide to the principal function or 
intended purpose of the place. 
In sum, aggressive manners and captive circumstances – being a disproportionate and 
immoral interference – are not justified by the right to freedom of expression, and thus are 
                                                          
harmful.  CHW 86. That is, criminal sanctions in accumulative harm often reply on defying the regulatory 
threshold. See HTO 244. 
81 Cohen v California 403 US 15, 91 S Ct 1780, 29 L Ed 2d 284 (1971) [21]. 
82 See Angus Erskine and Ian McIntosh, ‘Why Begging Offends: Historical Perspectives and Continuities’ in 
Hartley Dean (ed), Begging Questions: Street Level Economic Activity and Social Policy Failure (The 
Policy Press 1999) 39. 
83 See Committee for Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 1 SCR 139, 77 DLR (4th) 385 [394]- [395]. 
Similarly, graffiti is purportedly an expression of art or other ideas. However, if public places are intended 
for other known/presumed uses, graffiti should be limited. 
84 See N Blomley, ‘The Right to Pass Freely: Circulation, Begging, and The Bounded Self’ (2010) 19 SLS 331, 
331, 345. 
85 Julia Koestner, ‘Begging The (First Amendment) Question: The Constitutionality of Arizona's Prohibition 
of Begging in a Public Place’ (2013) 45 Ariz St LJ 1227, 1241. 
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wrongful disruptions of public order. But simple active approaching, though intrusive, can 
be a proportionate means of expression and not wrongful.  
Based on the analysis of factual and wrongful harms, there are three categories of wrongful 
begging conduct that correspond to legal interests in convenience and comfort and inner 
peace: (1) soliciting to a moving person in a bus stop, cab stand, railway station, entrance, 
or lying, sitting or standing in the middle of a passageway as to obstruct convenient passage; 
(2) soliciting a ‘captive’ person engaged in other activities – if, for example, while they are 
in an enclosed area,86 in an outdoor café, while queuing or stopped at traffic lights – should 
be regarded as disturbing the comfort or safety of the use of a public place or facility; (3) 
soliciting in an intimidating manner or circumstances (in a group, by following, in close 
proximity to an ATM or pay phone, or during certain the hours of darkness should be 
regarded as causing fear or alarm (in terms of personal or property safety).87 All these 
specific articulations of begging conduct match legal interests with wrongful conduct in 
improper circumstances – and help clearly and effectively protect order (and safety) in public 
places. These concepts of interests ensure we avoid inconsistent classification of wrongful 
conduct – and these categories of conduct substantiate these otherwise hollow concepts. 
III. THE CRIMINALISATION OF LOITERING  
The ordinary, common-sensible definition of loitering is neutral staying in a place or moving 
around a limited area with no apparent goal. But in law, it bears a negative implication. It 
evokes suspicion of an unlawful purpose and thus often elicits some sort of legal response. 
People such as beggars may be punished by laws against loitering. Some loitering behaviours 
such as group loitering can disrupt the inner peace of members of the public, in the form of 
causing fear, and/or even cause inconvenience to free movement. This raises further 
questions about the valid scope of public order crimes. I will consider here how some 
jurisdictions have criminalised loitering and explain why these approaches have been 
problematic – in order to argue for a new approach to understanding loitering from the 
perspective of the harm principle. 
                                                          
86 The area includes public toilets, shops and dwellings etc. 
87 Besides, touching is criminal assault and an invasion of bodily integrity – with the attendant threat of robbery 
– such that it is naturally impermissible. 
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(i) Inconsistent Approaches to Criminalising Loitering 
Different jurisdictions have adopted varying approaches to tackling loitering problems, and 
with different aims. In this section I will look at what the ‘claimed harms’ of loitering are – 
and show why and how loitering is framed as a public order problem.  
Firstly, many jurisdictions criminalise some loitering conduct in order to prevent other 
crimes. The origin of this approach seems to be section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, which 
originally prescribed both the offence of loitering in a particular place for an unlawful 
purpose and the more general offence of loitering in a public place.  
Section 4 in its modern form remains as an offence of loitering in a particular place: ‘every 
person being found in or upon any dwelling house, warehouse, coach-house, stable, or 
outhouse, or in any closed yard, garden, or area, for any unlawful purpose...’. On the 
particular offence of loitering, Tasmania confirms the approach taken in the 1824 Act that 
loitering on property needs an unlawful purpose to be criminalised. Tasmania criminalises 
loitering (of a suspected person or reputed thief) on property ‘for any unlawful purpose’.88 
Similarly, being found in or on any building or enclosed area or transport facility without 
reasonable excuse is a specific loitering offence in New Zealand.89 This kind of test also 
features in the miscellaneous chapter in the Penal Code of California.90 As to the particular 
offence of loitering, these jurisdictions take a consistent approach: the act must be in a 
limited place for an unlawful purpose.  
However, no consistency exists between these jurisdictions regarding the general offence of 
loitering in a public place. England and the Republic of Ireland have repealed the original 
offence in the Vagrancy Act 1824.  In England, section 8 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 
abolished the offence of loitering in a public place – the provisions of section 4 of the 
Vagrancy Act 1824 which had applied to suspected persons and reputed thieves frequenting 
or loitering about the public places described in that section, with the intent to commit felony, 
                                                          
88 See Police Offences Act 1935, s 7. 
89 See Summary Offences Act 1981, s 29(1). 
90 California criminalised loitering ‘upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business’ 
and refusing ‘to identify himself and to account for his presence’ ‘if the surrounding circumstances are such 
as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification’ (see Penal Code Ann. 
(West 1970), s 647(e)). There was guidance on when such a demand might be made. But the standards to 
judge whether one has identified himself was held to be unconstitutionally vague (see Kolender v Lawson 
461 US 352, 361 (1983)). Now ‘loiter’ ‘refers to delay or linger without a lawful purpose for being on the 
property and for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered.’ (Penal Code, s 
653.20(c)). 
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were repealed.91  Similarly in Ireland, it was suggested that no new offence of general 
‘loitering with intent’ should be enacted to replace section 4.92 However, some common law 
jurisdictions such as Tasmania and New Zealand still retain an offence of loitering in a public 
place. Tasmania criminalises loitering in a public place ‘with intent to commit a crime or an 
offence’.93 New Zealand has a general loitering offence of ‘being found in public place’ 
‘behaving in a manner from which it can reasonably be inferred that he is preparing to 
commit an imprisonable offence’.94  
The above approach is thus justified in terms of preventing other crimes (that the loiterers 
might commit). But it is not clear whether these jurisdictions can justifiably enact an offence 
of loitering in a particular or public place – and if so, what kind of intention should be 
required. More importantly, the approach does not address the harms of loitering itself (to 
public order).  
One alternative approach to the criminalisation of loitering involves it not being based on 
the harm of loitering itself, but on the harm of the defiance of an order to disperse. For 
example, in New Zealand a request to cease loitering is backed by a substantive penalty: ‘in 
circumstances that do not cause the constable to suspect an intention to commit any other 
offence’, there may be a warning to leave and it is the refusal to obey which leads to the 
imposition of a fine.95 In this scenario, the loitering itself is not harmful – not a preparation 
for further crimes as in the first approach. But it is not immediately clear whether the 
persistent loitering is a public order problem. So, we need to ascertain the harm associated 
with persistent loitering that justifies criminalisation. 
The third approach to criminalising loitering recognises something more of an intrinsic 
interest in public order. Arizona, for example, outlaws being present in a public place and 
soliciting in an offensive or disturbing manner, or being present ‘in a transportation facility’ 
(i.e. actually on public transport) and conducting ‘business, trade or commercial transactions 
involving the sale of merchandise or services’ after a request to cease or without 
authorisation, etc.96 However, the law does not criminalise loitering itself but the further 
conduct of solicitation or selling that offends or disturbs others. The law engages with the 
                                                          
91 Preparation needs a specific intention, rather than an obscure intention to commit a feasible felony. See Lyons 
v Owen (1963) Crim LR 123.  
92 See Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Report on Vagrancy and Related Offences (LRC No 11, 1985) 96. 
93 See Police Offences Act 1935, s 7. 
94 See Summary Offences Act 1981, s 28. 
95 The fine shall not exceed $ 500, see Summary Offences Act 1981, s 29(3). 
96 See Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 Criminal Code, s 2905. 
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uses of public space in order to target specific forms of conduct related to or associated with 
loitering. One jurisdiction in Australia (the Northern Territory) outlaws persistent loitering 
in order to discontinue or prevent public disorder problems caused by loitering (obstruction 
of movement and interference with the enjoyment of using a public place).97 This law means 
that loitering itself is conceived as a public order problem when it involves the obstruction 
of traffic movement or interference with the enjoyable use of a public place – such that it is 
justifiable to criminalise the persistence of such disorderly loitering.  
Another approach targets disorderly loitering by gang members. It is an offence in Chicago, 
when ‘a member of a criminal street gang engaged in loitering with one or more other 
persons’ in any designated public place, refuses to leave as ordered by police. 98  The 
approach is aimed both at preventing further crimes such as drug dealing – and at the harm 
implicit in gang loitering itself, specifically, disrupting public order by causing obstruction 
and intimidation to the public. This aims partly at policing the movement of the public in the 
city.99 It means it is justifiable to criminalise the persistence or repetition of such disorderly 
gang loitering. 
In sum, there are inconsistencies between jurisdictions; between substantive and procedural 
measures in a given jurisdiction; and even within the operation of the same measure in a 
given jurisdiction. None of above approaches can offer clear and comprehensive answers to 
the harmfulness of loitering. In next section, therefore, I will assess and refute the claimed 
                                                          
97 Section 47A of the Summary Offences Act 1923 provides that:  
    (1) A person loitering in any public place who does not give a satisfactory account of himself when 
requested so to do by a member of the Police Force shall, on request by a member of the Police Force to 
cease loitering, cease so to loiter. Penalty: $2,000 or imprisonment for 6 months, or both. [subsection (1) 
generally punishes persistent loitering after no reasonable account of the actor ] (2) Where a person is 
loitering in a public place and a member of the Police Force believes, on reasonable grounds (a) that an 
offence has been or is likely to be committed; or (b) that the movement of pedestrian or vehicular traffic 
is obstructed or is about to be obstructed, by that person or by any other person loitering in the vicinity 
of that person; (c) that the safety of the person or any person in his vicinity is in danger; or (d) that the 
person is interfering with the reasonable enjoyment of other persons using the public place for the purpose 
or purposes for which it was intend(ed), the member of the Police Force may require any person so 
loitering to cease loitering and to remove from that public place any article under his control, and a person 
so required shall comply with and shall not contravene the requirement. Penalty: $2,000 or imprisonment 
for 6 months, or both. (Emphasis added) 
98 The Municipal Code of Chicago includes explanations of designated public places in subsection (b) and of 
‘gang loitering’, ‘criminal street gang’ and ‘criminal gang activity’ under subsection (d). See s 8-4-015 
(Gang loitering). This scheme survived the constitutional challenge of being vague, arbitrary and overbroad 
in City of Chicago v Morales. The previous wording ‘to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose’ 
gave ‘absolute discretion to determine what type of activities constitute loitering.’ 527 US 41 (1999). 
99 See Ron Levi, ‘Loitering in the City That Works’ in Markus D Dubber and Mariana Valverde (eds), Police 
and the Liberal State (Stanford General 2008) 198. 
128 
 
harmfulness of loitering. Then in section (iii) I will apply the harm principle to consider 
comprehensively how to identify possible harms in cases of loitering.  
(ii) Claimed Harms of Loitering 
There are, broadly, three claimed harms of loitering. First, loitering by individuals or groups 
might be criminalised to prevent future crimes (either in general, or where some specific 
intent is required). It is claimed that the criminalisation of loitering will prevent the 
commission of such future crimes as drug trafficking, violence or the harassment of 
neighbouring residents.100 This is indirect harm. Second, loitering by individuals or groups 
might be criminalised because it can damage the quality of life in a particular neighbourhood 
(also because some further crimes might conceivably be committed). It is argued that 
loitering may limit residents of a neighbourhood in pursuing recreational, familial and 
commercial daily life on a street corner, or outside a shop or café because they are concerned 
about the crimes that the loiterers might commit in the future.101 This is a harm of loitering. 
Thirdly, loitering by groups might be criminalised because the groups are themselves 
intimidating.102 Residents may simply be intimidated by the presence of groups of young 
people – even if these young people do not intend to be intimidating or it is not envisaged 
that other crimes might be committed. There is a harmfulness implicit in a large group. I 
would argue from the consistent perspective of the restated harm principle that the three 
kinds of claimed harms above (future crimes of loitering, loitering’s interference with daily 
life, intimidation from large groups) do not justify criminalisation.  
In respect of future crimes, loitering itself is as neutral an action as begging. Loitering in 
residential areas could be either an innocuous daily activity or involves preparation for the 
commission of contemplated crimes, depending on the actor’s intention. But the intention 
may not be readily established – it should be proved from objective circumstances. Similarly, 
the crime of being ‘out-of-doors after nightfall’ is ‘basically one of suspicion’. 103 
Criminalisation should target more specific and non-neutral behaviours (such as further 
harassment offences) – rather than the general and neutral loitering itself – because the low 
                                                          
100 Ibid 180. 
101 Ibid 198. 
102 Gang loitering is obviously such intimidating, see Municipal Code of Chicago, s 8-4-015(b) (Gang loitering). 
And it is not uncommon for people to think other group loitering as intimidating.  
103 See P Michael Lahan, ‘Trends in the Law of Vagrancy’ (1968) 1 Conn L Rev 350, 365. 
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probability of loitering causing further harm should not override the general freedom of 
loitering as a form of personal liberty.  
There is little cause for concern if there is no substantial risk of being committed. 
Accordingly, the apprehension of above normatively unestablished remote harm of loitering 
and the corresponding harm of daily life being interfered cannot reasonably be imputed to 
the loitering.  
Finally, if some people do not apprehend remote harm, but nonetheless suffer anxiety merely 
because they observe an ordinary group (not comprising reputed thieves or gang members) 
loitering in an ordinary public place (not designated by the police as suspicious), loitering is 
seen as an eyesore and gets on their nerves. This is a personal problem of abnormal 
vulnerability and, as argued in chapter 3 (III(ii)a), their anxiety should not be imputed to the 
loitering conduct. Otherwise, group loitering as an exercise of the freedom of assembly will 
be denied. For example, nowadays strangers gather in a place to play some cyber-games 
together on their mobile phones. It would be an excessive interference with freedom of 
assembly if individuals are punished simply because others become anxious at the sight of a 
group gathering in an ordinary place. 
In sum, loitering by an individual or a group usually does not risk remote harm or harm life 
quality or cause anxiety in the normative sense. In the next part I will look at how, 
exceptionally, loitering can be harmful or risky.  
(iii)  Harms of Loitering 
In this first step of my test of criminalising loitering, I will look at how loitering can be apt 
for criminalisation in three cases of present harms, suspected harms and remote harms.  
a. Present Harms of Loitering  
Loitering is generally conducted by walking around a place or standing in a place, or sitting 
or lying in a place that is typically not necessary for public passage. Loitering does not, in 
general, unreasonably interfere with the use of a public place. However, loitering itself can 
cause harmfulness on the spot in exceptional or rare cases – as in the third and fourth 
approaches above of criminalising loitering. Intoxicated loitering may cause inconvenience 
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and discomfort to free movement and enjoyable use of a public place. A flash mob may 
cause an obstruction, while gang loitering may cause alarm.  
Firstly, one may loiter because of drunkenness or intoxication in general. Drunken loitering 
is highly likely to disrupt public convenience and comfort because of the space occupied and 
the accompanying smell and even vomit.104 Secondly, there are flash mobs that began as 
peaceful experiments in which large groups of people would gather in public places to 
transiently perform innocuous acts and then quickly disperse. 105  This may temporarily 
obstruct pedestrians. Lastly, gang loitering, because of the particular identity of the actor and 
the ex ante designated places, is enough to cause alarm to the public. ‘Gang loitering means 
remaining in particular areas of the city’ designated by written directive by the police ‘under 
circumstances that warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that 
behavior is to enable a criminal street gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to 
intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities’.106 The reaction 
of alarm is thus perfectly reasonable, different from the abnormal anxiety reaction simply 
from the sight of an ordinary group loitering in an ordinary public place. Accordingly, the 
asserted control over the public area concerned harms others’ normal use of it and their life 
quality. In these three rare cases, there can be scope for criminalisation.  
b. Remote Harms of Loitering  
When the loitering is found to have substantially risked an interest by further conduct, there 
can be substantive punishment. The risk needs to be proved as a non-trivial probability unless 
the remote harm is of tremendous magnitude. As Feinberg articulates, possible harm gravity 
and possibility compound the scale of risk of harm to decide its acceptance.107 Immediate 
threat to public safety could justify substantive punishment, as well as procedural ‘stop-and-
frisk’.108 Immediate threat of public disorder could also be a justification, but remote harm 
of minor public disorder may not be. The decision depends on whether or not the risk of 
                                                          
104 It is an offence to be intoxicated in a public place in some jurisdictions. See Summary Offences Act 2005 
(Queensland), s 10. 
105 See L Claycomb, ‘Regulating Flash Mobs: Seeking A Middle Ground Approach That Preserves Free 
Expression and Maintains Public Order’ (2013) 51 U Louisville LR 375, 375. 
106 See Municipal Code of Chicago, s 8-4-015. 
107 See HTO 216. 
108 See David Keenan & Tina M Thomas, ‘An Offense-Severity Modal for Stop-and-Frisks’ (2014) 123 Yale 
LJ 1448, 1448. If an officer has a reasonable and specific suspicion that a suspect is involved in a crime and 
may be carrying a weapon, stop and frisk is justified (Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968)), but it is unclear how 
much objective evidence could make a suspicion reasonable. See James W H McCord and Sandra L McCord, 
Criminal Law and Procedure for the Paralegal:  A Systems Approach (3rd edn, Thomson Cengage Learning 
2006) 330. 
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remote harm is high. If it is not, there is too much erosion of liberty to justify addressing low 
risk. This risk assessment exercise should not be reduced to the subjective 
judgment/suspicion of a police officer. Criminalising preparation needs more specifically 
objective evidence such as trespass 109  – or the possession of articles causing safety 
concerns.110 
A specific remote harm of loitering may be sexual solicitation.111 In England, section 1 of 
the Street Offences Act 1959 punishes loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution.112 
Solicitation is a future crime of loitering and it could amount to public disorder. Solicitation, 
as begging, generally does not harm others. But it offends incorrect targets and other viewers 
unnecessarily by the fact of it being conducting in public.113 The public is exposed to the 
offence. The risk of the public being offended is clear and present. So there is substantial 
risk which justifies the preventative criminalisation of loitering engaged in for the purposes 
of solicitation. It should be punished as well as the soliciting behaviour.114 However, it may 
be difficult to prove that the loitering was carried out with the purpose of solicitation, but it 
will be comparatively easy to establish reasonable suspicion/probability to procedurally 
order the suspected person to leave. Therefore, a procedural order backed by penalty should 
preferably be prescribed. Such a measure requires further examination of the harms of 
defiant loitering. 
c. Harms of Defiant Loitering  
Persistent loitering that defies a policing order to disperse can be harmful. The public or 
police authority needs competent evidence relating to the intention of remote harms of 
loitering to justify criminalisation. When there is no such clear evidence, but only reasonable 
suspicion (as in the fourth approach), loitering is generally targeted for detective 
                                                          
109 See Regina v Mark Riddell [2013] EWCA Crim 2284, in which the defendants were arrested on suspicion 
of burglary which was not pursued against them and the appellant pleaded guilty to the vagrancy offence. 
110 See Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, s 47; Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 
1995, s 49; Civil Government (Scotland) Act 1982, s 58; Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 
1982, s 49(1); Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, s 92 (2). Or a male being found in a women’s 
toilet without convincing excuse to exclude criminal purpose at the scene. 
111 This example is now more meaningful in theory than in practice because information technology has 
substantially changed the way of initiating sex worker transactions. 
112 California similarly outlaws loitering ‘in any public place with the intent to commit prostitution’ (Penal 
Code, s 653.22). Arizona, in a more general manner, outlaws being present in a public place and soliciting 
in an offensive or disturbing manner. See Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 Criminal Code, s 2905. 
113 See Abraham Sionk, Prostitution and the Law (Faber 1977) 59; Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Report 
on Vagrancy and Related Offences (LRC No 11, 1985) 256. 
114 See Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Report on Vagrancy and Related Offences (LRC No 11, 1985) 268. 
132 
 
convenience by police at the scene on the basis of the presumed risk of further crimes (as in 
the second approach of criminalising persistent loitering).  
Assuming reasonable suspicion, temporary detention verifying, identification and search 
could be acceptable police procedures. 115  ‘[I]f there are articulable facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be 
stopped in order to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while 
attempting to obtain additional information.’116 Reasonable suspicion of involvement in a 
crime justifies such a provision being backed by arrest and prosecution.117 The reason is that 
‘[t]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, or check identification in the absence 
of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing 
offenders to justice’.118 The suspicion should be connected with the probability of specific 
crime(s) being committed – not some obscure intention to commit a feasible felony119 – nor 
mere immoral purpose or ‘hiding from the police’.120 Convictions can evidence intent and 
reasonable suspicion.121 The known character of the individual could also be a basis for 
reasonable suspicion.122 Drug-related loitering at suspicious locations where drug use is 
notoriously prevalent or in ‘designated areas of the city’ ‘by written directive’ may also 
allow procedural dispersal as well as investigation.123 The dispersal order as a governmental 
technique – predicated on reasonably-believed harmful purpose or effect should be limited 
to specified enforcement areas, rather than to a whole city, and should only last for a matter 
of hours.124  
Refusal to desist and leave can justify criminalisation because it is harmful. In one case, a 
protestor was attending a demonstration which constituted a major disturbance to public 
transportation. After being asked to leave, she moved three or four paces then stopped for 
                                                          
115 See Brown v Texas 443 US 47, 51-52 (1979). 
116 Hayes v Florida 470 US 811, 816 (1985). 
117 See Hiibel v Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada 542 US 177 (2004). 
118 United States v Hensley 469 US 221, 229 (1985). 
119 See Lyons v Owen [1963] Crim LR 123. 
120 See David Ormerod, ‘Ingredients of Offence: Test to Determine Whether Person ‘Found’ In an Enclosed 
Yard for An Unlawful Purpose – Vagrancy Act 1824, s. 4’ [2008] Crim LR 216, 218.  
121 See R v Fairbairn (Walter Joseph) (1949) 2 KB 690. Injunctions made by a court require proof of the past 
conduct or future danger to ‘on the balance of probabilities’ standard or even to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
standard. See R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 82. Orders sought by 
police should also be done so on an objective basis. 
122 See R v Wilson [1962] NZLR 979. 
123 See Johnson v Athens - Clarke County 529 SE 2d 613 (Ga 2000); Chicago Municipal Code, ss 8-4-015(b) 
(Gang loitering) & 8-4-017(b) (Narcotics-related loitering). 
124 See Ron Levi, ‘Loitering in the City That Works’ in Markus D Dubber and Mariana Valverde (eds), Police 
and the Liberal State (Stanford General 2008) 199. 
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25 seconds during which time she waved her fists and yelled her disapproval at other people 
in the vicinity. Whether her action amounted to ‘loitering’ should be answered by an 
objective consideration of the observable facts and circumstances.125 Given the preceding 
major disturbance to public transportation, even if there were no waving fists and yelling,126 
the loitering was sufficiently serious to have an criminal aspect to it. The reason, as argued 
in chapter 2 (II(ii)b), is that the persistence of loitering is a harmful disruption to the specific 
administration activity which is a civil life activity based on a reasonable suspicion (that the 
continuation of the loitering would escalate the disturbance).127  
In short, when there is an objective basis for concluding that a person’s loitering may lead 
to or assist in the commission of a crime, the police could firstly procedurally detain and 
check the suspect at the locus or order them to leave; secondly they could move to arrest and 
even prosecute for a substantive penalty if the procedural measure were defied.  
(iv) Wrongful Loitering Behaviours  
People are free to loiter for an innocent purpose in the exercise of their liberty.128 Loitering 
itself should be generally seen as the freedom of the person and the right to use public places. 
It has meaning for both individual fulfillment and social prosperity. These liberal values 
should be balanced (against the potential harms) in assessing whether loitering has taken 
place in a wrongful manner, which is the second step of my test of criminalising loitering.  
The process of balancing is referable to the criminalisation of begging and can be simplified. 
For example, in flash mobbing, the protection of expressive performance art is more 
important than the resultant transient obstruction. Flash mob participants could claim the 
protection of expressive performance art.129 Punishing flash mob participants for breaching 
the peace or disrupting the traffic/pedestrian flow by an unusual or eccentric manners – 
where a mass group stands in the middle of a passageway, rather than punishing them for 
their mere participation, is currently the optimal holistic approach.130  In contrast, gang 
loitering in an ex ante designated place is wrongful because the actor has other ample places 
                                                          
125 See Power v Huffa (1976) 14 SASR 337. 
126 The behaviours should cause alarm, see Ch 3, II(ii)b.  
127 This procedural order of dispersal slightly limiting liberty is justified by the more important interest in 
preventing crimes and disorder. It should be free of desistence. 
128 See Kent v Dulles 357 US 116, 126 (1958). 
129 See L Claycomb, ‘Regulating Flash Mobs: Seeking A Middle Ground Approach That Preserves Free 
Expression and Maintains Public Order’ (2013) 51 U Louisville LR 375, 378. 
130 Ibid 404-05. 
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in which to exercise their freedom of gathering at no great cost while the public cannot 
choose other places in which to conduct their daily lives without substantial cost. So, these 
cases show that loitering behaviours are usually not wrongful – and rarely would there be 
valid limits of loitering behaviours. 
In sum, it is only exceptional obstructive loitering, intoxicated loitering and gang loitering 
(that should be regarded as disrupting public order) – or loitering substantially risking further 
crimes – that can be seen as types of loitering that are unnecessary, wrongful and thus can 
be directly criminalised. Other objectively suspicious loitering conduct generally only 
justifies procedural identifications, stop-and-frisk and/or mandated dispersals as 
preventative measures backed by substantive penalties. Legislation addressing loitering 
should be amended accordingly. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
It is encouraging that research, legislation and justice have all endeavoured to delimit valid 
criminalisation of public order crimes, though from different perspectives and to different 
extents. This chapter has comprehensively applied a consistent criminalisation principle to 
typical public order offences. Solicitation and loitering are typical behaviours that may 
disturb the normal use of public places. The part on begging has principally examined actual 
harms in the framework of the harm principle, while the part on loitering has mainly focused 
on risks of harms. Solicitation and loitering are not in themselves a harm to public amenity 
or a concern of security, but do tend to be grouped with offence to others or with aesthetic 
harm or risking increased crimes. However, the suggested harms/risks either do not set back 
a criminally protectable interest – or are not criminally imputable because of doctrinal or 
empirical reasons – or are not criminally wrongful because they are justified by personal 
meaning to the actor and social value to others. 
On the level of setting-back interests, public places e.g. streets exist mainly for peoples’ 
convenient and comfortable movement. Where there is interference with this type of 
movement, public place order is disrupted. Considering the main use of public places helps 
to select positive and negative cases of candidates for criminalisation. Peaceful behaviours 
by the wall/guard rail generally interfere with no one, but aggressive approach to others or 
unreasonable use of a place, given the venue, time and other circumstance, may be a 
disruption of public order. This harm-clarifying thought is the meaningful starting point of 
criminalisation. No offences of nuisance should be enacted without identifying the 
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interference with life comfort, convenience or peace. Not only begging for material giving, 
but solicitation for charitable, commercial or other social purposes should be regulated 
similarly, for the proper use of public places and people’s life convenience, comfort and 
peace.131  
On the level of fair imputation/prevention, remote harms can be normatively recognised only 
when there is normative involvement, as well as a substantial risk. The general need of this 
theoretical level in criminalisation practice should be emphasised with a careful examination 
in specific situations. Claimed harms of begging, loitering, etc. tend to be empirically 
dubious, and further, cannot be normatively imputed to the conduct.  
On the level of wrongfulness, the existence of amenity and safety of the public harmed or 
risked by a given behaviour and the existence of rights/freedoms backing the same behaviour 
are not mutually exclusive. They may co-exist in the same case as structurally-conflicting 
interests, and a doctrinally-structured balancing exercise is required to determine the 
wrongfulness of the conduct.  
This chapter has thus demonstrated that the harm principle can, in a clear and efficient 
fashion, assess and shape valid criminalisation of begging and loitering to a relatively full 
extent. This systematic, doctrinal framework of three-step tests (harm-imputation-wrong) 
can enlighten the criminalisation analysis of all cases of public disorder – particularly 
multifarious behaviours covered by common law offences such as public nuisance in 
England and breach of the peace in Scotland. Their relevant statutory embodiments, if 
possible, should be considered in terms of this normative test – that the systematic moral 
limits of the criminal law might be met. 
                                                          
131 Or in similar words, ‘enjoyment of, or peaceful passage through, a public place.’ Rights in Public Space 
Action Group, ‘Review of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld)’ (Law Right, August 
2004), 5 < www.lawright.org.au/_dbase_upl/Review_of_Vagrants.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018). The First 
Amendment protection of free speech extends to soliciting for oneself and soliciting for others (see Nate 
Vogel, ‘The Fundraisers, The Beggars, And the Hungry: The First Amendment Rights to Solicit Donations, 
To Beg for Money, And to Share Food’ (2012) 15 U Pa J L & Soc Change 537, 542). Begging exemplifies 
solicitation in general. Begging has similar motivations to other street-level economic activities, including 
busking, pavement art, windscreen cleaning and street trading (see D Mukherjee, ‘Laws for Beggars, Justice 
for Whom: A Critical Review of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act 1959’ (2008) 12 Intl JHR 279, 
280). To consider begging as a form of holistic solicitation is not only illuminating to consistently determine 
the legal status of begging, but also to equally and efficiently to resolve all the solicitation cases – the 
message communicated generally is neutral and may not constitute an offence under the offence principle, 
but the manner of communicating may be harmful or offensive. 
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Chapter 5 Offensive Conduct: Indecency and Insult 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter considered how the harm principle can consistently be applied to cases 
of begging and loitering in order to delimit the scope of public order law. This chapter will 
examine cases of offensive conduct that involve a serious loss of inner peace to members of 
the public, and will argue for a more consistent application of a criminalisation principle. As 
argued in chapter 2, the offence principle can be applied to types of offensive conduct as 
suitable candidates for criminalisation, by progressively looking at the serious offence that 
is caused or risked by the conduct and assessing whether or not the conduct is reasonable. 
This chapter thus aims to apply these broad principles to some specific examples of 
offending.  
The chapter is in three main parts. In Part II I will consider the many different forms of 
offensive conduct and offensive reactions. We should ‘resist categorical statements about 
the legal significance of offence without further specifying the kind of offence in question’.1 
Therefore, in Part II I will outline a method for developing a consistent classification of 
offensive conduct into threats, indecencies and insults – and then for each category of 
offensive conduct I will analyse the typical categories of offence reaction (the consequential 
mental displeasure). The criminalisation of threats is non-controversial,2 and thus requires 
no separate attention in this chapter, which will otherwise focus on indecencies and insults.  
In Part III, I look at how indecent conduct can cause serious offence to others. This part has 
three sections. Section (i) analyses the scope of indecency, limiting it to the violations of 
standards of propriety that are a problem of public offence. Section (ii) further argues that 
serious offence caused by indecency is relevant to criminalisation in this area, setting out 
relatively clear rules for identifying categories of (likely) serious offence. Section (iii) finally 
looks at how the wrongfulness of indecencies requires a balancing of the seriousness of the 
indecency against the right to freedom of expression. This section primarily considers the 
                                                          
1 Douglas Husak, ‘Disgust: Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB 96. 
2 See the relevant discussion many years ago, Peter Alldridge, ‘Threats Offences – a Case for Reform’ [1994] 
Crim LR 176.  
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wrongfulness problem argued in chapter 2, because the imputation problems of indecency 
and insult cases have already been analysed in chapter 3.  
Part IV then proceeds to look at whether and how insults can be criminalised – not because 
of harm but because of the serious offence caused to others. I will firstly outline the kinds of 
insults that are capable of giving rise to serious offence. Then, in the particular category of 
insulting a group, I will look at how crimes of hate speech can be persuasive cases for 
demonstrating the advantage of applying the offence principle in preference to ideas of 
(remote) harm. Finally, I will argue that the wrongfulness of offensive insults has not been 
properly tackled by legislation (on insulting a group), and look at how freedom of expression 
can override the offensive insults and thus argue that the hierarchical balancing steps argued 
in Part III(iii) should still apply. 
II. CLASSIFYING OFFENCE 
I set out the outlines of an offence principle in Chapter 2. In this section I will identify the 
types of offence that the principle applies to because, in order to effectively apply the offence 
principle in the following parts, it is necessary first to develop a reasonable classification of 
offence. The goal of classification is to identify precise and coherent types of offence.  
Existing theoretical classifications of offence are either too fragmented or incomplete – that 
is, they develop too many or too few categories. Feinberg, for example, classifies cases of 
offence into six types in Offense to Others: (a) affronts to the senses; (b) disgust and 
revulsion; (c) shock to moral, religious or patriotic sensibilities; (d) shame, (vicarious) 
embarrassment and anxiety; (e) annoyance, boredom and frustration; (f) fear, resentment, 
humiliation and anger (from empty threats, insults, mockery, flaunting or taunting). 3 
However, these types are based on three different standards which may overlap with each 
other: categories (b), (d), (e) and (f) are based on offence reactions (category (f) is also based 
on offensive acts), while category (c) is based on affronted sensibilities. In the face of so 
many, and such inconsistent categories, it is difficult to efficiently and effectively apply the 
offence principle.4  
                                                          
3 See OTO 10-13. The first type of affronts to senses are not offence (but harm as argued in chapter 2, II(ii)a). 
4 He only reveals the meanings of these types. Ibid 14-22. He goes on to mediate the offence principle (ch 8), 
analyse profound offences (ch 9), especially different types of obscenity in a series (chs 10-16). As will be 
summarized (III(i)), on obscenity, he means not only indecency (acts), but also pornography and insults. 
138 
 
In another influential account, Simester and von Hirsch offer standard examples of wrongful 
offence, including insulting conduct and exhibitionism.5 However, this is an incomplete 
summation of the potential range of offensive conduct, mainly based on intuition and 
experience. Moreover, in giving these examples, they do not consider the broader categories 
to which the examples belong (e.g. exhibitionism belongs to the category of indecency, 
discussed below). Lastly, they do not consider the role that the consequence of the offending 
act may play in the classification of offence. Other authors choose disgust as a type of 
offence reaction to deepen understanding of the offence principle in the area of disgusting 
conduct.6 However, they fail to explain how other types of offence can be analysed by the 
offence principle.  
In contrast to the inconsistent theoretical classifications above, legal practice in many 
common law jurisdictions seems to be consistent in combining the offensive conduct and 
the offence reaction in defining crimes of offence. In many Australian jurisdictions, key 
public order offences generally explicitly require offensive conduct and an offence reaction7 
– viz., (a) fear or alarm from intimidating or threatening conduct; (b) obscene/indecent 
exposure (of wounds or deformities to beg), singing or language. The indecent includes the 
obscene,8 and decency mainly concerns propriety towards body and sex, e.g. bathing and 
clothing; 9  (c) annoyance resulting from abusive, insulting, cursing, swearing, profane, 
blasphemous, objectionable behaviour. Offensive conduct is classified into three main types, 
namely threats, indecency and insults, and typical types of serious offence reactions (which 
the law seeks to prevent resulting from each type of offensive conduct) are usually explicitly 
stated as part of the definition. This kind of classification is based on the same primary 
standard (the offensive conduct) and secondary standard (the type of serious offence 
reaction). In Queensland it is a crime of public nuisance to behave in an offensive way (using 
‘offensive, obscene, indecent or abusive language’) or in a threatening way to ‘interfere with 
the enjoyment of, a public place by a member of the public’. 10  This crime implicitly 
combines offensive conduct and offence reaction – in so far that the enjoyment of a public 
                                                          
5 See CHW 97-99. The last example of infringements of anonymity in public spaces such as aggressive or 
insistent soliciting is mainly harmful as argued in the previous chapter (II(iii)b-c). 
6 One example is a book review of OTO, see Harlon L Dalton, ‘‘Disgust’ and Punishment’ (1987) 96 Yale LJ, 
881-913. See also Douglas Husak, ‘Disgust: Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB 91-114; 
Lindsay Farmer, ‘Disgust, Respect, and the Criminalisation of Offence’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H Kramer, 
Mark R Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (OUP 2011) 
273-89. 
7 See Crime and Misconduct Commission, Policing Public Order: A Review of the Public Nuisance Offence 
(2008) Appendix 2. 
8 See Summary Offences Act 1953 (South Australia), s 22 (2). 
9 See Police Offences Act 1935 (Tasmania), s 14. 
10 Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld), s 6. 
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place is a type of physical comfort or psychological peace). It has been suggested that the 
government should amend the offence to provide for a clear standard of offence and 
defence/excuse.11 The standard is needed to identify the class of offence, from which the 
consideration of criminalisation can progress.12 
British laws of offence are similar in combining the offensive conduct and the reaction to it 
and can also be classified into three main types. The first is fear, harassment, alarm or distress 
from threatening, abusive or insulting words, behaviour, visible representation, disorderly 
behaviour or contamination of or interference with goods.13 The second is outraging public 
decency in England, which requires obscenity at a higher level of impropriety than 
indecency, 14  and public indecency in Scotland, where affronting public sensibility is 
different from lewd and libidinous practices or behaviour directed at a specific victim.15 The 
English offence directly focuses on the degrees of offensiveness while the Scottish offence 
focuses on the public nature of the conduct to limit the seriousness of offence. The third is 
conduct likely to incite racial hatred, religious hatred and hatred based on sexual 
orientation.16 Systematically, the last group of offence seems better to be combined with the 
insulting conduct in the first group, as both attack others’ personality and dignity. Thus, there 
are mainly three types of offensive conduct (threats/abuses, indecencies and insults) with 
respective type(s) of serious offence. These categories seem to cover most cases of offence 
in criminal law and one category does not overlap with another. Moreover, these three types 
are neither too specific nor too general – and thus establish a good basis for the effective 
application of the offence principle.  
This approach to classification, which is based primarily on the conduct and secondly on the 
reaction to it, will be followed here for two reasons. Firstly, criminalisation exists to guide 
people’s actions and to instruct or inform judicial decision-making. So a clear statement of 
the prohibited conduct will be required. The clarity of a criminal law provision requires a 
primary focus on the qualities of the offending conduct. Secondly, the result of the conduct 
should be considered in the criminalisation process, and even be explicitly stated in the 
provision – in order to understand the purpose of the provision (i.e. to prevent offence or 
                                                          
11  See Tamara Walsh, ‘Offensive language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance: Empirical and 
Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 12 U Queensland LJ 123, 145. 
12 The defence is needed to exclude non-wrongful offence from criminalisation. 
13 See Public Order Act 1986, pt 1 and s 38. 
14 See R v Hamilton (Simon Austin) [2007] EWCA Crim 2062; R v Stanley (Alan Basil) [1965] 2 QB 327. 
15 See Webster v Dominick 2005 1 JC 65; McKenzie v Whyte (1864) 4 Irvine 570. 
16 See Public Order Act 1986, pts 3 and 3A. 
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harm or immorality) – and preferable to further guide or assist members of the public and 
judiciary. To ensure fair notice, it is preferable if the result were explicitly stated (‘causing 
or likely to cause alarm etc.’) – rather than being implicit in underlying legislative 
motivations. Although the offensive conduct may not exactly result in a given type of offence, 
it has typical offence reaction(s). The psychological affront should be considered in 
legislation even if not required for proof of criminal liability (likely offence should suffice).17 
Therefore, the following two parts will look at how the conduct categories (of indecency and 
insult) and reaction categories (of alarm, distress, disgust etc.) are related in determining the 
scope of criminalisation of offensive conduct.  
III. INDECENCY AND SERIOUS OFFENCE  
It has long been an offence to exhibit an obscene print or picture, or to ‘willfully, openly, 
lewdly, and obscenely’ expose one’s person. 18  However, I will argue here that that 
provisions such as this are too broad and indiscriminate – and then set out how the serious 
and wrongful types of offence caused by indecent conduct can be progressively identified.  
(i) The meaning of ‘Indecency’ 
As a first step, I will clarify the qualities of indecent conduct, and in particular explore how 
the meaning and scope of indecency should be distinguished from obscenity. In common 
parlance (and often in judicial speech as well), indecency can qualitatively refer to things 
which titillate or disgust, or both – while obscenity involves degree, referring to stronger 
titillation or stronger disgust.19 In this respect, obscenity does not differ from indecency in 
terms of the quality of the conduct, but in terms of its degree. The scope of indecency in this 
sense is generally summarised by Feinberg as: natural objects, persons’ actions and created 
things that would blatantly disgust, shock or repel normal people;20 pornographic materials 
                                                          
17 See Avlana k Eisenberg, ‘Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress’ (2015) 113 Mich L Rev 607, 653. 
18 See Vagrancy Act 1824, s 4. See also the four ‘catch all’ common law crimes mentioned in the Preface (I). 
19 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com CP No 193, 2010) para 3.17. ‘The words “indecent or obscene” convey one idea, namely, 
offending against the recognised standards of propriety – indecent being at the lower end of the scale and 
obscene at the upper end of the scale.’ Stanley [1965] 1 All ER 1035, 1038. 
20 See OTO 97-98. The first type is openly and massively obtrusive to sensibilities, not veiled or subtle 
offensiveness. Ibid 124-25. 
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and displays which are deliberately designed for erotic arousal;21 and a certain class of 
impolite words that are inherently meant to offend and shock.22  
In my thesis, obscenity differs from indecency from two perspectives. Firstly, obscenity laws 
(in the UK) mainly deal with the publication or distribution or consumption of pornographic 
materials – which would usually take place in private.23 Indecency, however, has always 
been about something public, while obscenity is a quality of the item and might affect private 
conduct.24 So I would choose the term ‘indecency’ to refer to violations of standards of 
propriety in public. That is, for the purposes of this thesis, I will limit discussion of indecency 
to what is socially distasteful and what amounts to impropriety in public. This notion that 
disorderly indecency is of offensiveness is also affirmed by Scottish judicial opinion:  
… the decision of the [South African] appellate court was concerned almost entirely with 
the question whether the audience were shocked. In my view, if such conduct is seen as a 
public order offence, questions about the depraving or corrupting effects [i.e. moral harm] 
of the conduct complained of are at most of indirect relevance ... As in the English offence 
of outraging public decency… it is sufficient [necessary, actually] for liability that, on an 
objective assessment, the conduct complained of should cause public offence.25  
Therefore, indecency does not include private obscenity in the sense of titillating materials 
which have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the viewers. Pornographic (obscene) materials 
are thus not primarily a problem of offensive conduct or public order (but probably a problem 
of moral harm), though the two may overlap in, say, the indecent display of those materials.  
Secondly, there can be different degrees of offensiveness. That is, the obscenity in private is 
not a problem of indecency, but when the obscenity has a public element, with its stronger 
offensiveness, is a problem of serious indecency. These indecencies are ‘far from being 
dangerously tempting, they are disgusting and revolting to the average person’. 26 
Understanding public obscenity as serious indecency is important because the offence 
principle is applied to prevent serious offence to others: i.e. trivial indecency should not be 
                                                          
21 Ibid 124-25. The second type can cause moral harm or risk sexual violence, even in private, if extreme, and 
can be the action in the first type if in public i.e. public displays or open depictions. 
22 Ibid 190-91. The third type generally causes the same degree of offence as the first one does. 
23 See Obscene Publication Act 1959, s 1(1). 
24 Lindsay Farmer, ‘Disgust, Respect, and the Criminalisation of Offence’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H Kramer, 
Mark R Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (OUP 2011) 
273-89. 
25 Webster v Dominick 2005 1 J C 65 [51]- [52] (emphasis added). 
26 See OTO 100. 
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criminalised. The degree of offensiveness of the obscene in public is shocking, disgusting or 
revolting, not merely distasteful or embarrassing.27 It is loathsome, very distasteful.28  
Thus, indecency is a public order problem, and criminalisation should target serious 
indecency (including obscene displays in public) that may cause serious offence to others. 
Therefore, the next section will look at how the arguments of serious indecency can work in 
criminalisation.  
(ii) Serious Offence caused by Indecency  
The exposure of sexual organs to others is a typical type of indecency and can help us to 
think through how the offence principle can limit the scope of criminalisation.29 Exposure 
of sexual organs is not necessarily the same thing as ‘sexual’ exposure, because sexual 
exposure requires some ‘sexual’ aspect or motivation to the exposure. However, as sexual 
exposure objectively entails exposure of sexual organs, the exposure of sexual organs may 
engage public order law as well sexual offences law. This section aims to ascertain how we 
should deal with exposure of sexual organs in the criminal law. I will firstly assess the legal 
approaches to the criminalisation of exposure of sexual organs, and then analyse the types 
of serious offence (likely) to be caused by the indecency. I will argue that it is theoretically 
and pragmatically meaningful to consider criminalising this kind of indecency from the 
perspective of serious offence to others, rather than from the perspective of harm.  
a. Sexual Exposure: Harmful or Offensive  
The exposure of genitals may in some instances be regarded as a sexual offence under sexual 
offences legislation. Traditionally, sexual offences were a sub-category of and then they 
began to be treated in a separate category from crimes against the person. 30  So, 
presumptively they are harmful (to personal/sexual interests). The Scottish offence of sexual 
exposure requires that conduct be objectively sexual (that the actor exposes genitals in a 
manner that a reasonable person, in all the circumstances, would consider sexual) – and that 
                                                          
27 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com CP No 193, 2010) para 3.21. 
28 See R v Hamilton (Simon Austin) [2007] EWCA Crim 2062 [30].  
29 Forms of indecency are mainly about sexual organs, such as exposure of sexual organs or performing sexual 
activity. See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public 
Decency (Law Com CP No 193, 2010) para 3.2. 
30 Compare Bl Comm 656 and Lord Justice Hooper and David Ormerod (eds), Blackstone’s Criminal Law 
Practice 2012 (OUP 2011) 292. 
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it be accompanied with the subjective intention of obtaining sexual gratification or causing 
alarm, distress or humiliation.31 The equivalent English offence requires that the offender 
‘intentionally exposes his genitals’ and ‘intends that someone will see them and be caused 
alarm or distress’.32 So the common and minimum requirement of the sexual offence in 
England and Scotland is that the actor intentionally expose his genitals. The sexual offence 
seems to be directed at harm to sexual autonomy i.e. the rather obvious interest not to be 
exposed to others’ genitals when one has not chosen or invited it. In short, in cases where 
there is a sexual element, it may be sensible to regard exposure of sexual organs as a sexual 
offence.  
However, it may not always be possible for legislators to distinguish between sexual and 
non-sexual exposure.33 For example, from the wording in the English and Scottish law it is 
apparent that the test of the exposure of genitals being sexual can be inconsistent. Although 
the offences do not necessarily require subjective purpose of sexual gratification, the English 
law only requires intentional exposure of genitals to cause alarm or distress – while the 
Scottish law further requires that the exposure be objectively sexual. It is not clear whether 
both different tests of being sexual can be reasonable. Further, a consequence of the presence 
of a sexual element in the legislation is the discretionary or even arbitrary judgement as to 
the existence of a sexual element in a particular case. That is, the question of whether this is 
a matter of sexual offences turns on the question of the sexual element but there is no clear 
guidance on the meaning of ‘sexual’ which would help the courts to make that distinction.  
The court not only needs clear guidance on the meaning of ‘sexual’ in judging whether the 
crime is constituted, but also requires further clear guidance on the meaning of ‘sexual’ in 
determining whether the criminal should be the subject of sex offender notification: ‘where 
the evidence discloses that there was a significant sexual element in the offender’s behaviour, 
such as to warrant additional measures to protect the public from the risk posed by the 
offender, the court should have a discretionary power to order notification.’34 That is, the 
                                                          
31 See Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 8 (‘sexual’ is defined in s60(2)). 
32 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 66 (Exposure). 
33 See Stuart P Green, ‘What Are the Sexual Offenses?’ in Chad Flanders and Zachary Hoskins (eds), The New 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) 67, 69-70. In some cases, although there was a 
significant sexual element, it may not be proper to label the conduct as a sexual offence rather than another 
kind of offence. An offender may injure or cut off victims’ sexual organs for psychiatric gratification. There 
may be a sexual element in particular, but it would be more proper to label the conduct as a crime against 
life or body, rather than a sexual crime. 
34 Report of the Expert Panel on Sex Offending chaired by Lady Cosgrove, ‘Reducing the Risk - Improving 
the response to sex offending’ (June 2001), 60 <www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/158890/0043160.pdf> 
accessed 29 May 2018. 
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sexual element in this stage should be sufficiently significant as to indicate an underlying 
sexual disorder or deviance from which society is entitled to be protected.35 However, there 
is no clear guidance on the significance of the sexual element on which that discretionary 
power rests in the marginal case. In short, the ambiguous meaning of ‘sexual’ affects both 
the constitution of the crime and the treatment of the criminal.   
To avoid the above problem of arbitrarily deeming an exposure to be sexual – with the 
consequence that the convicted offender be arbitrarily subject to sex offender registration 
and notification requirements – I would suggest that we consistently look at this from the 
perspective of the general nature that all indecent conduct has in common i.e. conduct that 
should cause offence to others, and that it should specifically constitute a public order 
offence when it offends a member of the public or in public.36 For example, in A Draft 
Criminal Code for Scotland with Commentary, all exposure of sexual organs belongs to 
‘offensive conduct’ rather than ‘sexual offences’. 37  So, I would suggest understanding 
exposure as an offensive offence because it causes or risks serious offence to others. In the 
next section I will look at how indecent exposure in particular and indecent conduct in 
general causes serious offence to others.  
This is not to suggest that we should never treat sexual exposure in public as presumptively 
a sexual offence. Some conduct, with the additional sexual intention of gratification and 
additional sexual conduct (rather than mere exposure of genitals) – e.g. public masturbation 
and especially in the vicinity of a school – may be better categorised as a sexual offence. 
That is, there will still be cases where it is more appropriate to charge sexual exposure rather 
than indecency, even when the conduct has taken place in public e.g. where there is some 
sort of clear sexual motive. But in cases of doubt (where there is no obvious sexual motive), 
we should presumptively charge the public order offence.38  
                                                          
35 See Wylie v M 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 18, Sheriff Pyle [13]; Hay (Ian Morris) v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 28. 
36 Of course, some cases of sexual exposure will take place in private, so would not be public order offences. 
37  Eric Clive and others, (Scottish Law Commission, 2003) 
<www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/5712/8024/7006/cp_criminal_code.pdf> accessed 29 June 2018, 180. 
38 This approach of choosing the proper crime category can be applied to other cases such as sexual assault: 
‘Where it is alleged that the accused has touched the complainer inappropriately, the Crown may charge that 
species facti as indecent assault, or since 1 December 2010 as a sexual assault (Sexual Offences (Scotland) 
Act 2009, s 3), or as a simple assault or as a breach of the peace. Where it is alleged that the accused has 
exposed himself in public, the Crown may charge that species facti as a statutory offence under by-laws; or 
as public indecency (Webster v Dominick 2005 JC 65) or, since 1 December 2010, as sexual exposure 
(Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 8); or as a breach of the peace.’ Hay (Ian Morris) v HM Advocate 
[2012] HCJAC 28. 
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b. The Seriousness of Offence  
For the purpose of the offence principle, indecent conduct should be criminalised in order to 
prevent serious offence to others.39 However, it is not clear what degree of seriousness 
should be the threshold for criminalising offence. In legal practice, there are inconsistent 
approaches to the test of seriousness. The statutory law on sexual exposure aims to prevent 
alarm, distress and humiliation – though this is not understood in terms of the offence 
principle, but as a standard of harm to the sexual autonomy of the victim.40 If we construe 
the serious offence to be prevented from the offensive exposure of sexual organs (assuming 
the provision is in a public order law), the categories of serious offence again seem to be 
alarm, distress and humiliation.41  
This test looks the same as the test in sexual offences. But there are important differences. 
In sexual exposure, the serious offence is a by-product of the harm to sexual autonomy by 
the sexual conduct with additional sexual intention and the additional sexual element (to the 
act or simple exposure itself), just as distress can be caused as a by-product of the harm to 
my reputation or body parts, while in offensive exposure, the serious offence is the direct 
result of the offensive conduct. 
But in indecency law more generally, the tests of serious offence are not consistently 
identified in authoritative cases law and Law Commission reports. Outraging public decency, 
a common law crime in England, is used to protect public members from being seriously 
offended by indecent language, behaviours or displays. It has been suggested that this crime 
be restated in a statutory form.42 In its 2010 Report, the Law Commission cites Lord Reid as 
setting out the test for outraging public decency as being something of a shocking, disgusting 
                                                          
39 The legislature should differentiate between types and degrees of offence in criminalisation, for reasons of 
fair notice and proportionate sentencing considerations. Prosecutors should also value the differences in 
types and degrees of offence to be discriminating in prosecution even if the law in its literal sense targets all 
indecency cases. 
40 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s 8; Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 66. 
41 ‘It is not necessary for A’s genitals to have been seen by anyone or for anyone to have been alarmed or 
distressed.’ Explanatory Notes to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, para 126. It should be observed that the 
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 adds ‘humiliation’ by section 8 (sexual exposure) while the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 only targets ‘alarm’ and ‘distress’ by section 66. When the disgusting (exposure) is 
imposed on a given person, it is also humiliating. Masturbating and driving alongside lone women drivers 
(Taft 919970, CA, Crim Div, unreported, see David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal 
Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 1238) and masturbating seen by the only one other person (Parkin v Norman 
[1983] QB 92, 92) were identified as humiliating. In brief, exposure may lead to alarm, humiliation and 
distress as types of serious offence.  
42 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com CP No 193, 2010) para 6.12. 
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and revolting nature.43 The Report then says that the offence must be strong enough to cause 
shock or disgust, not mere distaste or embarrassment – and that it should include humiliation 
of the target and indignation to a bystander, if there is one.44 However, in restating the test 
for offence in their final Report they use ‘shock, outrage or humiliation’ as the test of serious 
offence.45 In contrast, their 2015 Report does not focus at all on the specified likely offence 
reaction – it only requires the conduct to be seriously offensive (‘obscene or disgusting’).46  
Therefore, the exact types of caused/likely offence have not been clearly dealt with. Only 
the seriousness of the actual or possible offence has been generally emphasized – either 
directly by specifying types of serious offence reaction or, indirectly, by specifying the 
serious nature of the offensive conduct. It seems indecent languages and/or behaviours 
causing or risking a serious offence category of shock/alarm, disgust, humiliation, distress,47 
or indignation/outrage can be criminalised. 48  These concepts are too obscure to be 
understood or applied consistently in all cases. Understanding and improving the articulation 
of serious offence in legislative and judicial practice is problematic. We need to be clear how 
the seriousness of the actual or possible offence can be specified in a given situation. 
As argued in chapter 2 III(iii), the magnitude of offence depends on the intensity of the 
offence (mainly the category of serious offence) – and the duration and the extent of the 
impact on the affected person. I will not dwell here on how the quantitative factors of 
duration and extent can affect the seriousness of offence, because litigation practice does not 
directly involve such quantitative factors, but I will focus on the qualitative factor of the 
category of serious offence. This is stating an objective test in so far that humiliation, alarm 
or distress could be understood as objective qualities of the conduct, rather than as referring 
to any actual reaction. It would not matter if the audience were not in fact offended if the 
conduct were judged to be seriously offensive.  
In judging the seriousness of the offence, I would argue that generally indecency can be of 
three levels of offensiveness: ordinary/simple indecency; disgusting/serious indecency; and 
                                                          
43 Ibid para 3.4, citing Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP (1973) AC 435. 
44 Ibid para 3.21.  
45 Ibid para 6.13. 
46 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency 
(Law Com No 358, 2015) para 4.10. 
47 The listed shock, disgust, humiliation, indignation/outrage or annoyance of indecency in two reports still 
neglects distress valued in the (sexual) exposure legislation, although shock could include alarm. 
48 Irritation or annoyance is a milder variant of anger while fury or rage is an intensified variant, see Scott 
Schieman, ‘Anger’ in Jan E Stets and Jonathan H Turner (eds), Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions 
(Springer 2006) 494.  
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outrageous/extreme indecency – all depending on certain relevant contextual factors. These 
degrees of offence can be illuminated by Feinberg’s account. Feinberg argues that mere 
nudity and ordinary sex, if they take place in public, elicit mechanisms of shame (of the 
victim’s own sudden loss of control or vicarious sympathetic identification), embarrassment 
(because of the victim’s own presence being foreign in offenders’ privacy) and anxiety 
(because of the victim’s own stirred up feelings and others’ unrestrained public 
performance)49  – while abnormal sexual acts such as sadomasochistic sex acts or oral 
contact with canine genitalia, if they take place in public, are immediately threatening and 
spontaneously disgusting.50 So Feinberg has generally found two levels of seriousness of 
offence, depending on the nature of conduct i.e. whether the related nudity/sex itself is 
ordinary or abnormal.  
However, even in the case of mere nudity and ordinary sex, the indecency can be alarming, 
more serious than merely shaming and embarrassing, and for abnormal sexual acts, the 
indecency can be outrageous, more serious than merely threatening or disgusting. This is 
because of a supplementary test that can elaborate the levels of seriousness. Arguably in the 
latter case of abnormal sexual acts, if the act is public because of public display – e.g. 
exhibition of bestiality pictures – because the audience do not face the actor depicted in the 
display, the degree of offensiveness is lower than that when the act is public because of real 
public presence, e.g. real acts of bestiality heard or viewed instantly. Similarly, in the first 
case of ordinary sex, if the public form is display and the audience do not face the actor who 
arranges the display, the offensiveness is lower than when the audience do face the actor. So, 
the test for distinguishing between three levels of serious offence is primarily the nature of 
the conduct itself and secondly whether the actor of the sex or the display is at the scene.51  
So, typically, public nudity or sex can be offensive indecency in three different degrees. 
Firstly, for mere nudity or displays of ordinary sexual conduct, it may only be of simple 
offensiveness – merely embarrassing, rather than of such high offensiveness as to be 
humiliating, disgusting or alarming (but when the actor who arranges the display is at the 
                                                          
49 See OTO 16-19. 
50  Ibid 19-20. Feinberg does say why it is disgusting, although he says male homosexuality is held in 
considerable terror by many males. Ibid 20. For the mechanism of the ‘disgusting eliciting disgust’, also see 
Paul Rozin and others, ‘Disgust’ in Michael Lewis and others (eds), Handbook of Emotions (3rd edn, The 
Guilford Press 2008) 757-62; Douglas Husak, ‘Metaphysical and Empirical Speculations’ in IROB 106-11. 
This mechanism has been summarised in Chapter 1 (IV(ii)a) in articulating inner peace as an interest.  
51 We have to admit that the test of seriousness of offence is not straightforward as economic calculation. This 
may explain why Feinberg has not explicitly sought the test. The test is merely based on rule of thumb 
considerations, taking in to account some social experience, social tolerance and the cultural connotations 
of the conduct (such as whether a kind of sexual conduct is abnormal or not). 
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scene, it may still be alarming, although not disgusting). Secondly, the exposure of genitals 
without obvious non-harmful purpose or ordinary sex by real actors or displays of abnormal 
sexual conduct can disgust, alarm (when the actor who arranges the display is not at the 
scene, it may not be alarming,52 but still disgusting). This can also distress or even humiliate 
others in public, but may not outrage others’ minimum sensibility. Humiliation will be 
caused if the view of the indecency is forcible.53 Distress will be caused if the indecency is 
to a specified victim.54 Alarm will be caused if the indecency is to a general passer-by.55 
Disgust will be caused if the indecency readily reminds people of their animal-like 
vulnerability e.g. death, disease or infection, or of their animal-like distasteful choices.56 
Thirdly, for abnormal sexual conduct such as bestiality or necrophilia, 57  its public 
manifestation form by real actors viewed or heard at the scene is outrageous indecency.58  
In sum, when socially distasteful impropriety (indecency) is felt by others, the serious 
offence needed for criminalisation– such as disgust, alarm, distress, humiliation and/or 
indignation – can be caused, depending on a series of factors surrounding the indecent 
conduct – viz., whether the actor is at the scene (alarming), whether the receptor is specified 
                                                          
52 Indecent displays tend to offend without the actor’s presence in front of the offended (this is prominent in 
cyberspace). 
53 The most captive case (where it is difficult for the victim to escape) is forcible lewdness in which the victim 
is mainly harmed by personal and sexual infringements; being offended by the insulting (causing humiliation) 
is a by-product (because any force against the person is insulting). See Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 
Gauging Criminal Harm: ‘A ‘‘Living Standard’’ Analysis’ (1991) 11 OJLS 1, 25.  
54 Being captive generally means the victim is specified by the indecency. When a passer-by is specified as the 
victim, there is distress: ‘why do you specifically target me and why I am the unfortunate offended one?’ 
Even for phlegmatic police officers, grave harassment, alarm or distress can be caused by being particularly 
targeted. See Southard v DPP [2006] EWHC 3449 (Admin) [24]. 
55 In non-captive cases, there may be no humiliation or distress to specified targets, but only alarm to general 
passers-by. The word ‘alarm’ indicates undefined evils: the actor present at the locus is likely to commit 
further offensive and/or harmful acts there and this exerts serious psychological pressure (alarm) to the 
observer. 
56 See Paul Rozin and others, ‘Disgust’ in Michael Lewis and others (eds), Handbook of Emotions (3rd edn, 
The Guilford Press 2008) 761-62. The indecency is disgusting because it is against the recognition or belief 
that a stimulus is dangerous or distasteful and thus lead people to die or live like an animal. For example, 
‘the governmental interest served by the text of the prohibition is societal disapproval of nudity in public 
places and among strangers.’ Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 at 572 (1991). The disgust can be 
evidenced in other ways, such as hearing as well as seeing. See R v Hamilton (Simon Austin) [2007] EWCA 
Crim 2062 [34].  Further, ‘s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 and the common law offence of outraging 
public decency are capable of covering this behaviour [sexual activity in a public lavatory (including 
masturbation) targeted by s. 71, Sexual Offences Act 2003] where it causes harassment, alarm, distress or 
[other serious] offence.’ SC Deb (B) 18 September 2003, col 289. Usually there is no distress or humiliation. 
More importantly, people will not be alarmed for further possible acts because the actor does not intend to 
face people, so only disgust will be caused/risked. 
57 ‘It represents a violation of the respect that should be shown for human remains. When such behaviour comes 
to light, it is profoundly distressing for the family of the dead person.’ SC Deb (B) 18 September 2003, col 
310.  
58 In a heterogeneous community, the seriousness of various moral derelictions is widely divergent (citing s 
207.1, MPC, comment at 207 (Tent Draft No 4, 1955)), but there is a ‘moral consensus’ against flagrant 
breaches and affronts. See Louis B Schwartz, ‘Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code’ (1963) 63 Colum 
L Rev 669, 674. 
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(distressing) or forced (humiliating) and/or whether the indecency is disgusting or even 
outrageous. 
(iii) Wrongfulness of Public Indecency 
Indecent conduct that causes or risks serious offence still needs to be wrongful if it is going 
to be criminally targeted. A very controversial problem of wrongful indecency is where 
public nudity is adopted as a form of freedom of expression. This can accordingly be a useful 
illustrative case for thinking through the wrongfulness of indecencies. This part will examine 
how expression by offensive indecency such as nudity can be structurally limited, by firstly 
arguing for the general framework of balancing freedom of expression and offence to others 
– and then specifically analysing the extent to which freedom of expression should be 
protected and the alternatives to avoid the offence. 
a. Introducing General Framework of Balancing  
In reviewing Feinberg’s offence principle, I have in chapter 2 identified two lists of factors 
to be balanced and argued that the balance should be more structured. Here I will reaffirm 
my position by looking at the specific provisions of the ECHR and introducing the 
framework of progressive balancing.  
It has been claimed by Bailin that, in dealing with the permissibility of the exercise of free 
speech, the UK and the ECtHR should adopt the test that only the exercise of free speech 
that causes ‘a risk of violence’ is wrongful and can be criminalised 59  – following the 
American test of ‘clear and present danger’60 – or the more recent stringent test of ‘imminent 
lawless action’ in curbing political speech.61 However, while the American test emphasises 
the immediacy of harm, Bailin’s suggested test focuses on the seriousness of the risk – and 
is not limited to the political arena. More importantly, while both tests focus on the risk of 
harm (disorder or crime), it is not only the risk of harm, but also offence that can override 
the right to free speech. Technically, in the framework article 10(2) of ECHR, the exercise 
of freedom of expression can be restricted or penalised for ‘national security’, ‘public safety’, 
‘prevention of disorder or crime’, ‘rights of others’, etc.62 The ‘rights of others’ (article 10(2) 
of ECHR) to be balanced against free speech include the right to inner peace (not to be 
                                                          
59 See Alex Bailin, ‘Criminalising Free Speech?’ [2011] Crim LR 705, 709-11. 
60 See Schenck v United States (1919) 249 US 47. 
61 See Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 395 US 444. 
62 Thus, the possible harm to be prevented from speech is not limited to violence. 
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offended unjustifiably) in the exercise of normal life.63 Thus, for the offensive conduct to be 
wrongful, the right to avoid the affront should outweigh the right to freedom of expression 
in question.  
This process of the identification of wrongfulness introduces the operation of a strict 
application of a proportionality balancing exercise.64 Three progressive steps determine the 
wrongfulness of the offence:65 a necessity/suitability to limit the freedom in terms of the 
need to avoid offence; that the values of the freedom should not override that need; and the 
availability of the alternative courses of action for the parties involved. The first step is 
obviously passed: it is necessary to limit the freedom because the offence is brought about 
by the exercise of the freedom, and it is suitable to limit the exercise because the limit can 
avoid the offence.66 So, we move to the second step.  
b. Balance Values of Freedom of Expression and Need to Avoid Offence 
The preliminary test of the need to protect freedom of expression is whether the exercise of 
the freedom has some value that may outweigh the need to avoid the offence. If the personal 
value and/or social value of the free expression cannot override the offensiveness of the 
nudity, the nudity is wrongful. This is the most complex and important step in striking a 
balance.  
Firstly, identifying the values of the conduct can be fraught because the personal and social 
value of the conduct may be understood differently in different cases. The naked rambler in 
Scotland claims that he used nakedness to express his belief that being naked is not 
offensive.67 Naked group cycling was an activity designed to promote environmental and 
                                                          
63 See e.g. Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125 [20], [25]. 
64 The proportionality test can be illustrated by the balance of movement freedom and public order measures, 
for the balance criteria, see Liesbeth Todts, ‘The Legitimacy of Area-Based Restrictions to Maintain Public 
Order: Given Content to the Proportionality Principle from a European Legal Perspective’ (2017) 3 RAP 
128, 151ff. 
65 The Court overemphasises on the factor of less restrictive alternative, neglecting the systematic balancing 
test. See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, ‘Proportionality’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 454, 458. 
66 ‘There is a conceptual link between offence and expression.’ CHW 122. 
67 In the case of naked rambling, the ECtHR recognises that ‘the right to freedom of expression may include 
the right for a person to express his ideas through his mode of dress or his conduct’ (Gough v The United 
Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [149]), and shows that ‘the applicant has chosen to be naked in public in order 
to give expression to his opinion as to the inoffensive nature of the human body’ ([150]).  This is a case of 
expression of nudity itself, by nudity except only a hat, a backpack and shoes. 
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health awareness in cities like London.68  For the personal value of the exercise of the 
freedom in the two cases, nudity seems more important as a long-term pursuit or belief to 
the rambler, than as a temporary strategy of the riders. ‘Some rare persons [like the naked 
rambler] do have an interest in their own happiness [belief in public nudity]’ that other 
‘persons rarely seek directly’, ‘as a type of chief interest among equals’.69 However, as 
argued in chapter 2 (III(iii)), if the conduct were only seen as important by the individual 
actor, the meaning of the conduct is a subjectively arbitrary claim of the actor – not socially 
recognised as important. It will be normatively of little personal importance in his network 
of interests. The degree of social value is comparable in two cases, because even ‘activities 
or modes of life that at first repel us might be worthwhile, although we would not engage in 
them ourselves’.70  
Secondly, there are different types and degrees of offensiveness. The sudden sight of the 
naked rambler may be instantly alarming, especially to ‘children or vulnerable old people’ 
‘in or near one of the main streets of a busy town’,71 while the naked riders keep the public 
informed in advance so that the public may be mentally prepared. Thus, the latter may be 
less alarming, although it may still be embarrassing for some.  
Therefore, in the latter case the potent value of the naked cycling may outweigh the right not 
to be temporarily and slightly offended when there is no other pressing need of the public.72 
In the former case of naked rambling, the slight value of the conduct may not outweigh the 
serious offence.  
In comparison, if there are other significant harms as well as slight or marginal offence, the 
balancing result may be different. One example is where a company organised a partially-
naked Spartacus cosplay of 300 foreign men in a commercial area of Beijing, which many 
people were attracted to view and photograph even while they were riding escalators.73 As 
                                                          
68 See W Noble, ‘In Pictures: London's World Naked Bike Ride 2018’, Londonist (London, 6 June 2018) 
<https://londonist.com/london/art-and-photography/in-pictures-london-s-world-naked-bike-ride-2018> 
accessed 15 June 2018. 
69 See HTO 56. 
70 See R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 66-67. To express is of personal 
importance to the naked rambler and of social value in having diverse beliefs in human body and social 
nudity. 
71 Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [80]. 
72 Political expression such as wearing a jacket bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’ in the corridor of a 
courthouse (see Cohen v California 403 US 15, 91 S Ct 1780, 29 L Ed 2d 284 (1971)) is of great social 
value, and the value outweighed the slight disruption of inner peace.  
73 See Jin Tie, ‘‘300 Spartacus Soldiers’ Sending Food in Sanlitun were Pushed Down by Police’ Sohu News 
(Beijing, 22 July 2015) <http://news.sohu.com/20150722/n417325805.shtml?> accessed 29 May 2018. The 
safety risk from distraction could be imputed to the actors. 
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well as offence from partial nudity, the police discerned the prominent concern to be public 
safety in a crowded place. The offence and the substantial risk of harm cannot be justified 
when the personal importance to the commercial entity was not pressing enough – it not 
being a promotion of its core business – and the social value was neither remarkable enough 
– there being no emergence of new potential customers or core needs of the public engaged. 
c. Alternatives to Avoid the Offence  
Can the offence be avoided in so far that there may be other means by which the actor can 
exercise their freedom, at no unreasonable greater cost to them (than the current means) to 
achieve a comparable expression, and whether the offence can be easily avoided by the 
claimant,74 at no intolerable greater cost to them (than the offence)? 
When the actor has alternative means to achieve a similar effect at a cost no greater than the 
indecent means – even where the value of the expression could override the need to avoid 
the offence – the exercise of freedom of expression can be limited. It is the actor who causes 
the conflict of interests – and it should be the actor who should keep the conflict to a 
minimum level.75 Otherwise, there could be an abuse of that freedom by unnecessarily 
infringing others’ interests. For naked cyclists there may be few other means by which they 
can bring about a similar effect, because of the need to secure the attention of passers-by and 
more particularly, the media. To express or promote the need for health and sustainability 
may well be a popular topic and thus be in substantial need of uncommon means of 
expression such as naked cycling.  
In contrast, the naked rambler could have alternative options available to him, which instead 
lead to no offence or merely trivial offence being created – most obviously by resort to 
promotional advertising on clothing or through social media. Advocating public nakedness 
is a much less common phenomenon and thus even common means of writing or sloganising 
might still bring about a satisfactory publicity effect.76 If the expression of nudity itself 
should be justified, then advocacy of other non-offensive opinions to be non-offensive in 
                                                          
74 See Aatifa Khan, ‘A ‘‘Right Not to Be Offended’’ under Article 10(2) ECHR? Concerns in the Construction 
of the ‘‘Rights of Others’’’ [2012] EHRLR 191, 198; Secretary of State for the Home Department v Central 
Broadcasting Ltd and another [1993] EMLR 253, 271 (‘it is quite unnecessary for any relative of any of 
Nilsen's victims to be distressed by this programme if broadcast in its existing form in any way at all, since 
all that anyone has to do is to switch off the programme’). 
75 As argued in ch 2 (III(iii)), this standing is for social consideration. 
76 It is a pity that ECtHR mentioned ‘many other avenues’ (Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 
[175]), rather than generally emphasising ‘many other means’ which is more inclusive. 
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public should also be justified. When someone thinks having sex in public is inoffensive, or 
when someone thinks killing a cat in public should be free from interference, he could claim: 
‘This is my expression by doing it, and it should not be wrong’. It is unacceptable. 
When those affected have an alternative course of conduct available at no great cost or 
inconvenience to them – in circumstances where, say, advance warning had been given by 
the cyclists – then the actor may not need to resort to an alternative or that should be the 
exception. When the actor has no alternative while the affected does have a reasonable 
alternative to avoid the offence, then properly the affected should be expected to allow for 
the actor’s exceptional exercise of that freedom.77 However, in the cases of naked rambling 
and naked promotion, passers-by cannot avoid the unexpected offence at a cost no greater 
than the offence. That is the calculus. These actors must choose alternative courses of action. 
In sum, these steps provide an analytical framework which can be helpful in determining the 
limits or parameters of indecency – albeit this approach does not necessarily always provide 
legal precision because of the complexity of particular marginal situations.78  
IV. INSULT AND SERIOUS OFFENCE 
We now look at insults of ‘treat[ing] others without dignity’.79 This part will, firstly, classify 
different kinds of insults and outline the forms of serious offence which are caused. Secondly, 
it will analyse the criminality of a particular type of insults i.e. insulting a group of people, 
especially hate speech, to exemplify how to apply the offence principle. Finally, it will 
analyse the wrongfulness of insults. It is helpful to consider the ‘bigger’ picture of insults 
and their serious offence before examining a particular type of insult. So, in the first section, 
I will start by looking at how insults, whether against an individual or a group, can be 
perpetrated directly or indirectly. 
                                                          
77 As argued in ch 2(III(iii)), this standing is for social tolerance. 
78 This analytic framework can be really applied to other cases. With begging by exposing deformities or 
wounds, though the enormous personal importance and social value outweighs the right not to be offended 
(slight disgust (likely to be) caused; not the right not to be infected), the alternatives available to the actor, 
such as conveying their message by means of a paper board, are reasonably available with no greatly lesser 
effect, while there are no reasonably available alternatives for passersby not to be offended, thus limiting 
the medium of expression. 
79 Jonathan H Turner and Jan E Stets, ‘Moral Emotions’ in Jan E Stets and Jonathan H Turner (eds), Handbook 
of the Sociology of Emotions (Springer 2006) 553. 
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(i) Types of Insult and Respective Serious Offence 
Insults may be directly inflicted against the personality or dignity of an individual or a 
group.80 They may be directed at individual targets, but also groups, or individuals because 
of their membership of a group. Insults directed against a person are arguably a species of 
crime against the person, but these may also be a public order crime when the criminal law 
does not directly protect the dignity of an individual, but otherwise protects them from 
insulting conduct in public life.81 Whether direct insults against a group are a crime against 
personal rights or other interests will be discussed in the next section. I will argue that insults 
can be conducted against a group of people in the form of expressing, encouraging, stirring 
up, or inciting violence, hatred, or prejudice and causing resentment and even alarm or fear.  
In Feinberg’s example, when ‘a counter-demonstrator leaves a feminist rally to enter the bus’ 
and ‘carries a banner with an offensive caricature of a female’ whose caption is ‘keep the 
bitches barefoot and pregnant’,82 there is a gender hatred causing anger, resentment, distress 
and fear. The offensive caricature generally causes anger, but the word ‘bitches’ has a moral 
taint or whiff about it, which causes resentment and distress – while the wording ‘barefoot 
and pregnant’ causes a fear even of personal assaults. Other insults against a racial, ethnic 
and religious group can be punished for similar reasons (see section ii). 
Alternatively, insults may be indirectly aimed at the existence of an individual or a group by 
attacking objects or beliefs that are of special symbolic significance to those individuals or 
groups. As Feinberg shows, conduct such as insulting a crucifix or national flag is an 
emotional flare and a shock to high level sensibilities and can lead to serious offence such 
as sudden violent anger, anxious fear and humiliation. 83  Indirect insults firstly include 
religious insults, where the targets could be the symbols or sacred sites of a religion. Unlike 
direct insults to individuals’ dignity, these are directed at the sacred, thus affronting 
adherents’ sensibilities. Feinberg’s two examples on a bus are held to be offensive: a cartoon 
of Christ on the cross with the words ‘Hang in there, baby!’84 – and an abusive caricature of 
the Pope accompanied by an anti-Catholic slogan.85 Christ and the Pope are both matters 
held sacred by Roman Catholics, and abuses or insults to them are at least offensive to 
                                                          
80 Respectively see Chinese criminal law, ss 237 (insulting others), 249 (insulting ethnic groups). 
81 POA 1986, s 4A. 
82 See OTO 13. 
83 See OTO 11-12, 16. An affront to a higher sensibility is profound offence i.e. severe unpleasantness that can 
be caused even if it is only imagined to be conducted in private or known after the event. See OTO 57-58. 
84 Ibid 11. 
85 Ibid 13. 
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adherents of the Roman Catholic religion. The Republic of Ireland targets outrage among a 
substantial number of the adherents of any religion caused by any publication or utterance 
that grossly abuses or insults matters held sacred by that religion. 86  The ‘matters’ are 
comprehensive, including all possible targets.  
Indirect insults also include patriotic insults, where the target could be a hero, the nation’s 
constitution, symbols or memorials. In Feinberg’s example, the actor bundles his lunch with 
an American flag that he splits to clean his mouth, blow his nose and shine his shoes.87 This 
conduct of insulting the national flag is to offend passengers on the bus, mainly causing 
resentment or alarm.88 China punishes insults of the national flag or emblem of China.89 In 
2017, insulting the national anthem was also criminalised.90 In short, both religious insults 
and patriotic insults are indirect insults against a group.  
All types of insults can be all important doctrinally and pragmatically, but insults inflicted 
against a group or at individuals precisely of their membership of that that group, whether 
directly or indirectly, are of increasing importance, judging from the huge, burgeoning 
growth in legislation in the jurisdictions discussed below, and I will focus my discussion on 
this area of hate speech. In the UK, the focus of the positive law is on preventing hatred.91 
Hate speech has been theoretically summarised as speech that “expresses, encourages, stirs 
up, or incites hatred against a group of individuals distinguished by a particular feature or 
set of features such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation”.92 
So hatred is legally and theoretically necessary for this kind of crime because it is a possible 
effect of the speech.  
But I would suggest all speech that “expresses, encourages, stirs up, or incites violence, 
hatred and prejudice against a group …” is hate speech, because supranational organisations 
such as the EU and UN (see the next section) consistently treat violence, hatred and prejudice 
                                                          
86 See Defamation Act 2009, s 36.  
87 See OTO 11-12. 
88 Or it may cause distress to a person of that nation in abroad, see Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC 1125 (Admin). 
89 See Chinese Criminal Law, s 299. 
90 Ibid. Problematically, there is no correlating punishment for insulting the flags of other countries. See 
German Criminal Law, s 104. In contrast, on religious insults, every religion is protected to the same extent. 
Moreover, every individual is protected from personal insults. Section 4A of Public Order Act 1986 can 
generally be used to target intentional insulting behaviours. As suggested in chapter 1 (III(i)b), a country is 
just a typical subject of public interests; what really still mattered is individuals in so far that every individual 
should be protected from unjustified offence. 
91 See POA 1986, Pts III and 3A. 
92 B Parekh, ‘Is there a case for banning hate speech?’ in M Herz and P Molnar (eds), The Content and Context 
of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge UP 2012) 40.   
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against a group together. This is defining hate speech more widely that mere words, to 
include a behaviour and the display of writing, sign or other visible representation. As will 
be argued below, it is worth noting that this definition is not central to my argument, because 
I am not so much concerned with defining hate speech, but with classifying hate speech as 
insults in public order law. 
(ii) Serious Offence from Insulting a Group by Hate Speech  
Hate speech is insulting to the targeted group’s dignity and thus may deny the fundamental 
equality of humanity. How should hate speech engage the criminal law? In EU law, it is seen 
as ‘offences concerning racism and xenophobia’.93 In UK and China hate speech is usually 
criminalised because it harms or risks harm to certain interests. I will argue that its 
criminality may not lie in harm to others, but in serious offence to others.  
a. Refuting Harms  
There are different approaches to justifying the criminalisation of hate speech. Firstly, it is 
commonly claimed that hate speech causes remote harms. Legal theorists generally assert 
that (racial) insults directed at a group risks harm to their membership of that society, to the 
environment and freedom of opportunity generally.94 Legislators may specifically think that 
unregulated hate speech encourages others to go on and commit further crimes – atrocities 
even – against the group or its members. An example is found in recent Chinese recent 
legislation where inciting hatred, inciting discrimination or preaching violence has been 
normatively recognised as the ideological basis of terrorism. 95  Correspondingly, the 
publication, incitement and glorification (indirect and inexplicit incitation) of hatred, 
prejudice or violence is seen as a kind of criminal preparation risking remote harm of terrorist 
attacks, and was thus criminalised in 2015 as a crime against public safety.96  
However, the ground or notion of remote harm is dubious – the problems of recognising 
remote harm having been discussed in chapter 3(III). That is, there is rarely solid and 
concrete evidence that hate speech causes discriminatory treatment or other hate crimes, and 
                                                          
93 See Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of the criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/55, art 1. 
94 See CHW 115. 
95 See Anti-Terrorism Law (China, 2015), s 4(2). 
96 Chinese criminal law, s123C. 
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it may not be fair to impute the remote harm by another autonomous agent to the original 
speaker.97 
Another approach to criminalising hate speech is to treat it as a crime against personal rights. 
For example, in China there is also an established crime of inciting ethnic hatred or prejudice, 
this being as a crime against personal rights.98 So, this approach to justifying criminalisation 
is referable to the direct harm to psychological health or dignity of the victim. However, 
once again the empirical evidence of the causation is unsubstantiated, so the argument may 
instead turn to the plausible notion of the cumulative effect of spreading prejudice against 
the group that may escalate into discrimination, hatred or violence.99  
However, to impute cumulative harm to different autonomous agents also requires careful 
examination. 100  We cannot assume that the imputation is appropriate. Moreover, it is 
incongruous for the same jurisdiction to proscribe inciting hatred in general as a crime 
against public safety while retaining inciting ethnic hatred in particular as a crime against 
personal rights. It is preferable to adopt a more consistent approach of targeting all conduct 
of inciting hatred as insulting conduct. But once again (as in the case of exposure) a slightly 
more nuanced approach is commended. There may be cases of incitement which are clearly 
directed against a particular person, even if committed in public. So, the argument might be 
that where there is doubt (whether the incitement is an attack on the dignity of the particular 
person), it would be preferable to resort to the public order offence, rather than the crime 
against the person. 
Some UK legislation criminalises hate speech that is likely, or intended, to incite or stir up 
racial, religious or sexual orientation hatred as part of public order law.101 The expression of 
insults directed at a group of people may be seen as likely to stir up hatred. This approach 
                                                          
97 See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to 
the Hate Crime Legislation Review’ (Scotland Government, July 2017) https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/hate-
crime/independent-review-of-hate-crime-
legislation/supporting_documents/495517_APPENDIX%20%20ACADEMIC%20REPORT.pdf> 73-74, 
accessed 29 May 2018. The potential harmful consequences should not be entirely contingent upon the 
actor’s future choices. See Andrew Cornford, ‘Preventative Criminalization’ (2015) 18 N Crim LR 1, 15-
16. 
98 Chinese criminal law, s 249.  
99 See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to 
the Hate Crime Legislation Review’ (Scotland Government, July 2017) https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/hate-
crime/independent-review-of-hate-crime-
legislation/supporting_documents/495517_APPENDIX%20%20ACADEMIC%20REPORT.pdf> 70ff, 
accessed 29 May 2018.  
100 See HTO 225ff, CHW 85ff. 
101 See Public Order Act 1986, pts III and 3A. 
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has been adopted partly because of international treaty obligations. The UN requires the 
signatory states’ criminalisation of the dissemination or incitement of racial hatred, 
discrimination or violence.102 Hatred may lead to acts of discrimination, and both can lead 
to violence.103 EU law also requires criminalisation of the dissemination, incitement of racial 
hatred or violence.104 So, the crimes are understood in quite a different way in the UK – 
where incitement to hatred pre-dates the anti-terrorist legislation and is about protecting 
certain groups – with incitement conceived as a form of violence (it is precisely the 
immediacy of potential harm which is relevant rather than its remoteness). This approach 
seems sensible in theory – as argued in chapter 3 (V(ii)), in the case of extreme insults, there 
would be the substantial possibility of a physical conflict disturbing the civil life of others 
e.g. inciting violence or provoking a breach of the peace.105  For example, the Scottish 
parliament had criminalised certain forms of hate speech to prevent ‘public disorder’ in the 
sporting context.106  
However, in practice merely insulting (and non-abusive or non-threatening) expression is 
rarely likely to ‘stir up hatred’,107 even though it may well be possible to stir up other kinds 
of hate, such as hostility, ill-will, contempt or ridicule. It is admittedly difficult to define 
what ‘hate’ speech actually is – and it is arbitrary to merely prevent ‘hatred’ while leaving 
other kinds of hate. This is different from other jurisdictions that prevent various kinds of 
hate.108 Legislating to identify protected persons by their specific characteristics is also 
problematic. 109  Consequently, the scope of hate speech crimes can be arbitrary in 
                                                          
102 See UN Convention on Racial Discrimination (1965), art 4. 
103 See Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (A Consultation Paper) 
(Law CP No 213, 2013) paras 4.38-4.45. Thus ‘hatred itself is not illegal’ (para 4.38) since there is no 
conduct involved, but freedom of thought and conscience – but the expression or incitation of it is illegal 
because something more than mere thought and there is no freedom of expression over others’ dignity.   
104 See Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/55, art 1. 
105 See Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Speech, Media and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression (Palgrave 2001) 
20-21.  
106 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, s 1. But similar 
conduct is criminalised in neighbouring jurisdictions without requiring the likeliness of inciting public 
disorder. See section 3 of the Football Offences Act 1991 (applicable to England and Wales) and section 37 
of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2011. 
107 See Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (A Consultation Paper) 
(Appendix A: Hate Crime and Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights) 
(Law CP No 213, 2013) para A.80. 
108 See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to 
the Hate Crime Legislation Review’ (Scotland Government, July 2017) https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/hate-
crime/independent-review-of-hate-crime-
legislation/supporting_documents/495517_APPENDIX%20%20ACADEMIC%20REPORT.pdf> 78-79, 
accessed 29 May 2018.  
109 Ibid 52ff.  
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England/Scotland and inconsistent in application throughout the UK. So, the approach of 
targeting the incitement of hatred by speech is inherently flawed. 
I would argue for a different approach to criminalising hate speech – that it be consistently 
treated as insulting, and thus offensive conduct and thereby a public order problem. In 
section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, insulting conduct is criminalised because it offends 
others in public. In such an approach, the offence principle can arguably solve the problem 
of causing/risking serious offence by the expression of insulting speech. It can be reasoned 
that this kind of insulting conduct perpetrated against a group breaches the inner peace of a 
significant section of the public and is thus a breach of public order. In this way, hate speech 
is criminalised just to prevent instant serious offence to others, rather than to prevent 
subsequent provoked violence/disorder or remote harms. This approach is more sensible 
than other approaches since it may be difficult, if not necessarily impossible, to prove there 
is a likelihood or intention of inciting hatred, violence, disorder or remote harms (such as 
discriminatory treatments or terrorist attacks).110 
b. Establishing Serious Offence  
Serious offence to an individual victim, group and even to other fellow members of the same 
community should feature in the normative arguments for criminalising hate speech. This 
section will establish the relevant grounds for distress, resentment or alarm as the standard 
or threshold for criminalisation. Hate speech is of a high degree of offensiveness because it 
attacks the meaning of the very existence of a group of people – such that the caused/risked 
distress, resentment etc. are categories of offence that are serious enough to warrant 
criminalisation (as argued in the previous part on indecency).    
Firstly, the serious offence that is caused to the individual victim, and the group to which 
they belong, takes the serious form of distress, resentment or alarm.111 That is, hate speech 
impacts upon the unwilling victim and thus causes intense offence (not only resentment, but 
also alarm or even fear of violence). Also, there is something disturbing about the quality of 
the speech in itself. That is, even for those audiences consenting to the hate speech, they 
                                                          
110 Intoxication in a public place can be an interesting analogy. It is invariably criminalised because of ‘a 
reasonable apprehension that he might endanger himself or any other person in his vicinity’, punished by ‘a 
fine not exceeding £ 100’, in Irish Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994, s 4. Hate speeches ‘intoxicate’ 
people in public, rendering them fanatical, weakening their cognitive and self-control abilities. But it would 
be difficult to normatively establish a risk of further harm, while it is sensible to find a reasonable 
apprehension/alarm as a serious offence reaction, with a proportionate penalty.  
111  The offence probably escalates into harm such as emotional damage when intensified to an individual. 
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should take offence: ‘sometimes, however, we think not just that it is reasonable to be 
offended by X, but that one should be offended by it’ because ‘it flouts standards that people 
ought to care about, in a way that people ought to find offensive’.112 Furthermore, there is 
serious offence to other righteous members outside the targeted group. They may feel disgust 
at others being treated without dignity, and outrage at violations of the equality of general 
humanity.113 So the conduct is about both inner peace of the public and about dignity of 
people. When it is not clear that the criminal law in a jurisdiction directly protects dignity of 
an individual or a group, public order law is the obvious choice. Moreover, even if the self-
esteem, self-respect and self-confidence of the target is actually not harmed, the target can 
be protected from serious offence by public order law. 
All the offence may happen when the ‘powerful message of intolerance and discrimination’ 
is communicated and received. 114  Criminalisation is designed to prevent such 
communication. The wearing of Nazi or Fascist or Militarism symbolic representations 
could be seen as objectively approving of, justifying, preaching, glorifying or inciting 
relevant insulting conduct.115 Wearing a band with a swastika on it in a bus may be identified 
as something which stirs up racial hatred by threatening or insulting words, behaviour or 
written material,116 or by ‘sign or other visible representation’.117 Communicating a threat in 
order to stir up (religious) hatred is an insult and can be separately criminalised.118 
(iii) Wrongfulness of Offensive Insults  
After having identified the serious offensiveness of insults it is now necessary to look at any 
counterbalancing conflicting interests in the freedom of expression. This section will firstly 
criticise the inconsistent balancing consideration in English legislation (of insulting a group), 
and then explain how a reasonableness defence can assist in assessing the balance in some 
                                                          
112 R A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in IROB 63. It is difficult to identify all of these 
standards. But a core standard is obvious: whether the conduct is against ‘our firmest [‘moral’] convictions 
of ‘political equality and human dignity’. Robert Amdur, ‘Review: Harm, Offence, and the Limits of Liberty’ 
(1985) 98 HLR 1946, 1958-59. 
113 Disgust can occur not only when others ‘act without dignity’ (harming humanity of people in relation to 
other creatures), but also when others ‘treat others without dignity’ (harming equality of people in relation 
to fellow members). Jonathan H Turner and Jan E Stets, ‘Moral Emotions’ in Jan E Stets and Jonathan H 
Turner (eds), Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions (Springer 2006) 553. 
114 NY Penal Law, s 485.00. 
115 Two men was punished because of disrupting public order by wearing Japanese military costumes in a 
Nanjing invading site. See Shuangjiang Luo, ‘Spiritual Japanese Search(ed), Lawyers suggesting legislative 
Detailed’, Yangzi Evening Paper (Nanjing, 24 Feb, 2018). 
116 See Public Order Act 1986, s 18. 
117 See Public Order Act 1986, s 4A. For the case, see OTO 13. 
118 See Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, s 6(5). 
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cases, and finally suggest a valid and effective balancing framework to embody the abstract 
conception and unify its application. 
a. Inconsistent Legislation of Free Expression over Offensive Insults 
Legislation covering insults does not provide a clear and reasonable framework for 
recognising counterbalancing interests in free speech. English law seems to have 
inconsistent and unreasonable protections for freedom of expression in relation to offensive 
insults.  
The law created a new offence to criminalise the use of threatening words or behavior or 
display of threatening written material to stir up religious hatred,119 but allows insulting of 
religion for the ‘protection of freedom of expression’ by a section added in 2006.120 So it 
seems insulting a belief system rather than the group of its adherents can be excluded from 
criminalisation.121 But the distinction between a group and a belief system or the beliefs or 
practices of its adherents is difficult and arbitrary to make (as is that between attacking sexual 
orientation and attacking members of that group);122  it is incoherent to criminalise the 
posting online of statements such as ‘Muslims out of UK’, while allowing the posting of 
‘Moslemism fuck off’.  Actually, a poster of ‘Islam out of Britain’ may also be criminalised 
under section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for the racially aggravated version of 
the offence under section 5 of the 1986 Act.123 But it is still not clear how the scope of 
criminalisable insults of a belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents can be 
determined.  
Moreover, it is not clear why the Public Order Act 1986, as well as covering insults and 
abuses of a group defined by reference to a relevant racial or sexual feature such as colour, 
                                                          
119 See POA 1986, s 29B. 
120 See section 29J: ‘Nothing in this Part [religious hatred] shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits 
or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular 
religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices 
of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease 
practising their religion or belief system.’ (emphasis added) Scotland has a similar provision. See Offensive 
Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, s 7. 
121 See Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (A Consultation Paper) 
(Law CP No 213, 2013) para 2.119.  
122 See Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (A Consultation Paper) 
(Appendix A: Hate Crime and Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights) 
(Law CP No 213, 2013) para A.90. Displaying ‘Stop Immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality and Stop 
Lesbianism’ at the same time is insulting. See Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin). 
123 Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin), [2003] Crim LR 888; Norwood v United Kingdom (2005) 
40 EHRR SE 11. 
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race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins and sexual orientations 
(sexual conduct or practices), covers insults and abuses of such a feature that defines a group 
of people while allowing insults and abuses of another kind of feature that defines a group 
of people such as belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents because of freedom 
of expression.124 This is an obvious inconsistency within the Act. 
Outside the act, there is also inconsistency between Acts. Section 5, Public Order Act 1986 
previously also targeted ‘insulting’ conduct as sections 4 and 4A do, but this word was 
deleted by section 57 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 to respond to concerns of 
‘encroaching on freedom of expression’.125 If the deletion of ‘insulting’ in section 5 of Public 
Order Act 1986 by the 2013 Act was really designed to protect freedom of expression, why 
not also delete ‘abusive’ in section 5 and thus allow abuses which are likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress, as the 2006 section allows both insults and abuses of religious 
belief and practice? A clear and reasonable framework to counterbalance free speech is 
needed. 
b. Interpretation of Reasonableness Defence in Legislation  
The problem of inconsistent legislation of balancing freedom of expression and insulting 
conduct may have a solution in existing law, in the reasonableness defence: ‘that his conduct 
was reasonable’.126 That is, if the interest in free expression can be interpreted to override 
the right not to be insulted or abused, the insulting or abusive conduct is reasonable. The 
interpretation of this defence can be effective in analysing some cases. 
As mentioned earlier, Ireland targets outrage among a substantial number of the adherents 
of a religion caused by publication or utterance that grossly abuses or insults matters held 
sacred by that religion.127 But the criminalisation comes with a defence, applicable where 
‘… a reasonable person would find genuine literary, artistic, political, scientific, or academic 
value in the matter to which the offence relates’.128 Thus it seems that a relevant value in 
freedom of expression can override the offence. However, since the offence is factual and 
                                                          
124 See Public Order Act 1986, pts 3 and 3A. 
125 See David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 1241. So only 
insults of religion or the beliefs or practices of adherents that meets conditions set in sections 4 and 4A can 
be covered: the actor intended that or it was likely that another would believe that immediate unlawful 
violence would be used or provoked, or the actor intended and the act caused harassment, alarm or distress. 
126 Public Order Act 1986, ss 4A(3)(b) and 5(3)(c). 
127 See Defamation Act 2009, s 36. 
128 Ibid. 
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serious to a substantial number, the value must be overwhelming.129  So if the value is 
objectively not the principal content of the publication or utterance, it is does not outweigh 
the offence.  
Another example is New Zealand’s prohibition of blasphemous libel. 130  Here the 
reasonableness of expression in good faith and decent language should be understood in the 
sense of balancing interests from perspectives of the affected person, the actor and the 
general public. Why should the language be decent? It is for the avoidance of unnecessary 
offence. If a speaker is not literary enough to express decently, then the indecent language 
is necessary for the expression of ideas, and thus the expression is justified, i.e. there is no 
wrongfulness of the offence. In contrast, plain abuse is surely unnecessary indecent 
language. 131  The publication is wrong just because objectively the disruption is not 
necessary. 
The good faith of the actor entails some objective meanings and thus embodies 
reasonableness. The law protects the expression of religious opinions, or the establishment 
of religious opinions with arguments, in which there is good faith. If the opinion or the 
argument is without objective sources but fabricated as in the Austrian film,132 there is no 
good faith. A journalist’s reliance on the contents (that the volume and expansion of cannabis 
production there ‘made Morocco a serious contender for the title of the world’s leading 
hashish exporter’) of the uncontested official report is in good faith.133 If a person does not 
think a religious subject is true, he can challenge it with objective sources, as an atheist or 
humanist does or as a scientist does e.g. Darwin or Copernicus. That is the way to discuss or 
criticize a belief system or the beliefs or practices. To fabricate or vilify is not reasonable 
discussion or criticism, and thus it is not to be covered as protected freedom of expression. 
It is not acceptable to oppress objective discussion or criticism of religious matters as shown 
                                                          
129 The ECtHR ruled that internal authorities could refuse classification certificate to a video sufficiently 
offensive to Christian convictions. See Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 1. 
130 Section 123 of the Crimes Act 1961 prescribes that: ‘(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 1 year who publishes any blasphemous libel. (2) Whether any particular published matter is or is 
not a blasphemous libel is a question of fact. (3) It is not an offense against this section to express in good 
faith and in decent language, or to attempt to establish by arguments used in good faith and conveyed in 
decent language, any opinion whatever on any religious subject.’ (emphasis added) 
131 Then what is the content of the required good faith? Probably the provision requires that the actor is of the 
belief that the idea is right and the expression is a right. This is another type of reasonableness. But still, 
subjective element is not to be considered in judging the wrongfulness of offence; it is a problem of 
normative culpability. 
132 In the film, God the Father is infirm and ineffective, Jesus Christ a ‘mummy’s boy’ and the Virgin Mary a 
wanton; they plan with the Devil to punish mankind for its immorality. See Otto-Preminger-Institut v 
Austria (1994) Series A no 295-A. 
133 See Colombani and others v France app no 51279/99 (ECtHR, 25 June 2002) [65]. 
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by the death of Giordano Bruno, neither it is acceptable to move to the other extreme that 
connives in wanton vilification. Therefore, implicit insults by fabrication are unacceptable 
insults.  
c. Framework of Offensive Insults Counterbalancing Freedom of Expression  
The analysis of abstract reasonableness above may not be clear and consistent enough to be 
applicable to other cases. It is ‘difficult to see how a citizen can properly regulate his conduct 
in advance on the basis of the current case law’.134 In Percy v DPP, on the justification, the 
District Judge merely considered whether there was an alternative to the actor while the High 
Court considered further other factors: ‘the accused’s behaviour went beyond legitimate 
protest’; ‘the behaviour had not formed part of an open expression of opinion on a matter of 
public interest’; ‘use of a flag had nothing, in effect, to do with conveying a message or the 
expression of opinion’.135 A clear framework of balancing offensive insults and freedom of 
expression that embodies the defence of reasonableness should apply consistently in all cases. 
The ECtHR has exemplified how to limit the freedom in some cases,136 but its multiple 
considerations should be more clearly and reasonably structured as follows.  
The threshold problem of freedom of expression is to determine whether the conduct is 
absolutely excluded from any protection. Article 17 of the ECHR absolutely prohibits abuse 
of rights and thus some expression (‘aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
Convention’) are ousted from possibility of protection in article 10. How the ‘aim’ of the 
conduct should be interpreted is in dispute.137 It should be objectively interpreted rather than 
by resort to the subjective intention/faith of the actor; it means that if the act’s sole or primary 
use is to destruct or limit the ‘rights and freedoms’ such as reputation, dignity, equality, 138 
                                                          
134 Alex Bailin, ‘Criminalising Free Speech?’ [2011] Crim LR 705, 711. 
135 See Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125 [30]- [32]. However, its consideration of the knowledge of 
the likely effect is actually not relevant to proportionality here. 
136 See Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (1994) Series A no 295-A; Hoffer and Annen v Germany App no 
397/07 and 2322/07 (ECtHR, 13 January 2011). 
137 See Law Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (A Consultation 
Paper) (Appendix A: Hate Crime and Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on Human 
Rights) (Law CP No 213, 2013) paras A.28-A.40. 
138 This rejects the too high threshold of (a device) being exclusively or specifically designed or the too low 
threshold of subjective intention. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on 
Cybercrime (European Treaty Series - No 185) para 73. The ECtHR tend to oust the denial because of its 
‘main content and general tenor’ against the Convention’s fundamental values (‘basic ideas’) i.e. justice and 
peace in the Preamble (‘text and spirit’), contrasting the Human Rights Committee (UN) that considers the 
claim for protection of the freedom as principally admissible before determining no specific violation. See 
‘Introduction’ in Ludovic Hennebel and Thomas Hochmann (eds), Genocide Denials and the Law (OUP 
2011) xxxii-xxxvi. 
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then its negative value definitely outweighs its positive value and it surely falls out of 
possibly protectable expression. For example, the ECtHR ruled that an Austrian film’s value 
in free artistic expression should be treated with due regard; but when its content existed 
primarily to insult others’ religious feelings, it was against ‘the protection of the rights of 
others’.139 In this way, the conduct in the case of hate speech is absolutely excluded from 
any protection. As argued in chapter 2 (III(iii), extremist speech is inherently in conflict with 
‘our firmest [‘moral’] convictions of ‘political equality and human dignity’.140  
Once past this general threshold, as in a case of insulting speech that is not hate speech e.g. 
labelling an abortion doctor with the banner ‘Then: Holocaust/today: Babycaust’,141 we need 
to determine the specific protection of the freedom of expression in the progressive 
framework of proportionality that accords with article 10(2), ECHR. The first step is to check 
whether the interference with the freedom was necessary for a ‘pressing social need’.142 The 
need can be one or more of matters prescribed in article 10(2), ECHR.143 This is to check 
whether there is harm or offence to legal interests by the expression. For example, there was 
harm to reputation and dignity and serious offence in the case of labelling an abortion doctor 
with the banner ‘Then: Holocaust/today: Babycaust’. 144  So the interference with the 
insulting speech was necessary. The second is to check whether the expression is of public 
value that can outweigh the affected interest.145 Although freedom of expression outweighs 
temporary affronts to sensibilities, it usually cannot override personality rights such as the 
reputation or dignity of an individual. For example, the statements were made in a context 
of an element of a public debate on abortion, and there should be ‘special degree protection 
afforded’ – even to the extent of countenancing ‘exaggerated and polemic criticism’ such as 
describing a doctor as a ‘Killing Specialist’ – but a defamatory and insulting (Holo)caust 
characterisation was not ‘an acceptable element of a public debate’.146 The third is to gauge 
whether the mode of expression could have been expected to be less detrimental (the 
criticism by way of comparing abortion to Holocaust could be easily avoided) – and to check 
whether the offence could have been easily avoided by the accuser claimant (offensive 
conduct at the entrance of the clinic cannot be easily ignored by the doctor and his fellows). 
                                                          
139 See Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (1994) Series A no 295-A. 
140 See Robert Amdur, ‘Review: Harm, Offence, and the Limits of Liberty’ (1985) 98 HLR 1946, 1958-59. 
141 See Hoffer and Annen v Germany App no 397/07 and 2322/07 (ECtHR, 13 January 2011). 
142 Gough v The United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 8 [164]. 
143 See Hoffer and Annen v Germany App no 397/07 and 2322/07 (ECtHR, 13 January 2011) [49]. 
144 Ibid [47]. 
145  Political speech is of enormous public interest, especially important before legislation is passed and 
elections held. See Bowman v UK (1998) 26 EHRR 1 [42]. 
146 Hoffer and Annen v Germany App no 397/07 and 2322/07 (ECtHR, 13 January 2011) [44]-[45]. 
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It seems that if the banner is available online or in print and does not identity a particular 
individual doctor, the serious offence caused to the group of abortion doctors can be 
overridden by freedom of expression consideration.   
In short, proportionately balancing freedom of expression and its limits means that it is 
necessary to consider three steps: the necessity to prevent serious offence being caused by 
the exercise of the freedom; the balance of values of freedom of expression and the 
competing need to avoid offence; and the alternatives which might avoid the offence. 
Obviously, the solid framework of hierarchical steps argued for in indecency cases should 
still apply in insult cases. 
CONCLUSION  
There has been increasing acceptance of (likely) serious offence (whether disgust, alarm, 
distress, etc.) as a justification of criminalisation as well as the harm principle in public 
indecency laws and the Public Order Act 1986. Legal theorists should try to explain and 
guide this criminalisation trend of offensive conduct. Order maintenance should focus on 
the ‘direct effects on public order’ or quality of life, rather than on the ‘indirect effects on 
serious crime’.147 This chapter has argued that the offence principle (restated in chapter 2) 
can independently offer a workable framework to review and elaborate specific 
criminalisation of categorised offensive conduct. 
There are mainly three categories of offensive conduct (threatening, indecent and insulting). 
Their offensiveness can be specifically analysed and applied in criminalisation. The evils of 
public indecencies, such as sexual exposure, may not be the (sexual) harm as such, but the 
serious offence of shock/alarm, disgust, humiliation, distress or indignation/outrage suffered 
in specific conditions. The evil of insult in hate speech may not be in its harm or its risk (of 
its causing hatred, prejudice or violence), but in its serious offence. The offence can be 
confirmed as wrongful by structurally counterbalancing the freedom of expression – even if 
the values of that freedom override the need to avoid the offence, the resultant balance of 
the alternative courses of two parties may still decide that the offence is wrongful.  
                                                          
147 See David Thacher, ‘Order Maintenance Reconsidered: Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning’ (2004) 
94 J Crim L & Criminology 381, 412. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
In the Preface, I showed how the scope of public order crimes was arbitrary and argued that 
principled criminalisation can allow us to understand public order crimes in a clearer way. 
This thesis has examined the moral limits of criminalising conduct which breaches public 
order, by restating the concepts of harm and offence as applicable to criminalising the 
conduct. So, the key findings and contributions are two-sided but intertwined.  
In the first part of this conclusion I will explain the argument (and its contribution) in relation 
to public order law – elucidate what this new limited version of public order law would look 
like, and demonstrate how it would be different from my starting point mentioned in the 
Preface. By ‘limited’ I mean that the scope is narrower or constrained in some way – not just 
that crimes of public safety etc. are excluded – but also how my approach might limit the 
ambit of remaining crimes of public order. 
The second part will show how the limiting process in this domain can illuminate a 
principled approach to criminalisation more generally. The criminalisation framework has 
been restated around core concepts that are common in criminalisation literature – 
specifically wrongs, harms (setbacks to interests) and goods (interests).1 The moral limits of 
criminalisation are built on the clear and reasonable relationship amongst them. So, in this 
part my claim is not about criminalisation theory generally, but about the need to apply it in 
a hierarchical way, especially in the domain of public order crimes. 
It should be clear that the aim of the thesis is merely to identify conduct that should be 
regulated in some way. In other words, it does not move on to the next step of determining 
whether the conduct should be the subject of the criminal law or whether where are other 
effective ways of regulating it (e.g. civil penalties or administrative law). Even for moral 
limits of criminalisation, the problem of culpability/excuses is not addressed in this thesis to 
limit the scope of public order crimes.  
                                                          
1 See John Stanton-Ife, ‘What Is the Harm Principle For?’ (2016) 10 Crim LP 329, 354. In America, Feinberg’s 
moral limits of criminal law also develop to a relatively full extent around these concepts. 
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I. A NEW PUBLIC ORDER LAW 
I will summarise my argument, with its implications for the scope of public order offences. 
My starting point is to define the nature of the ‘interest’ in public order. The key elements 
of protected public order interests have been defined as conditions for smooth life and 
categorised into three types: life peace (without disturbing harassments); life convenience 
(in use); and life amenity/comfort (in enjoyment). Causing or risking inconvenience or 
discomfort, or breaching life peace, without proper justification, is the factual and normative 
harm/offence of a public order crime. Arguments which seek to justify criminalisation in 
respect of public order should thus identify specific setbacks to public order interests (i.e. 
legally recognisable physical and non-physical nuisances against interests in quality of life) 
– before moving to normatively balance any possible conflict of interests in social interaction. 
Therefore, I will explain how identifying the interest more clearly makes it possible to 
specify more clearly how it might be harmed or offended. 
Public order is generally seen as a residual or lump category, comprised of crimes which are 
necessary, but which are not accommodated elsewhere in the criminal law. However, I have 
argued that, from the special perspective of everyday life, it is possible to perceive public 
order as a particular kind of interest. Everyday life consists of activities which members of 
a society do for the continuation or improvement of their individual lives: sport, study, work, 
leisure, amusement, worship, traffic, religion, politics, etc.2 We engage in everyday activities 
which are not necessarily ‘life aims’, but which may be central to our lives in important and 
particular ways. Everyday life can have its own meaning and is itself worth maintaining. 
Every person needs a kind of life order every day. ‘Smooth life’ can be literally understood 
as where relevant life activities are going well and comfortable – free of problems, trouble, 
unpleasantness or sudden disruptions.  
In this way, public order can be seen as central to people’s quality of life, and public order 
law has its own purpose, remit and scope. From this perspective, crimes against public order 
can be seen as an independent category of crimes in criminal law. Firstly, from this 
perspective public order is different from public safety or general social administration – so 
the conduct connected with offensive weapons, fireworks, obscenity and pornography, 
political uniforms, quasi-military organisations etc., in much ‘public order’ regulation 
                                                          
2 See P Sztompka, ‘The Focus on Everyday Life: A New Turn in Sociology’ (2008) 16 Eur Rev 1, 9 & 11. 
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mentioned in the Preface (I), is not directly a public order problem. Second, among common 
law crimes that are commonly regarded as public order offences, public nuisance should be 
refined or narrowed from its ‘catching-all’ common law meaning to be formulated as a 
public order offence that protects life convenience, comfort or peace – or as a public safety 
offence that protects the physical safety or health of the public.3 Having explained which 
sorts of crimes are excluded, the focus of my new category of public order law is conduct 
that causes or risks specific inner states against smooth life – alarm, distress and annoyance 
– and conduct that causes or risks external setbacks to smooth life – obstruction, 
inconvenience, discomfort, loss of amenity, breach of the peace, harassment, disorder and 
disruption. This sort of criminality remains in the new category of public order law. 
It is problematic to understand the publicness of an interest and crime, especially in respect 
of public order law. Public order law, by its very name and from the perspective of fair 
labelling, needs to explain what is meant by ‘public’. I have tried to limit the publicness to 
occasions not concerning a specified victim in private – the test of being public is whether 
many individuals are actually or possibly affected. When many persons, a solitary 
indiscriminate person, or a singular individual on a public occasion (with by-standers/a third 
party) are adversely affected in terms of their life convenience, comfort or peace, the interest 
and crime can be labelled as public. Public order offences, moreover, are not too trivial that 
they should not be taken seriously by criminalisation theory. Firstly, if we apply the test of 
publicness outlined above, we can see that the interest is generally not trivial. Where more 
than one individual’s life convenience, comfort or peace is affected, the seriousness of the 
evil tends to be sufficient for the criminal law to intervene. Secondly, though some of the 
conduct may be ‘trivial’ the interest is not – and this therefore justifies thinking about them 
in terms of criminalisation theory. 
Having first identified the life interests in convenience, comfort and peace, the thesis then 
attempts to map public order offences on to them. Arguably, inconvenience means to make 
it difficult or even impossible to use a life condition, including obstruction, e.g. the notice 
‘out of order/use, sorry for the inconvenience’, discomfort or loss of amenity will worsen 
the effect of the use of the life condition, while breach/disruption of life peace (as manifest 
in distress, alarm, harassment, disorder, etc.) disturbs the original state of peace. Therefore, 
typical categories of offences against public order potentially include: (a) crimes against the 
                                                          
3 Or we can simply discard this offence name and enact these two kinds of crimes.  
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convenient public use of life places, such as blocking a door to prevent entrance or to 
throwing an object that may disrupt a sporting event, (b) crimes against the convenient public 
use of life facilities, such as to disrupt the function of post offices and hospitals; (c) crimes 
against  the public enjoyment of general environmental conditions, such as emitting a noise 
that may disrupt public meetings; (d) crimes against the public communication and the 
accessing of information, such as the dissemination of false news that may cause public 
inconvenience; (e) crimes against public external peace, such as the creation of stubborn 
‘pop up’ internet advertisements; (f) crimes against public inner peace, such as involvement 
in public indecencies or issuing insults. Each category’s rationale and meaning has been 
enunciated. Categories of public order crimes should be put on a consistent and rational 
basis. This is an important rule to establish and develop a flow of new desires, values and 
rules in respect of public order which itself is not a fixed concept but is dynamic and evolves 
with time. 
Breaches of this interest in public order must then be understood in terms of either harm or 
offence to others – in the absence of which there can be no crime. Harm and offence are 
capable of being identified more clearly once we understand the nature of the interest here. 
In the particular context of my account of public order as a protectable interest, harm in 
public order has firstly be understood as objective disruptions to physical interests in life 
order. This means that various collective interests identified in some criminal offences – such 
as general security, mutual cooperation, psychological trust in the law, the sense of general 
security, and respect for official authority – are not public order problems because in these 
cases we cannot consistently recognise a setback to life convenience, comfort or peace. 
However, conduct which undermines authority or administration in some cases – such as 
disregarding police warnings to disperse or entering officially banned or restricted areas – 
may involve recognisable setbacks to a public order interest, i.e. harmful disruptions to the 
smooth continuation of certain, specific activities of public authorities.  
As a factual setback to a protectable interest, offence is a breach of inner peace that is based 
on and mediated by normative sensibilities, the breach being caused or triggered by 
communication. These sensibility and communication mechanisms of offending others can 
shape the scope of offensive conduct. So-called offences against morality, decency or 
religion – such as indecent naked rambling, displays of sexual behaviour and public cruelty 
to animals – should be classified as public order crimes, which breach others’ inner peace. 
Or they otherwise should be repealed or decriminalised if they cannot be justified as public 
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order crimes – for example, mere thoughts of private immorality such as private incestuous 
behaviour, or knowledge of the behaviour after the fact cannot offend in the sense required 
by the communicative mechanism – and no alternative justification for criminalisation exists.  
Further, in the area of public order, not all factual disruptions of order are normatively 
wrongful. There may be good reason to interfere with others’ smooth life. Justification can 
be found in actions which may ‘reasonably be expected in the normal course of life’ e.g. 
exercising freedom of expression or freedom of assembly and association.4 The reason 
advanced should be principally balanced against the harm or offence in a public order case. 
We cannot assume that the disorder or offence was always directly and necessarily caused 
or risked by the conduct and there is no difficulty with imputing the result to the conduct. 
Therefore, I have identified new problems of imputing abstract risk of offence, remote risk 
of offence and remote harm of offence. In respect of all the imputation problems discussed 
here, a structured approach has been proposed. The first test is formal: i.e. whether the 
‘parallel people’ would react in the same way or whether the risk, compounded by its 
possible gravity and its probability, is sufficiently severe. The second test is one of 
substantive justification: i.e. whether the parallel people’ reaction is still justified – or 
whether the severe risk is still acceptable, given the personal importance to the actor and the 
social value inherent in their conduct.  
This new approach to imputation allows us to have a fresh perspective on some longstanding 
problems in this area of the criminal law. A police officer is still to be regarded as a person 
liable to be affected by disorderly conduct – in terms of the test of parallel people. But 
offence caused to a group of parallel people may still not be imputed, because of the failure 
to pass this test of constitutional value. Begging in the immediate vicinity of an entrance to 
a public building can pose a substantial risk of obstructing others, and there is no competent 
justification to refute the imputation of disorder. Similarly, public nudity/sex carries a 
substantial risk of offending others, and there is equally no competent justification to refute 
the imputation of offence. In cases of teenagers congregating in public or begging in public, 
it is difficult to prove that such conduct is very likely to lead to further offensive behaviour. 
In contrast, the creation or possession of extremist material is inherently likely to lead to 
onward exhibition – and thereby offence to the public – and there is little counterbalancing 
                                                          
4 See Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (Law 
Com No 358, 2015) paras 3.60-3.61.  
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value in creating or possessing extremist material. In extreme cases of offending others there 
will be the significant risk of physical conflict disturbing the civil life of others – while the 
conduct has little acknowledgeable personal importance and social value.  
Finally, I applied the restated concepts of harm and offence to some typical public order 
problems in order to demonstrate how this principled approach might work in practice. I 
have identified some categories of truly intrusive and wrongful begging/loitering conduct 
that bear on legal interests in convenience and comfort and inner peace. Firstly, soliciting 
and loitering are not untypical behaviours that may disturb the normal use of public places. 
Soliciting and loitering are not in themselves harmful to public amenity, nor do they 
inevitably raise security concerns, but they tend to be associated with causing offence to 
others or aesthetic harm or increasing crime-rate. However, the suggested harms/risks do not 
set back a criminally protectable interest. Or they are not criminally imputable because of 
doctrinal or empirical reasons. Or they are not criminally wrongful because they are justified 
by personal meaning to the actor and social value to others. Further, I have examined cases 
of offensive conduct that involve a serious loss of inner peace to members of the public. For 
the purpose of public order maintenance, I have focused on the direct effects on quality of 
life rather than on its further effects on serious crime. The evils of public indecencies such 
as sexual exposure may not be its implicit (sexual) harm – but the serious offence of 
shock/alarm, disgust, humiliation, distress or indignation/outrage in specific conditions. The 
evils of insults such as hate speech may not be its harm or its risk (of hatred, prejudice or 
violence), but its serious offence. By structurally counterbalancing the freedom of expression, 
the offence can finally be confirmed as wrongful.  
Overall, through this method, I have shown that the scope of criminalising typical public 
order related conduct can be sensibly decided by the steps of limiting criminalisation. The 
restatement of the concepts of harm and offence, as the construction of structured limitations 
of criminalisation, is valuable in considering whether current laws on public order crimes – 
particularly public order acts and relevant ‘catch-all’ common law offences – are consistent 
and coherent, whether they need to be simplified or harmonised and whether more categories 
of public order crimes need to be created.  
II. A NEW HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK OF LIMITING CRIMINALISATION  
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The framework for limiting criminalisation in respect of public order is based on the 
argument that criminalisation hierarchically requires a wrongful, imputable, recognisable 
setback to a protectable (public order) interest. The hierarchical requirement provides a new 
possibility to reflect on existing internal frameworks of criminalisation. Though theorists 
have tried to provide diverse frameworks of limiting criminalisation – with clarified 
prescriptive definitions and even coherent conceptions – they typically fail to provide the 
framework hierarchically, i.e. step by step – and thus may fail to clearly guide the 
criminalisation practice. More importantly, they fail to apply the framework to a category of 
crimes consistently, and thus may fail to persuasively show their applicability in 
criminalisation practice. Public order law with its defects has been a useful illustrative 
example to thread through the hierarchical framework of principled criminalisation.   
The first requirement of criminalisation is to identify a legal interest to be protected. 
Theorists can readily reach this consensus because criminalisation aims  at something that 
can be understood in terms of interests to be protected. However, theorists may disagree on 
what an appropritate interest in criminal law is – and the conception of public order as a 
revevant interest provides an appropriate opportunity to answer the question. Feinberg has 
tried to construct a system of protectable individual interests. Though this thesis follows his 
individualistic understanding of interests, little benefit is derived from his near-arbitrary 
listing of a series of interests. If legal interests are to be protected by law, then the law must 
be prudent and set standards to determine their scope. ‘However, comparatively little 
progress has been made in developing normative criteria for the recognition of a legitimate 
Rechtsgut [legal interest/good].’5 This thesis has tried to follow Eser’s three steps to find and 
argue for the interests in public order – they should be socially-founded and factual, socially 
recognised and constitutionally consistent.6 Legal interests in criminal law are substantive, 
specific interests for the conduct of peoples’ lives and should be consistent with civil law 
and constitutional law.7 In this way, this thesis has constructed public order interests as 
categorised life convenience, comfort and peace.  
Secondly, only when we identify a setback to a legal interest, caused or risked by the act, 
can we have a reason to consider criminalisation. Setbacks to interests (goods) are criminal 
evils. This thesis follows Feinberg’s parallel thought process that two criminal evils can 
                                                          
5 CHW 29. 
6 See Albin Eser, ‘The Principle of ‘‘Harm’’ In the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of The 
Criminally Protected Legal Interests’ (1965-1966) 4 Duq U L Rev 345, 413. 
7 See M Zhang, Preliminarily on Legal Interests (CUPLP 2000) 162-67. 
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justify criminalisation – harm to others and offence to others. Harm and offence are 
considered from the perspective of classifying criminal infringements of interests.8 I have 
consistently compared and contrasted harm with offence in arguing the constitution of each 
– viz., the interest concerned; the recognisable setback; the imputable setback; and the 
wrongful setback. As of the interests set out in the first chapter, all the life convenience and 
comfort interests and outward peace are physically manifest and can be conceptualised as 
objects of harm – while inner peace is psychological and thus the object of offence. Public 
order refers to the dimension of legal interests, and disruptions of public order refers to two 
kinds of evils – either harm or offence.9 Thus, I have firstly defined public order as specific 
types of legal interest and have then applied principles of criminalisation in the ensuing 
chapters. 
Therefore, the nature and scope of legal interests limit that of harm/offence. Only when we 
identify a legal interest, can we recognise an evil setting back it. Both the interest and the 
consequential evil are needed to truly understand a crime. To solely research on harm and 
offence without referring to what (interests) to harm and offend is neither persuasive nor 
logical. Thus, Feinberg defines harm as setbacks to interests and also explains interests in 
detail.10  
Conversely, the theory of harm/offence can also affect that of legal interests. As for 
comprehending the publicness of a legal interest, in so far that there may still be room for 
doubt I simply follow the individualistic approach to define public order interests. Why not 
try a general approach to understanding public order as an interest which cannot be reduced 
to individual interests, but rather as a kind of common good, such as morality, civility or 
efficient administration? It may not be clear that my work in Chapter 1 completely 
challenges this sort of conception, because it is, admittedly, difficult to argue that morality, 
civility or efficient administration are not a socially-founded, socially factual interest for 
                                                          
8 Parallel harm and offence are more understandable and workable than one single notion of ‘legal interest 
infringement’ in China (or ‘setbacks to interest’ in Feinberg’s words or Rechtsgutsverletzung in German) in 
analysis of criminalisation. 
9 When Feinberg considers ‘the relation between offense and privacy’ (OTO 5), he does so in terms of there 
being something between a category of infringements (or evils) and a kind of infringed legal interests (or 
goods). 
10 In this sense, Feinberg’s first chapter of four volumes on the moral limits of criminal law, ‘Harm as Setbacks 
to Interest’, should be reorganised by reordering his sections’ titles in his chapter: ‘3. Interests and Wants’; 
‘2. Welfare Interests and ulterior Interests’; ‘6. The Concept of an Interest Network’; ‘7. Legally Protectable 
Interests’; ‘4. Harms, Hurts and Offenses’; ‘1. Meaning of Harm’; ‘5. The Way Acts and Other Events 
Affect Interests When They Harm Them’. The italic sections are on goods while the left sections are on 
evils. 
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good life and thus are not protectable. Therefore, in Chapter 2, this thesis has argued for an 
important step in limiting criminalisation – setbacks to a legal interest should be 
recognisable, given the requirement for legal certainty and clarity of the clarity of criminal 
provisions. Harm or offence ‘to others’ should be recognizable. This requires that the harm 
should be a setback to a categorised and substantive interest by an objectively measurable 
force – and that the offence be an affront to sensibility by initiating socially meaningful 
communication. In this step, if public order were something general as morality, civility or 
efficient administration, its setbacks cannot be clearly and consistently recognised in 
legislation and justice. Thus, public order cannot be defined as a communitarian good.11  
Thirdly, it is unfortunate that, while theorists may agree on the normative need for 
imputation and wrongfulness, they disagree on the meaning of each and their interrelation. 
The requirement of normatively imputable harm/offence has been outlined in restating the 
concepts of harm to others and offence to others – and applied to cases of harmful disorder 
and offensive conduct. Normative imputation has been structured. Some recognisable 
setbacks to protectable interests are too abnormal, aggregative or remote to be imputed to 
the conduct – so they may simply be excluded from the scope of criminalisation.  
Additionally, we may need to consider further whether the conduct is substantively 
justifiable, even if the setback were normally caused or substantially risked.  
Some setbacks are clearly imputable and may directly face the problem of identifying 
wrongfulness.12 Wrong is a concept in criminal law whose meanings will depend on the 
context.13 Here wrong is principally based on evil (harm and/or offence) to others. But we 
still need to move from a factual evil (a setback to a legal interest from the perspective of 
the victim) to normative wrongfulness – that the setback is unjustified – that when 
considered from the perspective of the actor, they had no good reason to create it. In (direct) 
harm to others, the evil is construed to be wrong except in cases of e.g. exercising a 
                                                          
11 This is where the question of whether moralism in criminal law is reasonable can be solved as the question 
of whether the moral perception of a group of people can be a kind of legal interest in criminal law. If not, 
of course, no direct harm/offence is involved. But if so, then its setbacks should be legally recognisable. 
12 Wrong is principally necessary for criminalisation. Prohibition with a censuring function is based on the 
wrong as criminal law’s moral voice (see CHW 19). Because a citizen has wronged others, the state can and 
should punish them as a representative of others. The wrong in criminal law is an important and necessary 
way to maintain and nurture mature, rational and responsible citizens, when every citizen with assumed 
autonomy and dignity should suffer predictable consequences for committing a wrong. The wrong need not 
be justified in moral terms. It could even be justified in political terms. But I do not address political 
justification here as Duff when he proposed public wrong as a requirement for a citizen to answer for each 
criminal offence (see Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘A Critical Reading of R A Duff, Answering for Crime’ (2010) 31 
Adel L Rev 47, 47). 
13 See CHC 80-81. 
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recognised right. In offence to others, the communication-based evil may be counterbalanced 
by the right to freedom of expression. If no justification were claimed and accepted, the 
identification of a wrong as a normative evil is fulfilled. It is not a solid criminalisation 
theory to dwell on the matter of wrong without analysing an evil in depth. Neither is it 
sensible to anchor justification of criminalisation on evils, without further examining 
possible justifications of the conduct that may negate wrongfulness.14  
In public order, freedom of expression is a particularly important justification in excluding 
wrongfulness of causing/risking inconvenience, discomfort or breaching of inner peace. It 
provides an opportunity to reflect on Feinberg’s framework of balancing conflicting interests, 
particularly his consideration of the moral quality of each interest.15 The thesis has refuted 
the understanding of the immorality of an interest – the interest is immoral and thus of lesser 
value in the balance of interests.16 It is because the immoral interest is not socially recognised 
that it is not a protectable interest at all. However, the idea of immorality is still worthy of 
consideration, if we understand it as meaning that since the measure to exercise the freedom 
is not proportionate, it evidences a lack of consideration in social cooperation – and is thus 
immoral and not worthy of protection.   
In sum, this thesis has attempted to argue for a limited scope of public order crimes by 
restating and applying a hierarchically-principled framework of criminalisation. It has 
narrowed the scope of public order (crimes) by eliminating some misconceptions and 
ambiguities regarding their scope.17 The summarised language of concepts and the adoption 
of a hierarchical approach to limiting criminalisation has certain advantages over Feinberg’s 
theory. The preliminary conclusions regarding the scope of public order crimes and the 
framework of limiting criminalisation remain to be elaborated in future work.18  
 
                                                          
14 It seems Feinberg overly focuses on harm and offence (see HTO and OTO) while Semesters and von Hirsch 
proportionately emphasise wrong (see CHW). The authors claim that they do not ‘allow the normative to 
take over’ (see A P Semester, Andreas von Hirsch, ‘On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation’ (2016) 
10 Crim LP 367, 377). This thesis embraces this position but it is doubtful whether, without hierarchical 
steps between two ends, they have done that.  
15 See HTO 204-06. 
16 ibid 205-06. 
17 Hopefully, laws on other crimes such as public safety crimes can also be elaborated in the hierarchical 
framework of limiting criminalisation. 
18 ‘Criminalisation is a central issue—may be the central issue—for criminal law and criminal theory.’ MMCL 
303. Principled criminalisation deserves more research than has thereto been undertaken. 
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